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Tonkin and Cochin-China (Vietnam) were never renowned as the principal markets of 
European companies, but as supplementary places and intermediaries in their East 
Asian trading networks in the seventeenth century. With the advantages of local 
products, especially silk which could serve the intra-Asian demand, and of geography 
which meant that it lay on the route between the south and mainland China, both Tonkin 
and Cochin-China attracted the Dutch, English and other foreign merchants to trade 
there during the seventeenth century. Vietnam epitomised how the English East India 
Company learned and adapted to the unfamiliar environment of overseas areas in the 
EIC’s first century of discovering and expanding in East Asia. The thesis shows the 
Company’s changes in key management on both personnel and factories; and in 
business making-decision which included investment, types of imported and exported 
commodities, and types of trading partners. They learnt lessons in how to establish a 
trading system in East Asia, how to use this network to serve the main aim of key 
markets in China, India, and to a lesser extent Japan throughout the seventeenth century. 
The thesis also examines the progress of the EIC in overseas trade in diplomacy as they 
understood more about local governments and the way to treat Confucian states to 
obtain privileges in trading and residing. Alongside a study of the lessons the EIC 
gained epitomised in this case study of Vietnam, the research also challenges the 
existing views about how the EIC used small factories or intermediaries in overseas 
trade and, highlights their role in the EIC’s commercial strategy in the seventeenth 
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1 English pound   = 20 shillings  = 240 pences 
1 Spanish dollar   = 8 reals/ rials 
    = 5 shillings 
    = 0.75 taels 
1 tael      = 6s 8d (1660-1760) 
    = 2,200 Tonkinese cash 





1 Chinese picul/ pecul  = 133.5 lb = 60.382 kg  = 100 catties 
1 catty    = 16 taels  
1 tael    = 37.5 gr = 0.0827 English pound 
1 English pound (lb)  = 0.454 kg 
1 English great pound (for raw silk)  = 0.681 kg 
 
Sources: P. Shepard, ‘The Spanish Dollar: The World’s most famous Silver Coin’, 
Business Historical Society. Bulletin of the Business Historical Society (pre-1986), 
1941, pp. 12-16; Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680. 
Vol. 2: Expansion and Crisis (New Haven, 1993), pp. 379-380; Chaudhuri, The Trading 







Amber, ambergris: A yellowish fossil resin used for ornaments; or the wax-like 
substance found floating in tropical seas  
Baa(s): Tonkin silk textile 
Baftas: a coarse to fine quality calico, usually dyed white and red, or less frequently 
black and blue, produced especially at Broach (Persian bafta ‘woven’) 
Baize: a coarse English woollen cloth 
Broadcloth: the traditional English heavy woollen cloth, between 28 and 30 yards long 
and 63 inches wide, weighing about 90 lbs 
Calambac: the finest kind of aloes wood, found in Champa 
Calio: a fine-textured cotton cloth from Malabar. The name derives from the town of 
Calicut 
Canvas: a coarse hempen cloth, occasionally used for outer clothing 
Capon: an officer, who worked like an assistant for the Prince in Tonkin in the 
seventeenth century. 
Catty: the anglicization of Malayo-Javanese kati, the term in typical use for the Chinese 
weight equivalent to 16 taels or 1 1/3 lbs (0.6 kg) 
China-root: the tuber of various species of Smilax, used medicinally and particularly 
valued as a cure for syphilis 
Chintz: a fine to superfine quality hand painted or block printer cotton cloth from the 
Coromandel Coast 
Chio(s): Tonkin silk textile 
Chious/ Chiourons: Tonkin wrought silk 
Chop: an official permit which was granted by the King of Tonkin or Cochin-China 
towards foreign merchants for trading in the whole country. 
Condrin: the anglicization of Malay kanduri, a term in typical use for one hundredth 
part of a tael 
Cossaes: a plain white muslin from Bengal  
Damask: a rich silken fabric, woven with designs and figures 
Dispatchadore: a Portuguese word, the definition of Tonkin’s officers, as intermediary 




Dungarees: a coarse plain white cotton cloth from South India and Masulipatam 
Gauze: a thin semi-transparent silk or cotton fabric 
Hockins/ Hockings: Tonkin yellow silk 
Indigo a dark blue dye made from the plant Indigofera tinctorial 
Lacquer: perhaps the most essentially Japanese art form, lacquer is a type of varnish 
derived from the sap of the tree Rhus vernicifera, native to China and Japan. Its main 
chemical constituent is called urushiol from the Japanese word for lacquer, urushi 
Lings/ Pelangs/ Pelings: Tonkin wrought silk 
Loas: Tonkin wrought silk 
Mas: a Malayo-Javanese word used by the Europeans to indicate one-tenth of the 
Chinese tael of silver 
Moorees: a plain white cotton cloth from South India and Masulipatam, used as a base 
for chintz making 
Musk: an odoriferous reddish-brown substance secreted in a gland by the male musk-
deer, used medicinally and in perfumery 
Pecul/ Picul: a Malay term used for the Chinese weight of 100 catties (1331/3 lbs or 
60.5 kg) 
Perpetuanos: a light English woollen cloth 
Quan/ Tonkin cash: Tonkinese money, 1 quan was equivalent to 600 coins 
Rial/ Real of eight: an anglicisation of the Spanish real de plata, the ‘pieces of eight’ of 
popular usage, equivalent to one-eighth of a Spanish dollar, or 61/2 pence 
Rixdollar: silver coin, was equivalent arounf 48-60 stivers (in the 1660s-1670s) 
Sandalwood: the wood of the fragrant Santalum album, used for incense and cosmetics, 
or of the non-odorous Pterocarpus santalina, used as dyestuff and for manufacturing 
small wooden articles 
Sappan wood: the red type dye wood of the Caesalpina sappan, also known as 
brazilwood 
Satin: a closely-woven silk fabric with a glossy face and a dull reverse 
Serasses: an Indian cotton cloth, perhaps from Surat 
Tale: Chinese unit of money and weight 
Velvet: a silk fabric with a thick soft pile 






This thesis examines the role of Vietnam in the English East India Company (EIC) 
strategy in the seventeenth century by viewing the complex trading interactions between 
the EIC and the two Vietnamese kingdoms of Tonkin and Cochin-China. It discusses 
how the experiences the EIC gathered in Vietnam moulded its future and were critical 
in helping it to develop an effective system for further development. The connections 
between the EIC and Vietnam are chosen for analysis because they typify complexities 
of the EIC changing and improving strategies towards East Asia, as it moved from 
cultivating free trade to using factories alongside diplomatic trade, and finally tried to 
establish colonies in the early eighteenth century or the progress from a single trading 
institution to a complex organization. The EIC experiences during the seventeenth 
century illustrate its initial engagement with two problematic issues. Firstly it was the 
issue of administration and personnel or of controlling overseas factories and servants. 
Secondly, it was the subject of driving distant trade independently and effectively 
including investment, imported and exported commodities, trading networks and the 
methods of stimulating overseas trade satisfactorily. In examining the case study of the 
EIC interactions in Vietnam this thesis reveals the importance of the seventeenth-
century trading dynamics, an understudied period in the EIC’s development. Via the 
above evidence, the thesis shows that the case of Vietnam is also significant as it 
examined the learning process the EIC had applied in both terms of management, 
diplomacy and trade. 
 The EIC connections with East Asia, including Tonkin and Cochin-China, 




merchants, Queen Elizabeth I founded the EIC by Royal Charter in 1600 as a joint-stock 
trading organisation with a monopoly to trade between Britain and Asia.1 Accessing 
East Asia was essential to the English because of the wealth of commodities there, 
particularly spices, textiles, ceramics, and sugar. The Company undertook several 
voyages and established depots and factories in the area in its first decades of trading. 
Lacking expertise in trading, however, the EIC was unable to take a leading position in 
East Asia before the 1650s although the English attempted to expand from Bantam to 
Japan and other places in China Sea in the 1610s.2 The Company’s revived interest in 
East Asia developed after the 1650s with a renewed desire to trade with Japan and 
China which led to the creation of intermediate factories in Siam, Vietnam, and Taiwan. 
Moreover, until the late century and early eighteenth century, the English considered 
Cochin-China with military and colonial views as it built a garrison in southern 
Vietnam to control the South China Sea. The subject of this thesis relates to only one 
location among several possible choices where the Company attempted to establish 
branches to take part in the intra-Asian trade and gain access to China and Japan. The 
role of Vietnam in the EIC strategy, however, is under-studied and little known. The 
thesis thus tries to provide an important case study of the way in which the EIC learned 
from such engagements as it moved from a heavy reliance on individuals and agents to 
developing factories through diplomatic and commercial activities, and eventually to 
colonial ambitions in the seventeenth century. 
                                                             
1 W. Foster, ‘England’s quest of Eastern Trade’, in P. Tuck (ed.), The East India Company, 1600- 1858 
(London and New York, 1998), pp. 144-153; K.N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company: The 
study of an Early Joint Stock Company, 1600-1640 (London, 1965), pp. 10-13. 
2 D.K. Bassett, ‘The Trade of the English East India Company in the Far East, 1623-84, part 1: 1623-
1665’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 92 (1960), pp. 32-47; J. Keay, 




Figure. Timeline of the EIC activities in Vietnam (1614-1705) 
 
Vietnam, like other countries in East Asia, experienced a ‘long-term crisis period’ of 
tumultuous transition with long-drawn-out conflicts and changing dynasties. 3  From 
1627, Vietnam divided into two parts: Đàng Ngoài (Northern Vietnam) which means 
‘outside region’ (named Tonkin/Tonking/Tonqueen by European traders), and Đàng 
Trong (Southern Vietnam) which means ‘inside region’ (termed Cochin-China). The 
appearance of the new kingdom of Cochin-China prompted a distinct shift in 
Vietnamese history, especially with regards to its diplomatic and commercial policies 
towards Europeans. Vietnamese rulers opened the kingdoms and invited foreigners to 
trade to find a political alliance and external supports, with the hope of importing 
                                                             
3 W.S. Atwell, ‘A Seventeenth-Century General Crisis in East Asia?’, Modern Asian Studies, 4 (1990), 
pp. 661-682; R.V. Glahn, ‘Myth and Reality of China’s Seventeenth-Century Monetary Crisis’ The 
Journal of Economic History, 2 (1996), pp. 429-454; G. Parker, Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and 
Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven & London, 2013); A. Reid, ‘The Seventeenth-
Century Crisis in Southeast Asia’, Modern Asian Studies, 24 (1990), pp. 639-659; Southeast Asia in the 
Age of Commerce 1450-1680, vol. 2, Expansion and Crisis (New Haven and London, 1993), pp. 202-266; 
A.T. Hoàng, Silk for Silver: Dutch-Vietnamese Relations, 1637-1700, chapter I, (Leiden 2007); D.P. 
Nguyễn, ‘Việt Nam thời Mạc-Cuộc chiến không khoan nhượng giữa hai tập đoàn phong kiến Lê-Trịnh và 
Mạc’ [Vietnam in the Mạc period-The Remorseless Struggle between the Lê-Trịnh and the Mạc feudal 
clans], Historical Studies, 9 (2004). Vietnam’s political crisis launched when Mạc Đăng Dung supplanted 
Lê dynasty and established Mạc dynasty in 1527. This led to the Southern-Northern wars (1533-1592) 
between dynasties of Mạc and late Lê. The political schisms continuously caused the Trịnh – Nguyễn 




modern technologies and improving their domestic economy. 4  The Portuguese and 
Dutch quickly grasped the opportunity provided by new policies while the EIC arrived 
into Vietnam in different and harder times.5 
 The English established their first foothold in Tonkin and Cochin-China in the 
1610s, before the outbreak of the Trinh-Nguyen wars (1627-1672). The Company’s 
enterprise in Tonkin (1672-1697) and their renewed presence in Cochin-China in the 
1690s occurred when there was a pause in the Vietnamese wars and local demands for 
European military and capital support were reduced. From the Vietnamese viewpoint, 
the English appeared at inappropriate times, when the opportunity to engage with 
Vietnam was limited as the relative peace meant that the Vietnamese had less need of 
foreign assistance, especially Tonkin returned to the hard policy towards foreigners. 
Consequently, it was harder for the EIC to form relationships with Vietnam than it had 
been for other Europeans in the first half of the seventeenth century. 
The main argument of the thesis is around the place of Vietnam in the EIC 
strategy in East Asia in the seventeenth century. English activities in Tonkin and 
Cochin-China in this century provide a rich, but largely neglected example of the 
Company’s changing strategies and learning in management, relationships, commodity 
substitutions, trading networks and the factory system. During this period, it developed 
from a nascent company into a full-fledged international trading enterprise.6 As the 
                                                             
4 Nguyễn Văn Kim (ed.), Vietnam in the commercial system of Asia, 16th and 17th centuries (Hanoi, 
2007).  
5 G.B. Souza, The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea, 
1630-1754 (Cambridge, 1986), p. 113; T.H. Nguyen, ‘The Paracels and the Portuguese navigators in the 
sixteenth century’, Science Journal, 3 (1998), pp. 30-42; S. Sanjay, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 
1500-1700: a Political and Economic History (London, 1993); Hoang, Silk for Silver, pp. 52, 61-96. 
6  K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660-1760 




characteristic of writing Vietnamese history in the early modern period and the lack of 
primary materials from Vietnamese perspective (see next part), the thesis tries to 
highlight the role of Vietnam in the EIC strategy from the view of the English by 
analysing primary serouces of the EIC. There are three main issues; the change in the 
EIC administration in the Tonkin factory, the role of individuals (English factors and 
partly Vietnamese rulers, traders) in helping the EIC to trade successfully in Tonkin, 
and the place of Vietnam as an intermediary in the EIC trading network in East Asia. It 
means that the thesis evaluates the role of Vietnam by seeing the EIC process of 
learning, adapting and improving in the seventeenth century. 
The case of Vietnam firstly illustrates the fact that London in the seventeenth 
century could not easily control the EIC distant factories and servants although the 
Court of Directors applied various approaches. Due to the lack of experience in the 
overseas trade, early in the century, the EIC advocated hiring skilled staff to serve in 
East Asia and granted them privileges to drive trade independently. These individuals 
secured the Company’s influence in East Asia and supplied knowledge of commerce, 
commodities and diplomacy to London. However, since this policy created a problem of 
private trade and illegal cooperation (which did not prioritise the Company’s interest), 
the EIC subsequently tried to limit the role of agents and re-organised their system in 
overseas areas.7 Illegal cooperation in the thesis is defined as the secretive and behind 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Bromley and E.H. Kossman (eds.), Britain and the Netherlands in Europe and Asia (London, 1968), pp. 
89-109; E. Erikson and P. Bearman, ‘Malfeasance and the Foundations for Global Trade: The Structure of 
English Trade in the East Indies, 1601-1833’, American Journal of Sociology, 112 (2006), pp. 195-230. 
7 From 1662, Englishmen who worked with the EIC could make their own trade with Asia if they would 
not negatively affect and highly compete with the EIC’s trade. P.J. Marshall, Trade and Conquest: 
Studies on the Rise of British Dominance in India (Aldershot, 1993), p. 279; E. Erikson, Between 
Monopoly and Free Trade: The English East India Company, 1600-1757 (Princeton and Oxford, 2014), 




the scenes collaborations between overseas staff in the same or different factories, or 
between the Company’s staff with local people for their own purpose such as obtaining 
personal power in distant areas, using the Company’s capital for their own trade, and 
then creating a private trading network between factories to compete with the EIC 
commerce. The EIC in the seventeenth century was not a stable organisation, but an 
unstable one with the involvement of different groups of merchants with distinct aims 
and targets. For that reason, the Court of Directors in London never controlled the 
overseas factories satisfactorily. Issues of management were evident in the struggle 
between London and Bantam (the EIC’s commercial hub in East Asia from 1602 to 
1682) and Madras (which managed the EIC’s trade in East Asia after Bantam was 
closed, especially from 1684), and in the conflict between Tonkin factors resulting in 
the EIC final failure in restricting the interference of distant agents. The thesis reveals 
the changing interrelationship between central management and overseas factories and 
particularly the attempts and process the Court of Directors tried to manage its factories 
and servants directly and effectively. Thus, via the case of the Tonkin factory, the thesis 
argues how small factories countributed to the EIC structure in the seventeenth century 
and how the Company changed its way of management to become the most powerful 
organisation in the next century. 
Secondly, each chapter of the thesis discusses the critical roles played by 
individuals (including English overseas servants and Vietnamese people) to the EIC 
establishment and expansion in long-distant areas and how that role changed throughout 
the seventeenth century. Focusing on knowledge transfer and the role of ‘agency’, ‘go-
betweens’, ‘brokers’ and ‘informants’, the study shows how the EIC gained diplomatic 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
English East India Company at Bantam, 1602-1682’ (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of 




and trading knowledge via the connections between English factors and Vietnamese 
people, even Chinese, Japanese and Dutch merchants in Vietnam and East Asia. 
Towards English overseas servants, their role was in collecting and providing 
knowledge, relationships, trading networks and commodities, and settling and 
maintaining the EIC position. Individuals became significant because of the EIC’s 
weakness, its lack of information about overseas areas and its desire to obtain trading 
advantages. Individuals were encouraged to join existing regional networks and act 
independently to resolve these problems. 8  In Vietnam, English factors created 
knowledgeable accounts of the region at different periods and from different 
perspectives. For example, the first English presence in Cochin-China and Tonkin in the 
1610s was organised by factors from the Hirado factory (Japan), especially Richard 
Cocks and William Adams, rather than on London’s instructions. That role was moved 
to Bantam agents before the English established factories in East Asia in the 1670s. 
While the Court of Directors in London had limited knowledge about the region, the 
Bantam Council (especially in the 1650s and 1660s) provided useful guidance about 
potential go-betweens. After the establishment of the Tonkin factory, English factors 
there played a leading role in collecting knowledge, creating relationships, and 
understanding trading networks and commodity substitution to maintain the factory as 
the EIC had no direct connection with mainland China and had failed in Japan.  
                                                             
8 A. Games, The Web of Empire, English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660 (Oxford, 
2008), pp. 84, 93; N.P. Dhiravat, ‘The Voyages of the ‘Sea Adventure’ to Ayutthaya, 1615-1618: The 
English East India Company and its Siam-Japan trade’, International Journal of the history of European 
expansion and global interaction (Itinerario), 45 (2013), pp. 50-69; D. Massarella, A World Elsewhere: 
Europe’s Encounter with Japan in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New Haven and London, 




Beyond that, the thesis also explores contributions of Vietnamese officials and 
merchants in the EIC improvement in the seventeenth century or the origins of 
information, knowledge the EIC gained in Tonkin and how the EIC adapted in 
diplomacy and trade from contacting with Vietnamese people. These people included 
the King, local Mandarins, traders, brokers, and even interpreters who contacted with 
the English daily. Their support, their trade, or even their requirements in connecting 
with the English provided the EIC fundamental knowledge of the necessity of 
diplomacy or trading lessons. The thesis, particularly in the last three chapters thus 
shows the role of Vietnamese people in shaping the EIC’s knowledge about 
commodities, trading network, and diplomacy. Understanding the nature of distant 
countries proved challenging and required the involvement of the Court of Directors, 
agents in the area and factors in Vietnam. The first alteration of English understanding 
was in their diplomatic approach to Vietnamese governments, especially the Trinh 
regime in Tonkin, which applied a hard policy towards foreigners. The daily connection 
between the EIC and Mandarins in Tonkin helped the English to choose the right people 
in Vietnam, and further right power in the region, with which to build strong diplomatic 
relationships. The EIC changing commercial strategy and activities in Tonkin 
demonstrates their understanding of diplomatic protocols. Moreover, with data from 
Bantam agents who themselves learned lessons from the Dutch, the EIC tried to build 
their intercontinental trade network via Tonkin, by exploiting the model of silk-silver 
trade between Tonkin and Japan, linking Tonkin with Siam, Macao, and Manila, and 
creating a Eurasian silk trade between Tonkin and London. The change in investment, 
commodities, and trading partners was created firstly by the English in Tonkin through 




adapted to the requirements of distant markets. That knowledge had a significant role in 
bringing about the EIC’s changes in the next century regarding both diplomacy and 
overseas trade.  
Thirdly, this thesis argues that the EIC use of Vietnam as an intermediary to link 
with Japan and mainland China reflected the importance of small elements in its 
overseas trading network or the place of Vietnam in the EIC commercial system in East 
Asia. It shows how the EIC exploited small and supportive elements to serve its primary 
aim and highlights the importance of the EIC system of factories in supporting its 
ambitions for long-distance trade. The thesis argues that in the first period of the EIC 
history, using small factories in the South China Sea was an effective way to secure the 
EIC expansion and influence in the area as they could not contact directly with key 
markets. Tonkin and Cochin-China were necessary as intermediaries due to their 
geography, and their ability to link with Japanese and Chinese merchants and to provide 
substitute goods for regional trade. Due to the growing threat of piracy, from the mid-
sixteenth century, China prevented Chinese merchants from trading with Japan. In the 
seventeenth century, the political crisis with the wars between the Manchu and the 
Ming, and then the Qing Maritime Ban in 1655 undermined all overseas trade from 
China. The policy prohibited all Chinese merchants from going abroad and refused all 
foreign merchants the right to trade in mainland China except for neighbours in East 
Asia who participated in the traditional tributary system. For that reason, the 
maintenance of formal trade under the tributary system between China and Southeast 
Asia and the existence of private trade was essential for regional trading. Trading ports 
in the South China Sea became the primary channel for Europeans to contact with 




Edict of 1635’ restricted the EIC’s opportunities as it allowed only Chinese and Dutch 
salesmen to call at Nagasaki for trading. These disadvantages required the Company to 
cultivate intermediary sites in the South China Sea such as Vietnam, Siam, and Taiwan 
to link with Japanese and Chinese merchants. This study thus reveals the importance of 
intermediate sites and the interdependence of both key and small markets within the 
EIC East Asian trading chain. However, the role of Vietnam or other supplementary 
markets in East Asia was short-lived in periods when the EIC was difficult to trade 
directly with Japan and China. These intermediate sites were never part of the EIC’s 
main strategy and only existed until the late seventeenth century. In the next century, 
go-between sites became worthless as direct long-distance trade among Europe, India 
and China developed. Yet the EIC use of intermediary sites, merchants and markets in 
the seventeenth century and their investment in the factory system, illustrates their 
creative and dynamic responses to an ever-changing political and economic landscape.  
Alongside the above arguments, the thesis also tries to demonstrate that the 
limitation of the EIC’s commercial and diplomatic relations with Tonkin and Cochin-
China reflected its weakness in competing with Asian and European rivals, the main 
reason of the EIC using seasoned staffs to drive its trade in East Asia. The EIC was 
financially and militarily weak, which restricted its ability to compete with its chief 
rival, the Dutch East India Company (VOC). 9  Before 1657, the EIC worked with 
                                                             
9 H. Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800 (Oxford, 1976); L. Neal, ‘The Dutch and 
English East India Companies Compared: Evidence from the Stock and Foreign Exchange Markets’ in 
J.D. Tracy (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-
1750 (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 195-223; D.A. Irwin, ‘Mercantilism as Strategic Trade Policy: the Anglo-
Dutch Rivalry for the East India Trade’, Journal of Political Economy, 99 (1991), pp. 1296-1314. Furber 
explained that before 1657 the EIC existed with separate investors, ‘terminable joint stock’ and therefore 




temporary investments, which only allowed for individual voyages to East Asia.10 The 
EIC created a trading joint-stock with permanent capital after receiving a new Charter in 
1657, but until 1684 the Dutch still dominated Asian trade.11 The limitations produced 
by the EIC’s financial position thus restricted English activities in Vietnam. In the 
1610s, Cochin-China and Tonkin were chosen as places untouched by the Dutch as they 
had focused on dominating Batavia and the Spice Islands. After the closure of the 
Hirado factory and the 1623 Massacre in Amboyna, the EIC decisions to stop trading 
with Japan, Siam, Vietnam and to maintain only the position of Bantam were 
unavoidable.12 Later in the century, their position was always shaped by the activities of 
the Dutch and Chinese in Tonkin. 13  Moreover, it was difficult for the English to 
compete with the Chinese, the traditional traders in Tonkin who had the support of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
organization.’ He even argued that the EIC was only power in the eighteenth century since it was 
becoming a government. 
10 Chaudhuri, The EIC, p. 22; Furber, Rival Empires, pp. 188, 192; P.D. Zwart, ‘Globalization in the 
Early Modern Era: New Evidence from the Dutch-Asiatic Trade, c.1600-1800’, The Journal of Economic 
History, 76 (2016), pp. 520-558, p. 521. The EIC’s investment in the separate voyages (1600-1613) was 
more than £500,000; while only the second joint-stock was above £1 million, the rest was around 
£400,000. Until 1630, the EIC invested £2,887,000 while the VOC always maintained the capital of 
6,424,578 guilders throughout its history. Furthermore, from 1600 to 1800, forty-nine per cent of 
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38, 79-88, 268-271. Furber argued that the Dutch power in Asia lasted until 1713 and only from the mid-
eighteenth century, the EIC rose its position in both India and China. 
12 D. Massarella, ‘Ticklish Points: The English East India Company and Japan, 1621’, Journal of the 
Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland, 11 (2001), pp. 43-50. 
13 IOR/G/12/17/1, Tonqueen factory 1672, p. 42a; IOR/G/12/17/2, Tonqueen factory 1672–1676, p. 121a. 
The English always received silks with higher price than the Chinese and Dutch got. In detail, they only 
got 13,5 taels weight of silk for 1 tael of silver plate while the Dutch had 15 tales weight of silk in 




Tonkin Court. Chinese traders were also popular and powerful in the South China Sea 
before the appearance of Europeans.14 It was they and the Dutch who monopolised the 
profitable silk-trade between Japan and Tonkin.15 As a result, the EIC had to cooperate 
with the Chinese for their regional trading future.16 Due to the EIC weakness of both 
trading knowledge, military and financial issues, the EIC had little choice to use 
experienced servants in compete with its rivals and expand the EIC position in East 
Asia. 
In conclusion, the thesis’s purpose is to illustrate and clarify the place of 
Vietnam in helping the EIC to gather information and understand more the trading and 
diplomatic environment in East Asia to adapt and improve over the seventeenth century. 
This thesis not only supports previous research about the EIC trade in East Asia 
(including its attempts to manage the long-distance commerce, and its structural 
revolutions) but also challenges received knowledge about the role of individuals, small 
factory, small market in the intra-Asian trading system and how the EIC learned and 
adapted to distant trade. By charting the EIC attempts to trade, to establish factories, to 
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cultivate formal relationships and to create a colony in Vietnam, the thesis reveals how 
the EIC evolved to become the most powerful trading company of the eighteenth 
century. 
Previous studies about the EIC, its trade in East Asia and Vietnam, particularly 
with the terms of new imperial history and transnational history have provided us with 
the fundamental knowledge of why the Company became involved in the intra-Asian 
trade including in Vietnam, and the role of information and carriers in social networks. 
This information was critical in constructing and developing the study’s main 
arguments. The thesis, however, challenges previous studies by exploring new sources 
of the EIC’s records related to the Company’s situation in East Asia in the seventeenth 
century, a crucial period in the Company’s historical development but until now largely 
ignored in the literature. The thesis will now focus on that literature and begin with an 
exploration of the EIC studies in terms of transnational and new imperial histories. 
 
The English East India Company, transnational and new imperial histories 
 
Philip Stern argues that since the mid-twentieth century, there have been a growing 
number of studies about the EIC, under terms of the new imperialism, globalisation, 
border-crossing, and transnationalism. 17  Generally, the appearance of new imperial 
history and transnational history created various perspectives, more imaginative way of 
connecting micro and macro levels in researching the history of the EIC and British 
Empire with different subjects of culture, gender, race, class, political thought, 
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mobility.18 Following other scholarship studied ‘small history’ or ‘micro-scale’, this 
thesis focused on the case of a small factory, market and overseas factors in Vietnam to 
provide new way of seeing the connection, network in the EIC strategy in the 
seventeenth century and particularly the role of ‘micro subject’ in the EIC history.19 
Regarding the ‘imperial turn’ and ‘new imperial history’, studies about the EIC consider 
subjects related to the role of the seventeenth century in the Company’s history, cultural 
empire, personal relationship or social network during the EIC development.20 In detail, 
on macro level, the thesis studies a connection of the EIC and Vietnam in the East Asian 
trading networks while on micro level that was a personal relationship between English 
factors, and between English overseas servants and Vietnamese people and the ways in 
which these affected politics and trade, or the ways in which Vietnamese individuals 
informed and taught the English diplomatic and trading knowledge. 
 If previous studies before the 1990s ruptured sharply the two different periods of 
the EIC, ‘age of trade’, and ‘age of empire’, recent research focused more on the EIC’s 
transformation in the late seventeenth century and the role the first period played in the 
improvement history of the EIC. The seventeenth-century EIC engaged closely with the 
first British Empire as it was the time of commercial and industrial expansion with 
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global networks and good exchange or a ‘forebear of the modern joint-stock’ with 
subjectivities of relation markets, networks, capitalism.21  From the late seventeenth 
century, the EIC had transformed its characteristic from ‘empire of liberty’ to imperial 
power with several military activities in Asia.22  The seventeenth-century Company 
history is thus notable as a ‘future colonial state’, ‘a harbinger of global capitalism’, and 
‘a form of early modern body politic’.23 Moreover, research about the EIC military 
history demonstrates that the English gradually paid attention to protect their influence 
and territorial expansion in Asia from the early seventeenth century. 24  Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam noted that the Company was a political actor from its beginning in both 
England and Asia.25 Ian Bruce Watson argues that the defensive fortification and force 
played important role in the Company’s history.26 By evidences from the EIC activities 
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in India, Sumatra, and St Helena, previous studies of Stern, David Veevers, Peter J. 
Marshall argue that from the 1680s the EIC changed its way of contact in the 
relationship with Asian countries and the history of the EIC was not only considered in 
term of commerce but also imperialism and that the Company-fiscal state was original 
from the late seventeenth century.27 Focusing deeply about the transformation of the 
EIC commercial or pre-imperial phase, James Vaughn argues that, until the 1680s the 
EIC transformation was remarkable as it considered widespread issues of fortifications, 
settlements, military affairs, administration rather than the issue of trade with Asia.28 As 
such, previous studies about the EIC connection with India (partly Sumatra, Bencoolen 
or St Helena) expressed the crucial role of the seventeenth century in the EIC history, 
particularly its transformation from ‘age of trade’ to ‘age of empire’ in the late century. 
Noticeably, most of the above scholarship concerned this idea in the EIC link with 
India, its main aim of trade with large factories, fortifications and settlements in 
Madras, Bombay and Bengal. It shows the fact that scholarships have paid more 
attention to the seventeenth-century EIC, but still with large markets. The broad 
question is whether small markets and factories could contribute to the seventeenth-
century EIC history, particularly in term of trading network. The thesis about the 
British-Vietnamese relationship thus tries to reveal the contribution of the seventeenth-
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century EIC small factories, particularly in the South China Sea. Beyond studies about 
the EIC transformation, the case of Vietnam shows that the EIC evolution also 
happened in small point as Vietnam, and it is a much more complex story in the EIC 
history.  
 The growth of transnational history in nearly decades also provides new ways of 
considering the history of EIC as networks and connections are treated as central in 
research and micro subject or individuals are focused deeply. As can be seen, the EIC 
was a key arena for transnational history with connections in both macro and micro 
scales and transoceanic flows of goods, ideas, thought and people.29  
 On the macro level, previous studies have paid attention to the EIC connection 
with potential markets in Asia and identified the core success of the EIC in the 
relationship between London and overseas factories. Kriti N. Chaudhuri, Michael 
Pearson and Sinnappah Arasaratnam view the EIC in the connection with the Indian 
Ocean.30 Those scholarships argue that the EIC success was in the connection with 
Asia, especially India and its activities were mostly conducted there. Alongside the 
Eurasian trade, Holden Furber and David Bassett demonstrate that the EIC also 
involved in connections of the intra-Asian trade, or even the private ‘country trade’ 
system. 31  Previous studies also demonstrate that London’s lack of resources on 
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proximity to become core or persuade overseas factories. They thus raised the questions 
of ‘distant sites of empire’ or the role of distant factories in the EIC history.32 These 
connections were not run by the Court of Minutes in London, but by overseas factors or 
agencies in Asia who lived in the networks of kinship or friendship. It might be a 
connection between distant factories in Asia or between those factories and savant 
institutions in London as Emily Erikson and Anna Winterbottom argue.33 Remarkably, 
those studies mostly still focus on India (or other potential markets in East Asia such as 
China, Japan, Bantam – see next part) as it was the EIC key markets with rich and 
explicit evidence for both macro and micro connection. The appearance of Siam or the 
Malay States in the private trading networks from Madras or Bengal was limited with 
little function and it was hard to generalise the role of small markets in the EIC 
commercial strategy in Asia, particularly East Asia. 
 On the small scale of connection, there are quite a lot of studies about personal 
relationship and roles of individuals who worked directly in Asia and contributed 
information, knowledge, experience to the EIC during its evolution process. As the 
previous mention, the EIC believed in its distant factors and agents in both the learning 
process and understanding the nature of trade in Asia in the seventeenth century. As a 
result, alongside studies about individuals in London, studies of Kathleen Wilson, 
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Stephen Howe, Alison Games and Miles Ogborn have argued that the British colonial 
progress should be concerned from ‘periphery’ or ‘overseas’ and in the connection of 
‘sub-imperialism’ or ‘man on the spot’ who had ‘global lives’.34 It is no matter that they 
were officials or private merchants, but their role was important towards the EIC 
expansion and connection in Asia as their family and trading networks helped the EIC 
to maintain the influence and commercial profit.35 Bayly has focuses more on the role of 
overseas individuals by analysing the issues of creation and transmission of knowledge 
while Winterbottom looked at the role of ‘go-between’ or brokers with the idea of 
‘native informants’ from postcolonial theorists.36 It is obvious that the above studies 
have paid attention to the role of individuals and their network in gathering information 
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and providing the EIC with their knowledge and experience. 37  By focusing on 
‘uncovering connections’ between individuals, this study shows how the Company 
learned and adapted new trading environment in the seventeenth century via the 
personal relationship between English overseas servants and Vietnamese people.38 
 However, apart from a small study of Winterbottom about Samuel Baron in 
Tonkin, other works about networks of individuals have largely centred on people in 
India or their activities in the Indian Ocean. Did English factors in small factories and 
local people there contribute to the EIC enterprise? This thesis examines personal 
relationship between English overseas factors and local people in both Tonkin and 
Cochin-China to view broadly linkages between the EIC and Vietnam in the first 
century of the Company and the ways in which those relationship affected the EIC. In 
doing so it shows that the EIC improvement and expansion was original from distant 
factors, not from the Court of Directors in London. Their role was not only bounded in 
gathering information of diplomacy, commodities, trading network but also transferring 
that information from overseas area to London to supply the EIC useful knowledge and 
partly self-deciding important activities of the Company in Asia. The connections 
between the EIC and Vietnam in the seventeenth century was not exactly the connection 
between London and Vietnam, but between the overseas English factors and 
Vietnamese rulers, mandarins, traders, and other local people. The thesis is not a study 
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of political relations, but rather of cultural and social connections, to show how the EIC 
learned and adapted from the East Asian trading environment via the role of individuals. 
 
The English East India Company in East Asia  
 
Regarding the EIC’s presence in East Asia in the seventeenth century, previous studies 
focus on two main subjects: its weakness and insufficient experience in comparison 
with rivals, and its connections with potential markets in the area. Chaudhuri, Niels 
Steensgaard, Leonard Blussé have argued that the EIC, despite being a multinational 
firm and one of the first joint-stock organisations in the world, was poorly financed and 
weak in military capability in its first century.39 Due to a lack of invested capital, the 
Company focused mostly on trade and did not have any powerful armed-land forces 
until 1660.40 Accordingly, Douglas Irwin and Femme Gaastra argued that this century 
was a difficult period for the EIC to compete with the Portuguese or Dutch.41 The 
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Company met with little success and found it difficult to maintain its presence in the 
South China Sea with the closure of Japan factory in 1621, the Amboyna Masscrace of 
1623 and later the closure of factories in Cambodia, Siam, Taiwan (from the 1650s to 
the 1680s) and above all with the withdrawal of the commercial hub, Bantam in 1682. 
While the Portuguese and the Dutch Companies often used military methods to 
establish their position in the Asian trading world, the EIC mostly pursued a free and 
peaceful trade policy and avoided direct fighting against other Europeans in the early 
seventeenth century. As a result, the Portuguese and the Dutch founded colonies early in 
Asia, and the VOC became the most influential European company in East Asia in the 
seventeenth century.42 By examining the English presence in both Tonkin and Cochin-
China, this thesis argues that the EIC’s weakness in the seventeenth century was a fact, 
but it always tries to learn and improve itself through contacting with regional 
merchants and other European traders. That the EIC learnt from its successful rivals in 
this period was repeated in instructions of Directors to servants and was one of the ways 
the EIC borrowed and adapted with the new commercial environment in Asia.43 
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 Together with the EIC’s weakness in long-distant trade, previous studies focus 
on the EIC problems of connections between London and overseas factories and 
servants in terms of trading system, administration, employment of workers and 
collaboration during its overseas trading expansion.44 Huw Bowen demonstrates that 
there were several groups of English merchants received Charters from the Kings and 
parliaments to trade in Asia in the seventeenth century, and even the EIC was unstable 
with different groups as well until 1709.45 The research uses the administration of the 
Tonkin factory to examine the issue of ‘malfeasance’ or ‘corruption’ in the employment 
of principal-agents.46 On the one hand, Chaudhuri, V. K. Seth, Niall Ferguson, and 
E.L.J. Coornaert argue that these factors were out of the control of London and that 
private trade was egregious and dangerous for the EIC due to the issues of timing and 
distance of the overseas trade.47 Moreover, David Veevers and Winterbottom show that 
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London lacked resources to manage overseas factors and distant factories, factors were 
important towards the trading and political development of the EIC.48 Recently, Erikson 
asserts that London’s attempts to control overseas factories and forts were not always 
successful due to the overseas social networks or the connections between factors, 
factories in Asia.49 Anna M. Carlos and Stephen Nicholas through a comparative case 
study of Hudson’s Bay Company argue that problems of agents were not serious and 
Santhi Hejeebu, Furber insist that permitting private trade was an efficient approach to 
control opportunism and expand the English position in Asia.50 Furthermore, a study by 
Sefarin D. Quiason about the ‘country trade’ or triangular trade in the South China Sea 
continuously backs the importance of private commerce for the EIC trading future in the 
area.51  
 Building on the findings of the above research, this thesis highlights the case of 
Vietnam to show that the EIC employment of experienced men in overseas trading was 
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a successful innovation although it created a few problems for the Company’s overseas 
trade. The use of experienced individuals greatly contributed to the EIC expansion in 
East Asia as these employees provided London with knowledge and information about 
overseas trade, settled and drove that trade, and built relationships with distant 
countries. In some periods, the EIC depended heavily on the overseas factors to address 
trade matters. The case of the Tonkin factory reveals that it was the powers of overseas 
factors and issues of distance and timing in the monsoon trade which often prevented 
London from effectively managing outlying branches and staff. The power of the 
Bantam Council over the Tonkin factory and the struggle between Tonkin servants 
indicate that until the late seventeenth century, English servants in East Asia were 
beyond the control of London. They consequently dealt in both Company and private 
trade being one of the main reasons leading to the ineffective trade and ultimate closure 
of the Tonkin factory in 1697. 
 Researching the EIC appearance in East Asia was still unbalanced as it mostly 
focuses on the EIC connections with leading markets. If India was mainly focused in 
Asia broadly, China, Japan and Indonesia became the main subject of historians in their 
concerning in East Asia.52 Going beyond, Andre G. Frank considered China as the main 
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emergence of the world economy in the early modern period and the activities of 
European companies were to focus on this market.53 By contrast, the small markets of 
Siam, Taiwan, Cambodia and Vietnam have received far less research attention and 
under a term of an experimentation. 54  The few studies to draw attention to these 
markets, such as those of Antony Farrington, Bassett, John Keay, have argued that these 
markets could not cater for the English demand completely.55 As a result, their role in 
the regional trading system is also little remarkable. Those small factories were short-
lived, and their function was only considered in the link with Japan, Bantam or China as 
the EIC faced difficulties in trading directly with those main markets. Significantly, 
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Vietnam was mentioned as a supplementary place in the regional trade, but it is rarely 
examined in-depth.56  
 Overall, the research about the EIC in East Asia in the seventeenth century 
provides us with useful insights about the EIC’s major concern with key markets and its 
problems in the long-distant trade. However, the seventeenth-century EIC in East Asia 
was mostly narrated in a single relation, in activities of ‘mere merchants’ and did not 
show the links between regional markets. The appearance of factories in Hirado, Siam, 
Cambodia, Taiwan was researched independently as experimentation and with different 
roles, not really in a trading network. Certainly, existing studies have not shown 
precisely the importance of the trading system around the primary market and how the 
EIC learned and operated overseas trade from this network. Previous studies show that 
the period 1600-1680 was an ‘experimental period’ of the EIC, but it was viewed 
through the progress the EIC tried to enlarge its markets, not to link those together. It 
also did not show the improvement of the EIC in the seventeenth century from free 
trade to semi-state by the late century. By focusing on small markets in East Asia in this 
research and the links between the intra-Asian trade, the thesis’ contribution is to clarify 
the role of intermediaries and how much the EIC needed small branches to serve its 
main trading goals in East Asia, and to build the EIC’s regional trading network in East 
Asia through connecting small factories with significant markets. Moreover, the study 
views the relations between markets in East Asia and the way capital was transferred in 
the EIC’s trading network. It means that study the British-Vietnamese relationship in 
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the seventeenth century provides more evidence about the way the English tried to 
create commercial chains in East Asia, to adapt with regional markets and to learn from 
its successful rivals to develop in the competition with its rivals. 
   
Tonkin, Cochin-China and the East Asian trading world  
 
Previous studies have established two critical features of the East Asian trading system; 
the central position of the two leading markets of China and Japan, and the attraction of 
Southeast Asian countries in the regional network in the seventeenth century. The South 
China Sea was seen as the equivalent of the Mediterranean Sea for connecting 
merchants of the world.57 Importantly, scholars such as Hall Kenneth, Ambra Calo, Ian 
C. Glover not only consider Southeast Asia as an intermediary but one of the most 
attractive commercial areas from the ancient and medieval periods with trading links 
with China, Japan, India, and Central Asia.58 Geoff Wade argues that Southeast Asia 
experienced the early commercial period (900-1300), and Anthony Reid uses the term 
‘age of commerce’ to describe the overseas trading development in Southeast Asia in 
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the period 1450-1680.59 They also present the trading potential of Southeast Asian from 
its valuable exported commodities included spices, silks, sugar, ceramic, and its 
commercial networks in the early modern period.60 Studies about China’s trading world 
stress the foundation of China’s trade with its neighbours in term of ‘tributary’ where 
China works as a centre and other markets are as peripheries.61 Chinese merchants 
expanded their trade around the South China Sea and built their communities in popular 
commercial areas from the late fifteenth century, and those connections were essential 
for the development of supplementary ports in the South China Sea.62 Besides China, 
Japan was another key economy in East Asia from the period of the Tokugawa Shogun 
in the late sixteenth century.63 However, the political crisis in China from the mid-
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sixteenth century leading to the restricted policy towards overseas trade and the 
Japanese edict of 1635 created a new chance for the development of supportive markets 
in Southeast Asia as Chinese and Japanese merchants still engaged in the regional trade 
in the South China Sea privately and illegally.64 In the thesis, Japan and China were the 
main EIC targets in East Asia respectively during the seventeenth century. Japan was 
considered to supply the EIC large amount of silver while China would be the leading 
market of European goods and supplier of luxury commodities exporting to Europe 
such as silk, musk, gold, particularly in the late seventeenth century. The EIC demand 
to trade with Japan and China became the main reasons created the appearance of 
Vietnam as a supplementary factor or intermediary in the EIC regional trading chain. 
The English factory and activities in Vietnam were dependent on their situation in 
China and Japan while the EIC need the place of Vietnam to connect with Japan and 
China in the extant trading system.  
 Studies about Vietnam in the early modern period provide a useful point of 
departure for examining the reasons the EIC chose Vietnam to figure in its commercial 
strategy in the seventeenth century and to investigate how the EIC learned from 
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Vietnam’s situation. From the 1960s and 1970s, American scholars such as Alexander 
Woodside and John K. Whitmore viewed Vietnam as a Chinese political model.65 
Vietnam was conceived as a culturally advanced state and a central kingdom 
surrounded by barbarians who had to send a royal tribute to Vietnam to establish a 
formal relation.66 Chinese influence was the main reason for Tonkin’s unwelcoming 
policy towards foreigners in some periods, especially after the Trinh-Nguyen wars. 
Those studies about the influence of China on Tonkin also explain the difference 
between Tonkin and Cochin-China’s policies towards Europeans in the seventeenth 
century. Southern Vietnam tried to open the country for trade while Tonkin restricted 
interaction with foreigners broadly. 
 From the 1990s, instead of focusing on the Chinese influence in Vietnam, 
scholars moved to a term of ‘southern movement’ and the appearance of a new kingdom 
Cochin-China. 67  The Vietnamese conflicts and southward movement were also 
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considered from the viewpoint of commerce and overseas trade.68 The civil wars not 
only made Vietnam divided and powerless but also led to a strong drive for increased 
military strength, coupled with the development of a new overseas policy.69 As a result, 
both the Trinh and Nguyen Lords accepted and welcomed foreigners.70 Under the term 
of ‘age of commerce’, scholars such as Charles J. Wheeler, Li Tana and Hoang Anh 
Tuan have explicitly examined Vietnam’s role as an important market and an 
intermediate port for East Asian merchants. 71  They comment that Vietnam was 
attractive due to its geographical location as a mid-point in the South China Sea.72 
Recently, studies of a Japanese scholar S. Momoki and Vietnamese historians (V.K. 
Nguyen, M.D. Nguyen) have stressed the role of Vietnam as a trading intermediary in 
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the ancient and medieval periods, providing links with other East Asian countries.73 
Some have argued that Vietnam had a range of commodities suitable for Asian 
demand.74 Nguyen Thanh Nha has shown that Vietnam’s attraction was enhanced due to 
the growth of urbanisation, the spread of a money economy for foreign merchants, 
especially during the crisis period.75  
 Besides the political and economic subjects, recent research about the presence 
of foreigners in Vietnam in the seventeenth century provides another example of the 
attraction of Vietnam. Li, Nicholas Tarling, Wheeler, and Robert L. Innes have studied 
the activities of Chinese and Japanese merchants in Vietnam in this period.76 They have 
shown that Chinese and Japanese brokers were the first foreigners to exploit the 
potential of Vietnam and they built large communities in Thang Long, Pho Hien 
(Tonkin) and Hoi An (Cochin-China) to control their operations easily and to expand 
their influence in Vietnam. G.B. Souza and C.R. Boxer have shown that from the late 
sixteenth century onwards, the Portuguese sent missions and traders from Macao to 
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both Tonkin and Cochin-China.77 They wanted to replace Japanese merchants in Tonkin 
after the ‘Japanese Sakoku Edict of 1635’ and maintained the trade until the late 
1660s.78 The Dutch also acknowledged the role of Vietnam in the regional trade. From 
the 1620s they considered Cochin-China as a source of profit on silks for Japan.79  From 
1637 they established the Japan-Tonkin network to provide substitute silk for Japan in 
exchange for silver.80  
Going beyond those studies about Vietnam and the East Asian trading world, the 
thesis seeks to note the availability and potential of Vietnam in the EIC commercial 
strategy and use the Vietnamese case study to re-evaluate the role of main and 
supportive markets in the EIC commercial strategy in East Asia, revealing the critical 
importance and value of small countries in Southeast Asia. The study argues that the 
attraction of Vietnam was mostly from its geographical situation in the South China Sea 
with its extant connections with both China and Japan. Benefit from Vietnamese trade 
was from the intra-Asian trade because most Vietnamese products served Asian demand 
which required European Companies to understand and adapt their trading model 
accordingly. The thesis also shows how the EIC learned from Chinese, Portuguese, 
Dutch merchants and from Vietnamese people and drew on this knowledge to establish 
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a factory and enter into a formal relationship Vietnam in the century. Secondly, the 
thesis tries to highlight a contribution of Vietnamese people during the process the EIC 
contacted and traded in Vietnam in the seventeenth century. On the other way, the study 
researches how Vietnamese people reacted to the appearance of the English and how 
they contributed to the development of the English trade in East Asia in the seventeenth 
century. 
 
The English East India Company-Vietnamese relationship 
 
The above section shows how the thesis gathers support in certain aspects from previous 
studies but also challenges some of the earlier claims about the exact role of overseas 
individuals, the interrelationship between the main and supplementary markets in East 
Asia, and the potential of Vietnam in the EIC’s commercial strategy. The thesis seeks to 
use the case study of Vietnam critically to examine how the EIC learned lessons and 
adapted to trade overseas. While Vietnam has been an understudied area of research on 
the EIC, it has not been entirely overlooked. Some studies have sought to identify and 
provide primary sources; other studies have focused on describing and narrating the 
commercial and political relations. With regards to providing resources, Maybon has 
played a vital role from the 1910s.81 He highlighted most types of materials related to 
the English factory in the British Library. The most significant part of his research is a 
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documentary account of the EIC’s activities, with the inclusion of journals, records and 
diaries of Tonkin factors and instructions and letters of London, Madras, and Bantam to 
Tonkin. More than eighty years after it was compiled Farrington’s study of the EIC’s 
materials during its time in Pho Hien (1672-1682) provides avenues for investigating 
the relationship and the process by which the English appeared in Northern Vietnam 
further.82 This task was partly undertaken by Hoang, the first scholar to account for and 
clarify the EIC’s commerce in Tonkin from both the Vietnamese and English 
perspective. 83  However, this study mainly translates English primary sources to 
Vietnamese, rather than providing new analysis and examination of the EIC’s activities 
in Tonkin. 
 In terms of the direct connection between the EIC and Vietnam, Vietnamese 
scholars played little role as they had limited chance to discover the primary sources 
from the EIC’s records while Vietnamese sources rarely mentioned the English 
presence in Vietnam. They have focused on Vietnamese relations with neighbours in 
East Asia or on the general idea of Vietnamese overseas trade.84 The EIC’s relationships 
with Vietnam, therefore, were unpacked by foreign scholars based on the materials from 
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the EIC’s perspective. In 1958, Ma Yi Yi made a study of English trade in the South 
China Sea (1670-1715), including English activities in both Tonkin and Cochin-
China.85 This dissertation was the first to discuss the English presence in Vietnam in the 
seventeenth century, but it simply narrated and described the relation year by year 
adding a few basic evaluations. The research was quite clearly based on the EIC’s 
documents, and all the reports of events were copied directly from primary sources to 
draw a picture of English activities. Moreover, perhaps due to the character of academic 
study in the 1950s and the nature of this piece of research, it seems to stay at the level of 
description. Indeed, many of the deeper issues relating to the EIC’s presence of that 
period were not investigated satisfactorily in this study. These issues included the nature 
of the attraction of Vietnam, the way the English traded, the relationship between 
London-Bantam/Madras-Tonkin, the relationship between English factors and local 
government, the interaction between English merchants in Tonkin, and broadly the 
change of the EIC’s strategy in Vietnam throughout the seventeenth century. All these 
issues need to be investigated to understand fully the English presence in Vietnam in 
this period and its profile in East Asia.  
 In the 1960s and 1970s, several aspects of this ‘overlooked relationship’ were 
examined and analysed, but for a later period. Alastair Lamb investigated the English 
activities in Vietnam from the late eighteenth century to the end of the Gia Long 
dynasty, the first King of the Nguyen dynasty (1781-1821).86 He concentrated on the 
EIC’s missions to Vietnam in the context of Anglo-French competition and the attempt 
                                                             
85  Y.Y. Ma, ‘English Trade in the South China Sea 1670-1715’ (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, 
University of London, 1958). 
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to expand the sea route from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. Lamb’s study 
also serves as ‘a documentary account’ of the EIC’s missions to Vietnam.87 Building on 
Lamb’s work, Tarling studied this issue from Ming Mạng’s reign (1821-1841) until 
1858.88 A few years later, Lamb became the first scholar to study English diplomacy in 
Vietnam from the late seventeenth century to the French invasion in 1858.89 A brief 
narrative of the English presence in Tonkin and Cochin-China was also included in the 
introduction to his work. After the studies of Lamb and Tarling, scholars seemed to 
focus on the general Vietnamese overseas trade rather than on any special relationship. 
There has been only one recent piece of research about the EIC’s presence in Vietnam.90 
It focussed on one of the most tragic massacres of the EIC on Pulo Condore island (in 
Cochin-china) in 1705. A remarkable feature of the study is that the author employed 
both Vietnamese and English primary sources to examine in detail Vietnamese reactions 
towards the English in the fields of sovereignty and diplomacy and explore the reasons 
why the EIC paused its involvement in Vietnam after the English established a direct 
connection with China.  
In brief, to date, there has been only one dissertation about the EIC’s presence in 
Vietnam in the seventeenth century and one complete academic book about their 
                                                             
87 N. Tarling, ‘British Relations with Vietnam, 1822-1858’, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, 39 (1966), pp. 19-51, p. 19. 
88 Tarling, ‘British Relations’, pp. 19-51. 
89 A. Lamb, The Mandarin Road to Old Hue: The narrative of Anglo-Vietnamese Diplomacy from the 
Seventeenth Century to the Eve of The French Conquest (London, 1970). Based on the Lamb’s job, 
Nguyen Thi My Hanh did a study about the English mission in Vietnam in ‘Các phái bộ Anh đến Việt 
Nam trong bối cảnh sự xâm nhập của Anh vào Đông Á (thế kỷ XVII – nửa đầu XIX) [English missions to 
Vietnam in the context of English intervene into East Asia from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries]’ 
(Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Social Science and Humanities-Hanoi, 2014). 
90 D.W. Tze-Ken, ‘The Destruction of the English East India Company Factory on Condore Island, 1702-




relationship in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, the previous studies 
have not examined precisely the place of Vietnam in the connection with EIC in the 
seventeenth century and how Vietnam became important towards the process the EIC 
improved from free of liberty to a semi-state. Building on the previous studies, the 
thesis makes considerable contributions. Firstly, it provides extra materials from both 
English and Vietnamese perspectives which have not previously been studied since 
these sources were mislaid and scattered in the mid-twentieth century. These sources 
especially relate to the relationships between Tonkin factors and their private letters to 
Bantam or London.91 Secondly, this research unpacks unanswered questions about the 
EIC activities in Vietnam in the seventeenth century. Thirdly, in broad terms, it 
examines the critical role that the seventeenth century played in the EIC’s history in 
terms of both commodities and learning progress.  
 
PRIMARY SOURCES AND METHODOLOGIES  
 
This thesis draws on four main sets of primary sources from the EIC, the Dutch, the 
Vietnamese, and other European travellers. The first and most significant set of primary 
sources analysed in this thesis are taken from the EIC’s rich and detailed archives, 
including instructions, records, diaries, and consultations, journals of both London and 
overseas factories. The archives, now housed at the British Library in London, also 
include letters, logbooks, and narratives of English factors who worked in Vietnam. 
                                                             
91 For example, letters of Tonkin factors (W. Gyfford, W. Keeling, W. Hodges, T. James) to Bantam and 
London were recorded in IOR/G/21/6A-7A, Java factory (1670-1680), (1679-1683) but they had not been 
mentioned in previous studies. Those letters provided more information about what those factors thought 
about the trade in Tonkin or how they reacted towards London or Bantam’s arrange of Tonkin Council in 




Where possible the EIC sources are compared with Dutch and Vietnamese materials. 
However, these latter only play a minor role in the analysis since the Dutch materials 
just provide general information about the English in Tonkin and the character of 
Vietnamese historical sources means that they mostly focus on the affairs of Kings, 
rather than on commercial and social activities. Indeed, for centuries, most national 
historical documents or private documents and pamphlets had been written around the 
political life of Vietnamese dynasties. Issues of commerce were documented only in 
relation to the Vietnamese Court’s policies. Therefore, information about the English in 
Vietnamese records was sparse and brief. Private accounts and journals of Europeans 
adventurers in both Tonkin and Cochin-China in the seventeenth century provide a 
more general understanding and broad view of the European presence and commerce in 
Vietnam. However, those writings have a character of ‘autoethnography’ and need to be 
scrutinised within the historical context to understand their purpose and meaning.92  
 The EIC’s G series which holds the Tonkin Factory Records (among others) is 
crucial to this study as it includes sources which relate to the Tonkin factory. The 
Tonkin factory materials are arranged in ten parts of Diary, Records, Consultations, 
Journals referenced IOR/G/12/17/1-10 (1005 pages). However, around ten years of the 
Tonkin materials are missing (1680-1681, 1683-1693) from archives.93 Unfortunately, 
this period was the most dynamic of the Tonkin factory with the regular arrival of 
English ships after the closure of Bantam in 1682. Due to the lack of English factors’ 
writing in that period, scholars face difficulty in investigating and evaluating Tonkin 
                                                             
92 M.L. Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London, 1992), p. 9. 
93 In details, IOR/G/12/17/6 ends at 31 May 1680 while IOR/G/12/17/7 starts from 15 December 1681 
with a gap of more than one year. Seriously, IOR/G/12/17/8 finishes on 26 August 1683 and 




commerce, private trade and the EIC’s issues of management. This lack was partly 
compensated for by the records of the Java factory (G/21) in the 1670s and 1680s even 
though they are brief. Overall, the lack of documentary evidence for this period appears 
to have confused scholars and perhaps negatively influenced their views of the EIC’s 
activities in this period.  
Another problem is that the Tonkin records and diaries were compiled by 
different chief factors.94 As a result, the lack of harmony in the writing styles makes the 
documents hard to understand and follow. For example, Gyfford wrote a very detailed 
letter of thirty pages about Tonkin’s trading potential in his first record to London while 
other Tonkin chief factors only recorded the Tonkin factory’s activities briefly and 
ignored significant areas of interest, especially accounting matters. 95  The Tonkin 
records acted as a crucial tool by which the chief factor commended or criticised the 
performance of other servants. For instance, after 1693, the new headman Richard 
Watts used Tonkin records to blame previous factors, William Keeling and Lemuel 
Blackmore, for their private trade and for losing the Company’s capital. 96  These 
                                                             
94 In details, G/12/17/1 (1672) was written by W. Gyfford, Thomas James and Nicholas Waite. G/12/17/2 
(1672-1676): W. Keeling and John Styleman started to write the Journal. G/12/17/3 (1676-1677) was 
written by Thomas James, W. Keeling, and Henry Ireton. G/12/17/4 (1677-1678) only James and Keeling 
recorded. G/12/17/5 (1678-1679): the main role belonged to James and Keeling. G/12/17/6 (1679-1680) 
and G/12/17/7 (1681-1682): Lemuel Blackmore started his role in the factory but the factory’s power 
under the control of James and Keeling. G/12/17/8 (1682-1683): Keeling was the main chief of the 
factory with the help of W. Hodges, Lemuel Blackmore. From 1683 to 1693 was the time of missing 
materials and there have complicated views about this period. G/12/17/9 (1693-1697): Madras sent 
Richard Watts and Richard Farmer to investigate all Tonkin factory’s trade. They also played the role of 
the chief factor with an opposing view to Keeling. G/12/17/10 (1697): R. Watts wrote all journal register 
of the factory. 
95  IOR/G/12/17/1, William Gyfford, Thomas James and Nicholas Waite to the EIC in London, 7 
December 1672, pp. 41a – 55a. 




sources, with the records of complaints and altercation, are crucial to the thesis in that 
they show how relationships functioned in the factory. Because of the variable character 
of these reports, the letters of other Tonkin staff to Bantam, Madras or London provide 
useful counter-balance to assess the trustworthiness of the factory’s records about 
management matters and trading activities.   
Another set of primary materials for the Tonkin factory is found in the E/3 
series, consisting of Home Correspondence including letters sent to and from the Court 
of Directors in London relating to activities in Asia, especially in Bantam (1672-1682) 
and Madras (1687-1697).97 Those documents support the missing material from the 
Tonkin factory records, providing some information about Tonkin trade and 
communications between Tonkin, Bantam and Madras. They are also helpful to 
discover and compare the Company’s general strategies towards East Asia, the policies 
of Bantam as a director of policy and procedure, the direct action of English factors in 
Tonkin and the EIC’s changes of administrative methods. However, these materials are 
complicated since the Court of Directors in London frequently gave instructions, while 
the English Bantam and Madras had different opinions about trade in Tonkin. 
Information in the Bantam records about the Tonkin factory is brief and limited in 
nature, insufficient for understanding precisely what happened in Tonkin in some 
dynamic years. As a result of the inadequacy of any one individual set of records, the 
thesis tries to draw on all available materials to provide a comprehensive picture of the 
functioning of the Tonkin factory and to examine in detail different hypotheses about 
the English presence in Tonkin.  
                                                             
97 Letter related to Bantam in the ‘Letter books’ 4-7 (IOR/E/3/87-90: 1666-1672, 1672-1678, 1678-1682, 
and 1682-1685); or the ‘EIC Original Correspondence’ (IOR/E/3/31-33: 1670-1673), to Madras in the 




The B series, the Court Books, played only a minor role in providing 
information about the Tonkin factory as it seems that London paid less attention to 
small factories, such as Tonkin. The Tonkin factory rarely features in those documents 
and does so not in its own right but only under issues related to Bantam trade, including 
shipping and selling products. However, those documents do provide useful information 
on a few pertinent matters: London’s opinion on the structure of the Tonkin factory,  
how much profit the EIC obtained from the sale of Tonkin silks. This information, thus, 
helps to explain the change in the EIC’s trading plan in Tonkin and provides compelling 
evidence about the consideration of London towards Tonkin and small factories. 
With regards to Cochin-China, primary sources are not so rich as those for the 
Tonkin factory but do contain a range of different perspectives with three sets of 
sources. Firstly, the Hirado factory’s documents from the 1610s and the private journals 
of Richard Cocks and William Adams provide all the information available about the 
problems the EIC faced in Cochin-China. Secondly, we have the Indian Office Records 
(1695-1705) which refer to the English presence in Cochin-China. 98  Thirdly, 
Vietnamese documents about the EIC’s appearance in Pulo Condore (1702-1705) 
provide comparative material and show the Nguyen Lord’s reactions to the EIC and the 
end of the English Pulo Condore colony.99  
                                                             
98 The Cochin-China part was small in ‘Miscellaneous Factory Records’, IOR/G/40/18 (1695-1697). This 
document also includes private journal and opinion of Bowyear after his voyage. The information of Pulo 
Condore factory/garrison was in ‘East India Company and Indian Office Ledgers and Journals’, 
IOR/L/AG/1/1/12-13 (title: Pulo Condore factory 1705-1709-1714). Some other unspecific and private 
letters related Pulo Condore was in Indian Office Records, Home Miscellaneous Series and Bodleian 
Library. 
99 ‘Đại Nam thực lục tiền biên’ [Chronicle of Great Vietnam, Previous part], the formally historical books 




By examining the EIC’s activities in Tonkin and Cochin-China, this thesis 
researches how peripheral markets shaped the Company’s organisational structures and 
strategies in the seventeenth century. This thesis focuses on William McNeill’s model 
of connection to show the interactions between a main and a distinct supportive, and 
between people in different place and then examines how Vietnam, a small factory 
contributed to the EIC improvement in both terms of trade and learning process.100 In 
particular, it studies how Vietnamese people and English servants in Vietnam provided 
the EIC with information and knowledge which was the most significant for long-
distant trade in the early modern period. It argues that our understanding of the ever-
developing position of power centres (London, Bantam and Madras) can be further 
understood through tracking their changing connections with a go-between site as 
Vietnam. Moreover, our comprehension of the EIC overseas trade is enhanced through 
studying the interdependence between small and primary markets in the EIC’s 
commercial strategy in East Asia. Such objectives are reached through a mixed-methods 
approach. Qualitative and quantitative techniques of analysis are applied to both 
primary and secondary resources to ensure accuracy and to provide a comprehensive 
and in-depth investigation. However, primary materials receive minimal quantitative 
treatment, due to the insufficient and incomplete data sets of the essential periods under 
study. Therefore, the thesis uses secondary quantitative data which other historians 
worked on from the EIC’s records relating to English ships, commodities, money 
exchanged between Europe and Asia to compare the position of Tonkin factory in the 
EIC’s strategy towards general Asian markets. A detailed qualitative approach (the 
                                                             
100 W.H. McNeill, ‘The Rise of the West after Twenty-Five Years’, Journal of world history, 1 (1990), 
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close reading and the cross-referencing of different materials, the analysis of different 
recorded opinions of EIC staffs in their letters, instructions, records, diaries) was 
employed  to ‘mine’ the rich source materials, in order to discover how the EIC adapted 
itself to become successful in trade in Vietnam. These source materials came in two 
forms: 1) the official correspondence between the EIC in London and its servants in 
Vietnam, and 2) the English overseas factors' diaries and consultations recorded 
themselves.  
 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
Chapter One examines English individuals’ involvement in the EIC desire for 
commercial expansion in Asia, particularly in East Asia in the 1610s and early 1620s 
and how they recognised the place of Vietnam in the EIC intra-Asian trade. It shows the 
EIC innovation of using skilful overseas staffs and how they helped the EIC to 
understand the importance of regional trade in East Asia. Due to the desire to collect 
spices and to sell English goods, the EIC opened factories in the Spice Islands, Japan 
and Siam respectively and tried to build a regional trading network to secure its yield. 
With information from the Dutch and Japanese, the English in Hirado (Japan) 
considered Tonkin and Cochin-China as places which would support the English- 
Japanese trade by supplying raw silk and other luxury goods. The chapter concludes 
that the EIC had little experience in East Asia in the early period about both the issues 
of administration and trade (trading system and the role of supportive markets). It shows 
that the remedying of this lack of expertise paved the way for the Company’s 




Chapter Two focuses on how attractive Tonkin and Cochin-China were to 
European Companies in the seventeenth century and how individuals contributed to the 
EIC knowledge about the role of Vietnam in the regional trading network. Vietnam was 
perceived as advantageous due to its geographical position which provided a trading 
route to China and Japan and provided the potential to control the sea-routes around the 
South China Sea. Vietnam’s traditional relations with China and Japan and the wealth in 
natural commodities of both Tonkin and Cochin-China further consolidated its potential 
as a key intermediary site. This chapter argues that Vietnam’s advantage was to serve 
inter-regional trade, not global commerce. Learning from the trading activities of 
Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese and Dutch merchants, pioneering English overseas staff 
helped the EIC through experimentation to consider the potential places and then 
establish factories and create trading connections with Vietnam.  
 Chapter Three and Four draw the main argument of the thesis, how Vietnam, 
particularly Tonkin was important in the seventeenth-century EIC history by examing 
its attempts to manage and use a small factory to re-structure and improve the 
Company. Although the EIC worked effectively there in around twelve years (1676-
1688), the Tonkin factory was a clear example of the Company’s adaptation in both 
structure and commerce to become the most powerful trading force in the eighteenth 
century. Chapter Three focuses on both the EIC management policy towards distant 
factories and the role of English oceanic servants in Tonkin through their contact with 
Tonkinese rulers and officials. Firstly, the chapter argues that the EIC managed and 
controlled outer factories by means of its many changes to the Company’s structure and 
its constant drive to develop the flexibility required to maintain its position in East Asia. 




factories directly and effectively by various means. The case of the Tonkin factory 
provides clear evidence of the power struggle between the Court of Minutes in London 
and the Bantam Council, and the ongoing conflict between Tonkin factors or broadly 
the interaction between the core and peripheral elements in the EIC’s structure. By 
showing that London could not successfully manage the EIC’s overseas factories and 
servants, the chapter, therefore, highlights the role of distant sites in the seventeenth-
century EIC history. Secondly, the research shows that Tonkin factors, through their 
friendship and relationship with local powers, confirmed their influence in overseas 
areas. They played a crucial role in supplying the EIC with knowledge, contacts and a 
foundation for trade. However, they also caused problems for the EIC due to their 
fondness for privileges and due to the EIC’s weakness in monitoring its overseas 
factors. The chapter also demonstrates that the Tonkin Court, particularly officials who 
worked directly with the English provided the EIC necessary and significant 
information and knowledge about diplomacy and trade in Tonkin. 
 Chapter Four examines how the EIC drew on its trading experience to adapt to 
the Tonkin trading environment in both its commercial strategy and its daily trading 
activities. With the desire to create an international trading system connecting Asia and 
Europe, the EIC applied a series of commercial plans in Tonkin, firstly to link with 
Japan, then Manila (and thereby to Spanish America), and finally to connect with 
Europe. The chapter draws attention to the noteworthy alterations made by the EIC in 
investment, commodities and trading network for the Tonkin factory. By examining 
these issues, the chapter scrutinises the role played respectively by London, the Bantam 
agents and the Tonkin factors in maintaining the Tonkin factory and maximising the 




evaluate the interaction and the interdependence between the key and supplementary 
EIC branches in East Asia. It also highlights the importance of Tonkin as an 
intermediary or a gateway to link with China from the south, to collect silk for Japan 
and to obtain Chinese goods indirectly when the trading situation required. By 
analysing how local merchants traded with the EIC, the thesis partly indicates their 
special contribution towards English knowledge and adaptation in trade in Tonkin. 
 Chapter Five considers the English presence in Cochin-China in the late 1690s 
in the light of the EIC’s changes in strategy towards Vietnam and East Asia. Together 
with matters relating to the employees, the use of trading networks, and the use of 
intermediaries; issues of military and colony are considered in the transformation trend 
of the EIC. The voyage to Cochin-China (1695-1696) was partly the continuation of 
Madras’ attempts to develop ‘country trade’ as in Tonkin from the late 1680s, but it 
seemed to consider the role of Cochin-China with the idea of fortification. Attention is 
drawn to the difference in approach employed in this case, with a delegation being sent 
to negotiate for a free trade deal and a formal agreement recognising the critical role of 
individuals. The chapter highlights the fact that the primary activity of English people in 
Cochin-China was that of diplomacy through gifts. They conducted negotiations with 
both the King and native Mandarins to secure privileges to trade and to reside there.  
 Before concluding, the thesis shows how the New EIC failed in the relationship 
with Cochin-China in the early eighteenth century as it ignored the previous lessons 
about diplomacy and trade the Old Company obtained in the seventeenth century and 
only focused on using force to control the sea-route through the South China Sea. The 
lessons from both the EIC success and failure provided the foundation for its full 




to a certain degree the EIC attempt to perfect its structure and approach in trading with 
East Asia. The English presence in Tonkin and Cochin-China provides extraordinary 
evidence of the Company’s skill in using an intermediate market in the particular period 
of the English East Asian trade. The English presence in Pulo-Condore in 1702-1705, 
however, demonstrates a complete change in thinking for the new EIC towards 
Vietnam. No longer did the English care about trade, but viewed this island as a place to 
build a fortification to control the sea-route from India Ocean to the South China Sea. 
From that period onwards, the English only considered Vietnam in geopolitical terms as 
a means to maintain their strategic position in East Asia. 
 In conclusion, the English presence in Vietnam in the seventeenth century 
provides original insights into the EIC’s commercial strategy in East Asia. The primary 
argument of the thesis is that through the role of English overseas individuals and their 
experience in the relationship with Tonkin and Cochin-China in the seventeenth 
century, the English Company learned to understand the nature of trade in East Asia 
broadly. Secondly, the thesis provides an insight into the role of intermediaries in the 
EIC’s trade, a role which seems to have been hitherto neglected. Finally, the thesis 
challenges the function of networks in both the EIC’s structure and its regional and 








CHAPTER 1. BUILDING A FOUNDATION, HOW THE EIC’S EARLY 
ACTIVITIES IN EAST ASIA AND VIETNAM (1600-1610s) PAVED THE WAY 
FOR LATER CONNECTIONS 
 
This chapter argues that it was English overseas factors working for the EIC in Japan in 
the early seventeenth century who found information about the trading network 
operating in East Asia and the potential of Tonkin and Cochin-China as intermediaries 
and supportive markets for trade with Japan and China through the regional merchants 
and connections with Vietnamese people. Due to their engagement with the existing 
regional trade network, the EIC decided to use existing overseas staff, particularly who 
had worked at Bantam and then Japan to establish factories in South East Asia. The 
factories were designed to act as intermediary ports for trade with Japan, and the staff 
were encouraged to work mainly on their own initiative, to investigate new markets and 
source new materials. The establishment of intermediary factories and the use of skilled, 
independent factors to discover the potential for regional trade are evidence of the EIC’s 
willingness to learn by experimentation in terms of the Company’s trading structure and 
administration. If the Bantam factory, founded in 1602 reflected the EIC’s key target for 
trade in spices and pepper, the founding of a further dozen factories in Asia before the 
1620s reflected the EIC’s expansionist policy and the strength of endeavours undertaken 
by its overseas factors.101 Indeed, as Bantam had little demand for English cloth (its 
                                                             
101 Those were factories in Bantam (1602), Bencoolen (1603), Macassar (1610), Pulo Run (1616 – now 
Banda islands), Ayutthaya (1612), Patani (1612), Sukadana (1612- Borneo), Hirado (1613), Surat (1613), 
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Ternate (1620), Banda island (1620), Bandar Abbas / Gombroon (1623 – Persia). See A. Wild, The East 





tropical climate, was not suitable for woollen cloth), foreign staff were encouraged to 
use their own knowledge and connections to locate new sources of trading ‘currency’ 
(silver), to discover new markets and enlarge the EIC trade into Japan and China.  
 As the chapter demonstrates the early history of the EIC in Vietnam is 
inextricably related to its initial expansion into Japan and the policies devised by the 
relatively isolated factors there to support the Japanese trade. Thanks to the efforts of 
these overseas factors, supplementary factories in Siam and Borneo were established to 
serve Japan’s trade, and also exploratory visits to Tonkin and Cochin-China were 
undertaken. Exploration by the EIC’s overseas factors, largely undirected by London, 
played a key role in the EIC’s acquisition of knowledge about regional trading chains 
and the trading potential of various ports in the South China Sea. Such information 
became indispensable to the EIC in later years when establishing formal trading links in 
East Asia. This chapter discusses the EICs developing interest in Tonkin and Cochin 
China in the 1610s in the light of its early expansion in Bantam and Japan. It examines 
how overseas factors and staff were the driving force behind the expanding trade and 
how they contributed towards the EIC’s development in East Asia, using their 
knowledge of trading patterns and desired commodities, gleaned from their experience 
in Bantam and Japan, to propose extension into Vietnam. Although the EIC’s early 
interest in Vietnam came to nothing, the experiences and knowledge gained by these 
early EIC employees laid the foundations for later relationships after the 1650s and 
formed a key part of the EIC’s learning in South East Asia. 
 The source material for this chapter primarily arises from the records and reports 
compiled by the English factors in Japan during the 1610s as they played the most 




period. These records were largely assembled as part of Anthony Farrington’s research 
into the EIC’s factory in Japan. Other important sources include the diary of Richard 
Cocks, the chief of the Hirado factory and the log-book of a free English merchant, 
William Adams, who also associated with English merchants in Hirado and voyaged to 
Vietnam during this period. These documents illustrate the insights and reflections of 
English overseas factors regarding regional trade. 
  
The EIC commercial strategies in East Asia, 1600-1610s  
 
The establishment of the EIC in 1600 allowed English traders to compete with other 
European companies for Asian trade. There were two primary drivers behind the 
founding of the Company: English demands for collecting spices and pepper and selling 
their cloth and manufactured goods outside Europe. Reports or diaries of other 
European adventurers were translated into English and help them to have more 
knowledge about the potential of East Asia.102 The area was particularly rich in spices, 
pepper, silk, silver, gold as well as other expensive goods.103 The fact that Portuguese 
and Dutch ships returned full of spices and pepper in the 1590s increasingly motivated 
                                                             
102 In 1579, J. Frampton translated most of Marco Polo’s travels in the 13th. In 1588, Robert Parke 
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and the Situation thereof: Togither with the Great Riches, Huge Cities, Politike Gouernement, and Rare 
Inuentions in the Same’. W. Phillip worked on the book of the Dutch writer Jan Huyghen van Linschoten 
‘Itinerario and Reys-gheschrift’ and other sources to public ‘John Huyghen van Linschoten his Discours 
of Voyages into ye Eat and West Indies’ and edited Voyages into East and West Indies. Most the English 
previous voyages and knowledge about Asia were found in R. Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, 
Voyages and Discoveries of the English nation (London, 1598-1600). 
103 Linschoten, John Huighen van Linschoten his Discours of Voyages into ye Easte and West Indies 




the English to discover new routes to Asia.104 However, it was not easy to break into the 
existing Eurasian trading networks because of the power of other Europeans in East 
Asia and the limited knowledge possessed by English people about this area.105 The 
second driver behind the founding of the EIC was the emerging crisis in the exportation 
of English cloth in Europe and the need to find new markets.106 By the 1550s there was 
a crisis in English cloth exports as it experienced a collapse in trade with Antwerp and 
North Europe.107 This crisis lasted until the 1650s.108 New trade routes appeared with 
the establishment of the Moscow and Levant factories but none of them satisfied 
English producers and merchants.109 London brokers thus tried to find new potential 
markets for English cloth and encouraged the formation of the EIC. However, as R. 
Brenner has argued, the demand to export English goods was not the main reason 
                                                             
104 Chaudhuri, The EIC: The Study of an Early Joint-Stock Company, 1600-1640 (London, 1965), pp. 11-
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105 M.J. Huissen, ‘England Encounter Japan: English knowledge of Japan in the Seventeenth Century’, 
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behind the creation of the EIC. The main reason for the cultivation of English and 
European overseas trade in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was to 
import Asian commodities. The settlements of the EIC or other earlier chartered 
Companies sought to monopolise trade in Asia.110 In response to the English merchants’ 
eagerness for the creation of a chartered company, which shared out the costs and risks 
of trade in unknown parts of the worlds, the EIC was born. 
 On 31 December 1600, Queen Elizabeth granted a Charter to settle ‘The 
Governor and Company of Merchants of London, Trading into the Eaft-Indies’ (the 
English East India Company) to ‘adventure and fet forth one or more voyages, with 
convenient number of Ships and Pinnaces, by way of Traffic and Merchandize to the 
Eaft-Indies, in the Countries and Parts of Afis and Africa, and to as many of the Ifands, 
Ports and Cities, Towns and Places’. 111  The Company’s task was to focus on 
commercial activities to obtain profits and compete successfully with its chief rival, the 
Dutch East India Company (VOC) became a major supplier of pepper, spices and other 
Asian products for Europe. The Company could trade exclusively in Asia, and it had 
full authority in addressing all trading issues on behalf of the English government. In 
the early years, the Company undertook twelve different trading voyages to Asia.112 In 
the 1610s, the period in which the EIC’s factors were seriously examining the 
possibilities of incorporating Tonkin and Cochin-China into their trade patterns, the 
Company adopted a far more innovative commercial structure operating as a joint-stock 
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company.113 Indeed, the first joint-stock venture was undertaken in 1613 when the EIC 
realised that it required productive capital for trading. The need for a substitute source 
of silver in East Asia and the recognition of Japan as a potential supplier encouraged 
English overseas factors to learn more about the regional trading system and to expand 
to Cochin-China and Tonkin. By 1657, the Company had become a formal joint-stock 
organisation, drawing on capital from numerous investors, including merchants, official, 
dukes, judges, knights and clergymen. This formal joint-stock arrangement provided it 
with a more stable financial footing allowing for further attempts at expansion into 
South East Asian markets.114 Nevertheless, the EIC still wanted to gain substitute silver 
and capital from East Asia, and the establishment of several subordinate factories in the 
area provides evidence of the EIC’s attempts to balance the Eurasian trade by seeking a 
source of silver in East Asia itself.  
From the outset, the EIC also received significant privileges to help it in its 
trading. Importantly, one of the first privileges of the EIC was to be permitted to carry 
out up to £30,000 of foreign bullion or silver coins annually to purchase Asian 
products. 115  The EIC lobbied the English government to increase the allowance to 
£60,000 in 1663 without duty or fee as its exported goods could not cover the capital 
needed for the transoceanic trade. 116  Transporting treasure was understood as an 
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important component within Asian trade, as the Company intended to make profits from 
imports, rather than to enhance the popularity of English goods, which were mostly 
unvalued within Asian markets.117 The attitude to treasure transportation shows that the 
Company appeared to understand and to make the government understand the necessity 
of bullion in Eurasian commerce.118 English ships to Asia thus contained more money 
than goods; the first voyage carried £21,742 bullion, which accounted for about 75 per 
cent of the cargo value and only £6,860 in goods of woollen cloth, lead, and tin. The 
value of silver exports by the EIC to Asia increased to £52,087 in 1616 and £200,000 in 
1626.119  
Initially, the EIC was mainly interested in collecting spices and pepper, which is 
why in the early years of the Company, the Bantam factory played such a significant 
role. The Spice Islands became the EIC’s principal market, with the first voyage to 
Bantam (a famous trading port in Java, Indonesia) in 1602. Not even Japan and China, 
let alone Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries, figured in the EIC’s initial 
trading plans as they had little or no spices. Bantam was an existing mercantile centre in 
Southeast Asia and one of the largest cities in Asia in the seventeenth century.120 It also 
had cheaper spices than other locations in Indonesia. The price of pepper in Bantam was 
much lower than that in Achin (Aceh, Indonesia), 42 rials per bale of 400lbs compared 
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with 64 rials per bale of 387lbs.121 Consequently, the EIC selected Bantam as the site to 
establish its first factory in 1602.122 It had a strategic position and attracted merchants 
from the Arabian Peninsula, Persia, the Coromandel coast, Malaysia, Sumatra, Siam, 
Moluccas (Maluku), China and Japan. This factor helped the English to learn about and 
become involved in the intra-Asian trade.123 For 80 years it was the EIC’s principal 
trading centre in the ‘Southwards’ China Sea commercial system with the key function 
of supplying the EIC with pepper  (from Sumatra and Java islands) and spices (from 
India) through both local and the EIC’s formal merchants, but with a secondary function 
of enabling the EIC to participate in the intra-Asian trade networks.124  
The aim of competing with the Portuguese and Dutch encouraged the EIC to 
make changes in the 1610s to start accessing the regional trading network by creating an 
extensive system of factories in East Asia.125 Spices and pepper could not preserve the 
Company due to falling prices for these products as a result of the increased supply 
from both the Portuguese, Dutch, and English.  The price dropped by around 35 per 
cent, from 26 pence per pound in the period 1613-1616 to 17 pence per pound in 
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1627.126 This situation required the Company to find other Asian commodities, which 
could give it a dominant position in European markets. As early as 1604 English 
salesmen, recognising that their dream of selling woollen clothes in Java, Malacca and 
the Spice Islands was unrealistic, turned their attention to the market for Indian cloth in 
those areas.127 Although the EIC was permitted to export some bullion, Asian trading 
opportunities exceeded the EIC’s reserves and required substitute sources of silver. 
Identifying possible substitute sources became a considerable task of distant English 
factors.  
A triangular trade between London, Surat and Bantam was born after the 
formation of the Surat factory in 1613 to help to solve the bullion problem.128 They sold 
Indian textiles in Southeast Asia, sent spices and pepper back to Europe to obtain 
bullion. They then transported one part of that capital to Asia to purchase 
merchandise. 129  However, the triangular trade only solved a small part of the 
Company’s problems. Silver was mainly gained from selling spices in Europe, and it 
was insufficient to cover the Company’s overheads of labour, shipping, transportation, 
dock fees and warehouse costs. Moreover, the EIC still needed to transport considerable 
amounts of silver to maintain Eurasian trade. English dealers, therefore, needed other 
sources of silver in Asia or suitable markets for English cloth. The most viable option 
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was to use Asian money to purchase its goods. Bantam agents played a vital role in 
exploring potential sources in Japan and China, which would allow the English to 
expand their commercial influence and balance Eurasian trade. These Bantam-based 
merchants were not interested in Cochin-China and Tonkin, but the expansion into 
Japan made English factors learn about the potential of Vietnam through the existing 
trading network between Japan and Vietnam. The search for new markets meant that the 
EIC’s trading strategy changed slightly in the mid-1610s with the increasing 
involvement in the intra-Asian trade and the appearance of factories in Japan, Siam, 
Borneo and led to the first attempts to trade with Cochin-China and Tonkin through 
which English factors hoped to gain access to Japanese silver. At this stage, therefore, 
the quest for silver and access to the regional trading system were the driving force 
behind EIC expansion and its introduction to Vietnam. 
The attempt at a trading relationship with Vietnam was not part of the initial 
expansion from the Bantam Council but rather was a result of its early foray into Japan 
and the knowledge of Southeast Asian trade gained by English merchants in Japan. As 
early as 1613, the English established a factory at Hirado in Japan. There are two 
relevant points about this factory: namely its role in the East Asian trading networks, 
and secondly, the contribution of English overseas factors towards the settlement and 
maintenance of this branch and in consequence their learning regarding Vietnam. The 
Hirado factory, due to its potential source for silver, played a key role in the 
enlargement of trade in East Asia, second only to the Bantam factory, the headquarters 
of the EIC in East Asia. At this early stage in the EIC’s history, the establishment of 
other English factories in the China Sea and their attempts to contact China for goods 




spices in Bantam. Hirado factors recognised that as English products were undesirable 
in Japan, an effective method of accessing Japanese silver would be by becoming 
involved in the silk-silver trade since Japan already had large trading networks in the 
South China Sea in which they traded silver for silks. Later in 1618, English factors in 
Bantam, George Ball, Thomas Spurway and John Byndon also supported the Hirado 
factory in using Japan in the regional trade. They wrote to London that ‘it [Japan] 
supplyed as it should be, not with commodityes of England but of such as may be had in 
these partes of the world’. 130  Although their opinion appeared five years after the 
establishment of the Hirado factory, it was evident that English factors in the East 
recognised the limited demand for English goods in Japan and understood how the 
Hirado branch could contribute and participate in the English East Asian trading 
network. By the 1490s, the price of Chinese silks in Japan was ten times that of the 
original price.131 Nearly 80 per cent of Japanese imported goods were from China, of 
which silks accounted for more than 50 per cent.132 From the 1550s, Japan had become 
a key manufacturer of silver and then copper for China in exchange for Chinese silks 
and textiles, around three-quarters of total exported commodities. 133  Becoming a 
middleman in this network would not only have financed English overseas trade but 
would also have helped the EIC to trade with China, the market with the greatest 
potential in the area. Japan and its interconnected trade network with South East Asia 
thus became the best solution for the EIC’s problem of securing local currency. The 
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issue, however, was how English factors could obtain that capital as direct China-Japan 
trade had been halted by the Chinese government together with the appearance and 
development of Wako piracy from the mid-sixteenth century.134 Tonkin and Cochin-
China, parts of Japan’s existing trade network through the red seal system became 
important locations in the EIC’s commercial strategy in East Asia.135 As a result of their 
participation in this system, Tonkin and Cochin-China became significant players in 
both the Japanese and Chinese trade as they played a role of an intermediary to connect 
the halted China-Japan trade. The two kingdoms therefore came onto the EIC’s horizon 
as Chinese merchants also sailed there for trading allowing the EIC to collect Chinese 
commodities indirectly. As a result, the English presence in Tonkin and Cochin-China 
or broadly the role of Vietnamese intermediary sites in the EIC’s strategy greatly 
depended on Hirado factory and especially the role of English individuals there. 
 Establishing extensive and sustainable trading networks in East Asia was key to 
the EIC’s future success. If the Bantam Council played the role of deciding to expand 
the EIC’s trade in East Asia, William Adams (1564-1620), an English man who worked 
as a translator and an advisor to the Shogun of Japan before the foundation of the EIC in 
Hirado, played the role of providing the information and advice needed for the EIC to 
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create the factory in Japan and an extensive English trading network in the region.136 
Working with the Dutch in Japan, Adams learnt that the English had established a 
factory in Bantam and so sent a letter to the English there in October 1611, suggesting 
that they open a factory in Japan.137 In the second letter to Bantam on 12 January 1613, 
Adams recommended trading voyages from London to Bantam and Japan and advised 
that the best place to establish a factory in Japan would be Hirado (or Finando).138 
Although the English ships under the management of John Saris, a Bantam agent, were 
dispatched to Japan before the Bantam Council received the second Adams’ letter, 
through Adams’ expertise the English came to realise that this was an advantageous 
time to trade with Japan for several reasons. Firstly, Japan needed weapons from foreign 
trade due to the domestic political crisis. After becoming Shogun in 1598, Tokugawa 
Ieyasu was particularly willing to welcome foreign merchants as he needed their 
military support (to protect his authority and partly to reduce the role of the Spanish and 
Portuguese).139 Secondly, as the English had no contact with China, the Japanese market 
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was seen as an important site for the sale of the EIC’s products since it had a cold 
climate which might create a command for English wool. An estimation shows that the 
population of Japan in the seventeenth century was between 10 and 18 million while the 
first national population survey in 1721 showed that the number was more than 26 
million.140 Significantly, Adams demonstrated the existing regional trade network in 
which ships from Nova Spaya, Patani (Siam) and Malacca carried raw silk, damask, 
fish, satin, velvet, and other Chinese commodities in exchange for silver in Japan.141 
Interestingly, Adams seemed to have no information about Tonkin and Cochin-China as 
he mentioned nothing about those kingdoms in the letter. Knowledge about Vietnam, 
thus, was known by the English factors in Japan after the Hirado factory was 
established. Adams’ letter also showed that as ‘in Japan is gold and silver in 
aboundanc’, the EIC did not need to send money out of England if it could participate in 
the existing trade network to obtain that silver in exchange for other Asian products.142 
It became evident that Japan, which provided nearly 30 per cent of silver production in 
the world before the 1650s, was a principal source of silver.143 If, as Adams’ letter 
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suggested might be possible, the EIC could access it, the wealth of Japan would address 
the EIC’s issue of bullion to finance the spice trade.  
The presence of Vietnam in the EIC’s commercial strategy in the 1610s was 
indirectly affected by individuals during their consideration to establish the English 
factory in Japan, especially Adams and John Saris. 144  Their debate and argument 
centred on two main issues: the EIC’s exportation of goods to Japan and East Asia, and 
how to build the regional trading system around Japan. 145  Adams with his long 
experience of Japanese trade claimed that the export of woollen cloths had already been 
supplied fully by the Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish in Japan and that the price of 
English goods was much higher than that of Indian products, so English cloth had no 
market in Japan. Instead, Adams recommended settling a silk-silver trade between 
China and Japan.146 By contrast, Saris, whose central experience had been working for 
the EIC in Bantam evaluated Japan as a valued market for English woollen cloth as this 
kingdom experienced cold weather. He also believed that Japan was suitable for pepper, 
raw silk, skins and wood from Bantam and China. In Bantam in 1609, he provided the 
EIC with a list of commodities that might be profitable in Japan which included 
broadcloth of all sorts and colours, cosmetics for women’s faces, copper, lead, quick-
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silver, velvet, drinking glasses, raw silk, wax, candles, honey and elephant teeth.147 
London wrongly trusted Saris, its existing agent although one without real familiarity 
with Japan, and caused numerous products to be shipped to and remain unsold in Japan. 
The problems in Japan caused the English factors there to voyage to Vietnam and Siam 
to carry out further trade to maintain and enhance the branch. Here again, Adams with 
his better familiarity with the products, trading relationships, geography and climate of 
the region provided better advice. Based on the recommendation of Saris, English 
factors in Japan re-exported the unsold English goods from Japan to Vietnam and 
obtained poor results.148 In contrast, Adams carried welcomed commodities to Vietnam 
such as weapons, brimstone and copper and Japanese products. 149  As such, the 
disagreement between Adams and Saris and London’s trust in Saris indirectly related to 
the appearance of Vietnam in the EIC’s strategy and partly created new knowledge 
about the market of English commodities in Vietnam. Those lessons would be gradually 
learned by the English throughout the seventeenth century with both success and failure, 
through the case of the Tonkin factory and the English mission to Cochin-China.  
That both Adams and Saris agreed about the potential and position of Japan in 
the regional trade and discovered the way for the English to participate in this network 
initially drew Vietnam into the EIC’s orbit since Cochin-China and Tonkin were part of 
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the trading network between Japan and Southeast Asia through the red seal system. In 
their viewpoint, the EIC would play a role of middleman in the area, especially between 
China and Japan, collecting Chinese goods from Bantam, China, Tonkin, Cochin-China 
and Siam to sell in Japan. That role was envisaged as the same as that of the Portuguese 
and Dutch in their port-to-port trade. 150  English factors in the Hirado branch then 
gradually expanded the EIC’s trade in East Asia and discovered the potential of 
Vietnam in the regional system through learning from the experiences of the Japanese, 
Chinese, and Dutch merchants in Japan who had traded there. 
By pursuing this idea, English merchants in Japan, initially Adams and Saris, 
but also Richard Cocks the chief factor, proved their role in the EIC’s commercial 
strategy. The importance of their role is reflected in their involvement in the regional 
trading chain and their attempts to voyage to Cochin-China, Siam, Tonkin and to 
connect with China. They were most interested in forming a trading relationship with 
China and sought to revive the silk-silver trade between Japan and China since China 
was ‘the country exceeding fruitful... rich merchandise, velvets, damasks, cloth of gold 
and tissue, with many sorts of sugar’ which were highly desired both in the regional 
trade network and in Europe.151 China was deemed to contain the biggest potential 
market for the EIC in East Asia. It was, however, hard for the EIC to establish a formal 
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relationship with mainland China in the early seventeenth century as this was still in the 
period of the Ming rulers’ prohibition of private overseas trade. The Ming dynasty 
maintained only Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang as official ports for tributary trade 
with neighbours.152 Chinese private dealers were not permitted to trade abroad, and 
Western traders were not allowed to trade with mainland China. However, this policy 
failed to stem the commercial activities of private Chinese merchants as they still traded 
illegally or the trade between China and neighbours were undertaken through 
diplomatic missions.153 As a result, Chinese official and illegal private trade with other 
countries in the South China Sea, such as Tonkin and Cochin-China who might act as 
intermediaries for Chinese goods, began to become more important. Chinese traders 
carried much merchandise to Southeast Asia by the late sixteenth century. 154  The 
number of Chinese junks in the South China Sea was ten times greater than the number 
of European ships.155 The Chinese traders’ imposing presence in Southeast Asia thus 
provided a flexible means for Europeans to collect Chinese goods.156 Because Japan 
was particularly interested in obtaining Chinese silks and the EIC saw a role for itself in 
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this supply chain it re-energised the English interest in the Chinese market. Cocks 
adopted two approaches to obtain Chinese products. Firstly, he tried to use Chinese 
salesmen in Japan several times to gain a trading license. For example, he proposed to 
Li Tan, a Chinese businessman, a deal whereby he would give 8,000 Spanish dollars in 
exchange for permission to trade in China’s continent.157  However, this effort was 
unsuccessful and English factors had to focus on voyages to Southeast Asia to collect 
substitutes. Consequently, Cochin-China and Tonkin and other ports in the South China 
Sea became important intermediaries for the EIC to obtain alternative Chinese products 
for Japan. 
Cocks and other factors acknowledged the usefulness of the Japanese red seal 
system (which officially allowed Japanese ships to trade overseas) in trading with 
Southeast Asia.158 They saw the need for the EIC to gain access to this system to 
participate in the existing regional network. Importantly, this system allowed 
participants to avoid setting factories in different places and therefore reduced the 
expense the English had to pay in trading overseas. They speedily rented a junk to sail 
to Cochin-China in early 1614 to collect substitute silks.159 Cocks also bought the junk 
Sea Adventure and started sailing to Siam four times (first in 1615) with the aim of 
procuring deerskin, sappan wood, pepper, wax and the Siam-Japan trade became an 
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‘integral part’ of the EIC’s strategy.160 Voyages to Vietnam were also undertaken until 
1619 although at this stage trade with Cochin-China and Tonkin was not as successful 
as trade with Siam due to issues of the quantity of commodities in Southern Vietnam, 
the hardline policy of the Trinh Lord and the problems which the English themselves 
faced in using the Japanese red seal (see the next part). 
In general terms, the establishment of the Hirado factory signified the EIC’s 
change in trading policy with East Asia, demonstrating its desire to develop the existing 
regional trading chain to obtain substitute silver to cover the Eurasian trade (selling 
English goods in East Asia, exchanging regional commodities for Japanese silver in 
order to reduce the export of English bullion to Asia). English overseas factors played a 
pioneering role in finding new markets and expanding the EIC’s position in East Asia 
by establishing the Hirado factory and by attempting to collect Chinese products using 
both direct and indirect methods. Tonkin and Cochin-China appeared in the EIC’s 
system with the role of supplementary markets as the direct trade with China was 
interrupted. The finding and procurement of silver by English overseas factors was the 
key to the EIC’s progress and led to participation in the regional trade. These 
discoveries and the experiment of having employees in offshore areas provided the 
Company with useful lessons in how to adapt successfully to the character of distant 
trading networks, and how valuable of the regional trade in the EIC’s strategy. 
In the early seventeenth century the Company entered a period of remarkable 
experimentation, drawing on both the information supplied by its factors and other 
traders and on the lessons learned from its experimentations of expansion in East Asia. 
The first lesson was how to remedy the EIC’s lack of trading knowledge which had 
                                                             
160 IOR/E/3/3, no. 319, ‘Richard Cocks at Hirado to the East India Company’s Agent at Ayutthaya, 6 




caused major problems resulting in the closure of a series of factories and the EIC’s halt 
in the attention to East Asia until the late seventeenth century. The English arrived in 
this area late, and therefore they had less experience than their competitors. To limit the 
problem of insufficient knowledge, the EIC hired skilful men such as Pieter Floris and 
Lucas Antheuniszoon who both had formerly worked for the VOC, or Adams (from 
1613) who had worked with both the VOC and the Japanese government to work in 
distant areas.161 These pioneers had themselves learned about the nature of trade and the 
trading opportunities in this far-flung region.162 However, using experienced staff could 
not satisfactorily address the powerlessness of the EIC in East Asia. Its insufficient 
knowledge and experience continued to limit the EIC in evaluating and building the 
regional trading system. While the Dutch treated the Malay Peninsula, the Spice Islands 
and Japan as ‘integral parts’ of the whole East Asian trading system, the EIC seemed to 
keep their factories in Japan, Bantam, Siam and other places isolated from the main 
trading network as overseas factors attempted to connect and expand the English trade 
in a network themselves while London had no policy to encourage and develop those 
attempts. 163  The way overseas factors worked - isolated and without support from 
London - illustrated the management problems of the early EIC and the relationship 
between the core London and periphery overseas factories and factors. During the early 
period of the joint-stock company, London had little experience to manage its branches 
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and staffs, and the driving overseas trade was still greatly depended on the single 
attempt of those factors. The EIC’s overseas trade in this period, therefore, was 
experimentation mostly based on the policy of using skilled staff. This policy changed 
in the late century as the EIC recognised the role of management and of regional trade 
towards the expansion of the EIC in East Asia, which was epitomised precisely via the 
case of the Tonkin factory. Consequently, Cochin-China and Tonkin appeared in the 
EIC’s trade due to the efforts of English factors in Hirado. Their attempts to become 
involved in the intra-Asian trade, however, failed as they could not identify the true 
trading chain due to restricted information and support from London or Bantam.164 The 
following section discusses in more detail how English factors in Japan contributed the 
EIC’s knowledge and supplied information about regional trade and the potential of 
Tonkin and Cochin-China as intermediary sites in the East Asian commercial system. 
 
The English voyages to Cochin-China and Tonkin in the 1610s 
 
This part argues that the way in which the EIC recognised the place of Vietnam in the 
regional trading network during the progress they contacted with people in both Tonkin 
and Cochin-China and how their first received information affected the EIC’s 
connections with Vietnam in the next period. The English in Hirado acknowledged that 
any profit arising from Japanese trade was not from this market itself, but from the 
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connections it provided with other ports in East Asia.165 Adams drew attention to this 
opportunity in his letter to Bantam in 1613, stating that the EIC would send no money 
from Europe if they sold velvet, silk, damask and other Chinese products in Japan in 
exchange for capital as Japan was rich in gold and silver.166 That was the best solution 
to trade there since Chinese goods were in high demand in Japan and fetched a high 
price, while only a limited market existed for European goods. However, it was hard for 
the EIC to collect Chinese products, as the Chinese government had prevented all trade 
with Japan. Both Chinese and Japanese wholesalers needed a ‘third place’ or ‘third 
country trade’ to continue this profitable commerce. Japanese merchants formed 
‘Japanese towns’ in various parts of Southeast Asia such as Hoi An/ Faifo (Vietnam), 
Malacca (Malaya), Patani (Siam) and Bantam (Indonesia) to collect Chinese silk from 
Chinese junks sailing there. Japanese merchants sailed to North and Central Vietnam 41 
times before the English set up a factory in Hirado in 1613, and 50 times during the 
period of the English factory in Japan (1613-1623).167 Using the red seal system or 
investing privately in the Japanese ships to Vietnam became a good means of expanding 
the English trade to the South China Sea as they did not need invest money to establish 
factories there and they could use regional junks to trade southwards to collect Chinese 
and Southeast Asian commodities to sell in Japan in exchange for silver. Chinese 
private dealers also arrived in the above ports to trade with Japanese and other 
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merchants. 168  The deteriorating situation in the Japan-China relationship created 
intermediate trading ports in Southeast Asia and a good chance for English traders to 
break into this trading system. Thus, the role of ports in the South China Sea became 
key for trading activities for the EIC. Aware of this situation, in December 1613 Saris 
left the Engish factors in Hirado an advice that ‘the first [job] is…buying and fitting of a 
junke for Syam and Pottaunye with such quantetie of braudcloath, cloath of Cambaia, 
ollivants’ teeth and royalles as hath beene conferred upon,…for about that tyme the 
China junkes wilbe there, and trading with them is the gretest hope of benyfitt, for there 
commodityes are to be bought reasonable w’ch heare will yealde greate p’fitt.’169 This 
quote demonstrates that Saris recognised the importance of regional trade towards the 
EIC’s position and expansion in East Asia. He was also largely affected by Adams’ 
knowledge as he believed that Siam and Patani had become the main source of 
substitute Chinese goods for Japan as Chinese traders shipped and traded there 
regularly. However, his assessment was inaccurate because Siam and Patani were rich 
in wood and deerskin only. Through the Japanese and Dutch merchants in Japan, 
English factors in Hirado seemed to understand that Cochin-China and Tonkin could 
provide substitute silks for Chinese goods as silks were widely produced in both 
kingdoms. Consequently, the English arranged voyages to those kingdoms to discover 
the regional trading network and develop the Hirado factory’s activities. 
 The first English voyage to Cochin-China in 1614 took place at a time when 
they had insubstantial and unclear information about this kingdom and its potential for 
trade. It also was not as initially planned as English factors found no junk to travel to 
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Siam as Saris had proposed in December 1613. As Richard Cocks explained, 
information was mostly gained from Adams’ business partner, a Dutch trader who he 
had traded in Cochin-China a few years earlier.170 This information and the awareness 
of the existence of the Japan-Cochin-China trade through the red seal system 
encouraged English factors to travel there to gather Chinese goods. The voyage to 
Cochin-China was indirectly affected by Saris and Adams’ opinion about the 
participation of the English in the regional trade and directly operated by Richard Cocks 
and other factors as they made their own decisions about operations and with which 
‘country trade’ to connect. It meant that under the EIC’s policy of using experienced 
staff to discover and experiment in gaining access to the overseas trade, all English 
overseas factors had the opportunity to make voyages to expand the English trade in 
East Asia.  The adviser (Adams), founder (Saris), and factors of the Hirado factory all 
agreed about the importance and significance of the engagement into the existing trade 
network. This example again shows the distinct role of English individuals in 
discovering new opportunities for trade and expanding the EIC’s trade in East Asia and 
how they recognised the role of regional trade in enhancing the EIC’s position in East 
Asia in the early seventeenth century. 
 On 14 March 1614, the junk Rokan left Hirado for Cochin-China with two 
Englishmen, Tempest Peacock and Walter Carwarden with presents and a letter signed 
by King James I to the King of Cochin-China.171 The ship carried a cargo of £750 or 
2,983 taels with 8 broadcloths, half the ivory inventory of the Hirado factory, Cambay 
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cloth and 1000 rials (about 200 hundred pounds). 172  The stock for Cochin-China 
represented 13 per cent of the capital base of the Hirado factory. With mostly clothes 
and 1000 rials, the voyage not only showed the character of an experimentation to sell 
English cloths in a new market as Saris had advocated, but also illustrated its desire to 
obtain a good result on silk trade as they invested more than ten per cent of the Hirado 
factory’s stock there while information about Cochin-China was limited. Unfortunately, 
this voyage ended in disaster with the death of both Englishmen and the complete loss 
of the stock. This outcome created significant problems for the Hirado factory, and this 
start did not bode well for the relationship between the EIC and Cochin-China.  
 Reports of the Hirado factory to Bantam and London from 1614 to 1617 showed 
that the English had little exact information about this disastrous trip and they only got 
information from the Japanese and Chinese. The English received news that the two 
Englishmen had died, and their stock disappeared a few months after the voyage. At 
that time, Cocks believed that the Englishmen’s association with the free Dutch 
merchant in Cochin-China had led to their downfall, and the Cochin-Chinese thus killed 
Peacock and the Dutch while Carwarden had escaped but later had died in a storm.173 
The second version of events emerged in 1615 through Li Tan, a Chinese merchant, 
who claimed that Japanese residents had murdered the Englishmen and that the Cochin-
Chinese knew nothing about this.174 In 1617, another version of the event was provided 
by Japanese people who had travelled in the same junk as the Englishmen to Cochin-
China. According to them, Peacock was washed overboard and drowned because he 
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could not swim, being weighed down by 50 or 60 reals of eight in his pockets. 
Carwarden stayed at Cochin-China and tried to send a letter to the English factors in 
Japan through Safian Dono, a Dutch trader, but after that, there was no further news 
about Carwarden.175 One event recorded in three different versions illustrated that the 
English clearly had little real knowledge about the trade in Cochin-China and more 
broadly in East Asia. Their information was provided by other merchants and they had 
no direct sources to get exact version. This placed a significant limitation on English 
trade in East Asia as their knowledge about the region is narrow and English overseas 
factors needed to learn more through other traders. Meanwhile, the relation of the 
Japanese, Chinese, Dutch and even Cochin-Chinese in the English disastrous event 
partly demonstrated the difficulty and competition the English had to face in trading in 
East Asia. Nevertheless, Cocks and the English factors in Japan still expected to take 
part in the regional trade via voyages to Cochin-China as this kingdom was a depot for 
both regional and global traders. 
 If the first voyage to Cochin-China was only a substitute for the preferred 
journey to Siam, the second voyage in 1617 formed part of the Hirado factory’s 
commercial strategy to collect alternative silk to maintain the EIC’s position in Japan.176 
London decided to build the trade with China after receiving Cocks’ reports in 1615. 
The EIC allowed Cocks to establish a factory in China (if possible) instead of carrying 
goods from Europe to Japan in exchange for silver.177  With the help of Li Tan, a 
Chinese merchant in Japan, Cocks expected that a formal relationship would be 
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established soon; but their attempts were in vain. Therefore, the Hirado factory decided 
to improve the system of supporting trading ports to pick up Chinese merchandise for 
Japan. The English in London had expected to access a ‘store of silk’ in Ayutthaya and 
Patani through the voyage of the Sea Adventure in 1615. However, they learnt that Siam 
could provide only sappan wood and deer skins while Patani could supply only pepper 
and wax.178 Cocks had a different source of silk in mind and believed that ‘yf we may 
get a quiet trade into Cochin-China there we may be sure to have a raw silk every yeare 
in greate quantity. Some yeares there cometh above 1000 picos from that place only into 
Japon…. But for trade into Cochin-China for silk … it must be done in Japon junkes or 
English shipping.’179 It seemed that after four years in Japan, Cocks had gained much 
more experience and knowledge than previously about the trading system and the 
available commodities in the South China Sea. Through their contacts with the Dutch 
and Japanese traders and the experimentation in trading with Siam and Patani, he 
received information that those places could not supply silks for Japan while silk trade 
with Cochin-China was possible as this country supplied as much silk as China. 
Importantly, Cocks also recognised that it was cheaper and safer to engage with the 
Japan-Cochin-China link through the existing red seal system of the Japanese 
government, rather than settling a factory or using or English shipping (see supra).180 
With that system, the English just needed to get permission from the Shogun and then 
rent a small junk to sail to Southern Vietnam. This way could save money for the 
English as they did not need to buy a new ship or establish a new factory with high cost. 
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A junk was sufficient to collect silks and other products from Cochin-China. Cocks 
believed that although playing a role of supplementary market, Cochin-China would 
become important in the EIC’s survival and development in Japan. This opinion 
demonstrated the change in Cocks’ understanding about the possibility of commodities 
in overseas areas, the role of regional trade, and especially a consideration between 
establishing a factory and sending ships to collect goods regularly. A secondary purpose 
for this voyage was to discover more about the death in 1614 of the two servants, 
Peacock and Carwarden and to collect the English goods left in Cochin-China and ‘to 
get the debt the King of Cochin-China oweth your Wor’s’.181 As a result, the second 
voyage to Cochin-China was a means to broaden the EIC’s trade in East Asia as they 
had done in Siam and Patani. English factors hoped to gain permission to trade there in 
future and to participate in the Japanese trading link with Cochin-China. However, 
Cocks’ narrow trading expectation regarding Cochin-China again showed how 
incomplete was the information of the English about East Asian commodities. They 
were not aware for instance that Japanese merchants imported sugar into Cochin-China, 
as this was proving very popular as a commodity in exchange for silver while silk was 
quite small in quantity here.182 They were also not aware that Tonkin silk was better in 
quality and quantity than that found in Cochin-China (see chapter two).  
 Two English factors, Edmund Sayers and William Nealson, were on the junk the 
Gift of God belonging to Adams, which left Hirado on 23 March 1617 to Cochin-China. 
They carried around 1,896 taels of money and goods. This cargo included mostly 
English broadcloth, Indian cloth, Russian hide, some metals, luxury goods, and 9 taels 
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of cash.183 These products were unsold English goods in Japan. Instead of keeping them 
to rot in the warehouse in Hirado, the factors expected to sell them in Cochin-China to 
reduce the Company’s loss and find another market for the English goods. Adams did 
not hold the same belief in these commodities as the English factors, as evidenced by 
his earlier letter about the possibilities of Cochin-China trade. He also carried for 
himself some products such as copper, sake (Japanese drink), mawatta (Japanese floss 
silk), armour, pikes, brimstone, stille, striped cloth, arrows, verdigris, firearms, and long 
swords.184 It demonstrates the clear difference between Adams and the English factors 
regarding their knowledge about trade in Cochin-China. While the EIC carried cloth and 
luxury goods to everywhere in East Asia, Adams focused on weapons, brimstone and 
copper which were in high demand in Cochin-China. Accordingly, EIC trade in this 
kingdom had little success while Adams obtained a more satisfactory outcome. The 
difference in trading results between the factory and Adams then became the 
fundamental knowledge of the EIC about exported commodities in Vietnam in the late 
seventeenth century. 
 On the diplomatic front, the English factors also gained key lessons about the 
welcome of Cochin-China towards foreigners and opportunities from the open policy of 
the native government which encouraged the EIC to come back to Cochin-China in the 
following year and in the 1690s. In theory, diplomacy, especially diplomatic gift-giving, 
was important and necessary in all the relationships as it ‘transits the trust and 
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generosity of friendship.’185 Recently, scholars such as Felicity Heal, argue that gift-
giving is crucial to political success, and it ‘made the formation of a global political 
community’, ‘a cross-cultural communication’.186 The English, during the progress of 
trading with Cochin-China also used diplomatic gifts to get permission to trade and 
expand their influence there. On 3 May 1617, the English gave the King presents of 
broadcloth, amber, looking glasses. In return, they were welcomed by the King of 
Cochin-China and his Mandarins as Cochin-China needed foreigners to support its 
economy and military. Adams stated that the King ‘was very glad that Englishmen ware 
come againe into his countreye, and that we [the English] should bee very welcome 
whensoevere anye of our shepinge died come to his countreye, and withall had sent us 
his gousheme, …’.187 With the open policy of Cochin-China, the English had good 
conditions to establish a relationship with the Cochin-Chinese Court, and they were 
quickly granted an ‘unlimited’ trading licence which allowed them to trade anywhere 
and at any time in Cochin-China. This was a significant achievement of the EIC since 
this allowed them to participate in the regional trade via Cochin-China, a convenient 
place to meet and trade with most East Asian traders. Moreover, the King became the 
English trading partner as he ordered ‘much a pece of ordnance of brase’. The English 
were promised that if they could supply this order, they could then trade in Cochin-
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China without paying tax.188 After the voyage, Adams, to emphasise the potential for 
further trade with this kingdom, reported that ‘the King of Cochin-China is well 
contented our nation shall trade into his country’.189 Success on the diplomatic front, 
coupled with the King’s demand for a trade, especially arms-trade, was the fundamental 
reason that the Hirado factory prepared another junk to visit Cochin-China after 1617.190 
The plan also brought hope at a time of little trading success elsewhere. This success 
also taught English people useful lessons about how to treat the Cochin-Chinese Court 
and which factors were important for the EIC’s trading future in this kingdom. 
 On the commercial front, Sayers completed some useful trade in Cochin-China 
which supported the Hirado factory. He carried to Japan 307 catties 5 taels white silk 
(priced 493 taels), 79 catties Aguila wood (sappan wood - 180 taels), and 963 catties 
ditto wood (50 taels).191 The silks were sold in Japan at 218 and then 230 taels per 
pecul. Sappan wood was sold at between 8 mas and 1 tael 6 mas per catty.192 With such 
results, the voyage went some way to support English trade in Japan but could not 
procure the necessary quantity of silks for the Japanese market as Cochin-China could 
only provide insignificant amounts of silk. To deal with this problem, Sayers tried to 
purchase silks from Chinese salesmen (338 catties of white silk for 175 taels per picul), 
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but unfortunately, the English money was stolen by the Chinese.193 This event reflected 
the inexperience of English factors in dealing with their rivals in overseas trade and the 
level of difficulty they met during the trade in East Asia. Furthermore, English dealers 
faced a trading prohibition from Bernardo, a Japanese trader, as he had a commission 
from the King of Cochin-China to trade exclusively with Chinese merchants.194 Again 
the English learnt lessons about trade with regional merchants and recognised the 
difficulty of accessing the East Asian trade networks and competing with skilful traders 
in East Asia.  
 Results of the second journey to Cochin-China showed that this kingdom could 
be a part of the EIC’s trading system in East Asia, but its value was not enough to 
establish a factory there. Instead, Cocks tried to use more Japanese or Chinese junks 
under the red seal system to trade to restrict the English expense. He thus lobbied 
Japanese officers to gain a license for future trips to Cochin-China. The English used 
the Chinese junk, Shiquan, with Adams as a pilot, Sayers as merchant and Hayley as a 
mate for the third trip to Cochin-China in 1618. The amount of money carried on this 
voyage is unknown but was not very significant as the second journey confirmed the 
value of Cochin-China and the Hirado factory had little money without support from 
London and Bantam. Massarella has argued, it was less than 200,000 taels.195 The junk 
left Hirado on 11 March 1618 and sailed to Nagasaki on 17 March. Unfortunately, due 
to the inclement weather, it could not sail to Cochin-China. Until 14 May 1618, the junk 
had to return to Hirado. After this voyage, the Hirado factory had no opportunity to 
make further voyages to the South China Sea due to their illegal operation in the red 
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seal system. Instead of shipping southwards, the Hirado factory had to invest as a 
private trader in Adams’ voyage the following year (see below). The only journey was 
that of a junk which called at the Pulo Condore island (Cochin-China) in 1619 on the 
way from Hirado to Bantam, but there was no further trade at this time with Cochin-
China. 196  The English only reappeared in Cochin-China in the late 1690s as they 
considered to control all sea-routes in the South China Sea. 
 The failure of the third voyage to Cochin-China not only put the Hirado factory 
into further difficulty but also almost ended all English expectations of trading with 
South Vietnam. Moreover, in a serious miscalculation, they made an illegal exchange of 
red seals in 1617, and the Japanese government responded by delaying all trading offers 
to them. The English had received a license in 1617 for Cochin-China, but they sold it 
to Li Tan as the second voyage had not yet returned.197 That license was then resold to 
Japanese merchants. These traders encountered problems in Cochin-China, and the 
affair was reported to the Japanese government.198 Consequently, there was a delay in 
the English factory being granted a new license to trade and the red seal for Tonkin 
trade in 1619 was granted only to Adams as a free merchant although he was still 
associated with the Hirado factory. In these circumstances, the English factors had no 
choice but to expand their trade by investing as private traders in Adams’ voyage to 
Tonkin to discover the potential of this kingdom. 
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 Adams rented a private Japanese junk for his voyage to Tonkin on 17 March 
1619 and the English factory invested 700 taels in this journey.199 As Adams’ journal 
records, although the Tonkin kingdom welcomed foreigners, his trade was small and 
was not successful due to the competition of Chinese salesmen. On 20 April, Adams 
gave the King some presents and over the next few days, he proposed a silk-trade of 
4000 tales to local Mandarins.200 However, after nearly three months in Tonkin, Adams 
had only made modest exchanges with local people in Thang Long. The trade Adams 
most wanted with the Tonkin Court did not take place as there was no silk available for 
Adams in mid-July.201 No reason for this failure was given, but it might have been 
connected to the visit of a Chinese junk at that time. It could be that the King of Tonkin 
favoured Chinese dealers, his traditional customers, above Adams and the English 
merchants, who were relative newcomers. Eventually, Adams only managed to 
purchase a small range of goods, mostly Chinese silks (from Fukien) at different 
prices.202 The English factory received only a tiny share of the trade from this visit with 
4 piculs 20 catties of silk. The result did not reflect the availability of Tonkin silk and 
was insufficient to persuade the English to reinvest in Tonkin. However, like in Cochin-
China, the English obtained a lesson about the competition of Chinese merchants in 
trade in Tonkin. The limited supply of silk in both Tonkin and Cochin-China, the 
difficulties of the Hirado factory from 1619 to 1623, and the issues of VOC-EIC 
relationship resulted in no further voyages to Vietnam or Siam in the next years. The 
English withdrawal from Hirado in 1623 was unavoidable, and it caused the collapse of 
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any EIC operations in Tonkin, Cochin-China and the South China Sea in the following 




In conclusion, in the early days of the EIC, English traders learned useful lessons about 
the valuable role of individuals in expanding overseas trade and about the possibility of 
regional trade in East Asia. The EIC’s ambitious policy in East Asia was to identify 
commercial opportunities and enlarge its commerce through its overseas factors who 
had a free hand in operating without London’s direct orders or instructions. Alongside 
the primary aim of procuring spices and pepper from Bantam, the EIC’s factors tried to 
purchase a more diverse range of Asian commodities through experimental voyages to 
the South China Sea. Its distant servants were thus encouraged to identify new markets 
where the VOC had no presence or authority. However, the weakness of its capital base 
and a lack of military power restricted the EIC’s enlargement and competition in East 
Asia. These issues led to the Company’s failure in this period, with the closure of its 
factories and its withdrawal from East Asia for the following decades.  
The Company allowed English factors in Bantam or Japan to trade on their own 
initiative in East Asia as London had little knowledge about this area. This was also the 
reason why the EIC preferred to hire seasoned men to live and work in overseas 
regions. The opening of the factory at Hirado and the decisions to voyage to Siam or 
Vietnam were the results of the initiatives of English factors as they learnt about and 
adapted to the nature of trade in East Asia. They were the EIC’s pioneers, enlarging its 




knowledge of trading networks in East Asia and its over-dependence on (and sometimes 
ignorance of) employees’ suggestions. On the one hand, the Company’s servants were 
helpful in extending the EIC’s commerce through various voyages and factories. On the 
other hand, because they understood the EIC’s ambitions and desires, they reported 
appealing but biased or even sometimes useless information, to consolidate their 
position. Such misleading information often damaged the EIC’s trade in this region. 
 The inclusion of Cochin-China and Tonkin in EIC’s trade also reflects the 
pivotal role of English individuals from the Hirado factory, especially Cocks and 
Adams. Initially, based on the knowledge of Adams and desire of Saris, the Hirado 
factory wanted Siam and Patani as secondary markets to serve the primary aim of Japan. 
However, during the trading process in Japan, English factors, especially Cocks 
discovered the existence of Cochin-China and Tonkin in the regional trade system and 
how they could provide substitute goods for Japan. After five years in Hirado, the 
English gradually discovered the role and value of Cochin-China and Tonkin. Both 
those countries were chosen as they had silks and Chinese and Japanese merchants 
visited there for ‘third country trade’. Since Vietnam showed only modest potential for 
direct trade with London as its commodities mostly served Asian demands, it was 
considered as a supportive supplier and intermediary in East Asia. This role was 
reassessed in the EIC’s strategy in the late century. The first contacts between English 
merchants and Vietnam in the 1610s thus provided the foundational knowledge and 







CHAPTER 2. TONKIN AND COCHIN-CHIA: POTENTIAL AND 
ATTRACTIVE MARKETS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
 
If chapter one presents the role of English overseas individuals and the EIC’s learning 
about trading networks in East Asia through its first contact with Cochin-China and 
Tonkin in the 1610s from Japan, this chapter explains why the EIC arrived in the two 
Vietnamese kingdoms and provides a further focus on the contributions of the EIC’s 
factors in identifying Tonkin and Cochin-China as potentially important nodes in the 
regional trading system in the seventeenth century. Among the appealing aspects of 
Vietnam for European traders in this period were its strategic location, its political crisis 
and resulting relatively open policy towards foreigners, its raw materials and its 
fabricated products. Vietnam was at the centre of all the trade routes in the South China 
Sea and allowed for the nearest links with China. The new open-policy of both Tonkin 
and Cochin-China towards Europeans that resulted from their political crisis created an 
advantageous environment for trading in this period, especially for European 
Companies which started entering into Vietnam in the early seventeenth century. This 
chapter argues that above all the EIC understood Vietnam as a critical node within 
regional trade due to its availability to supply substitute products and the success in the 
silk trade of Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese and Dutch traders there. Using Vietnam as 
an intermediary for its commercial activities provided the EIC with further evidence of 
the attractiveness and openness of this country for trade. Learning from these activities, 
the EIC subsequently established a factory in Tonkin and set up a formal relationship 
with Cochin-China. Bantam agents and other overseas factors played the key role in 




progress of settling formal relations with those kingdoms. While the potential of 
Vietnam can be seen from the writings of European adventurers during that time; the 
EIC’s engagement in this area, especially in the case of Tonkin, can be tracked through 
the diaries of English factors in the 1610s and the communication between EIC and 
Bantam from the late 1650s.203 
 
The internal appeal of Tonkin and Cochin-China 
 
In the seventeenth century, Tonkin covered the area that is now Northern Vietnam, 
while Cochin-China was Southern Vietnam (from Hue province to the south). Both the 
kingdoms had advantageously geographical locations to connect to mainland China 
from the south and control the sea-routes and expand the regional trade in the South 
China Sea. Indeed, Vietnam lay on a trade crossroads allowing merchants to travel from 
Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia and from the West (mainland Southeast Asia) to the 
East (islands). It is noteworthy that although the indigenous inhabitants only engaged in 
coastal trade due to the limitations of their navigational technology, Vietnamese trading 
ports were always appealing to overseas traders.204 Thanks to its favourable position, 
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Map. Vietnam’s strategic geography in the China Sea world 
 
 Source: N. Cooke, T. Li, and J.A. Anderson (eds.), The Tongking gilf through 
history (Philiadelphia, 2011), p. 4.  
 From the first century AD, Vietnam’s ‘earlier’ kingdoms such as Dai Viet, 
Cham-pa and Funan, were the Southeast Asian mainland’s gateways to the Southeast 
Asian islands, especially to the Malay Peninsula.206 Li Tana has highlighted how Dai 
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Viet’s (Tonkin in the seventeenth century) ports played a significant position in trade 
between the hinterlands and the seas and an intermediary role in trade with 
foreigners.207 Its historical role as an intermediary in the regional trading network and as 
a southern gateway to China was one of the main reasons for the European presence in 
Vietnam in the seventeenth century. While the English in Hirado in the 1610s focused 
on the advantage of Vietnam in the trading system with Japan to get silk to exchange for 
silver, the EIC in the next decades gradually understood the role of Vietnam in East 
Asia, especially its location to connect with mainland China from the south and to 
control the sea-routes in the area. 
 Tonkin’s geography was noteworthy as it had a shared border with China and 
therefore facilitated the nearest travel to South China by land route while the Tonkin 
Gulf also supplied convenient access to China and Southeast Asia. 208  Chinese 
merchants in 1776 recorded the fact that ‘it is only six days and nights from Guangzhou 
(China) to Thuan Hoa and Quang Nam (Cochin-China, with the famous port Hoian) by 
sea…. It takes four days and nights and one geng [2,4 hours] to Son Nam [river port in 
Tonkin, a transit point before going to Thang Long]…’.209  This quote indicates that 
Chinese traders were aware not only of the proximity but of the relatively quick sea 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Lower Mekong Delta’ in Art and Archaeology of Funan: Pre-Khmer Kingdom of the Lower Mekong 
Valley (Bangkok, 2003), p. 1-33; B. Lockhart, K.P. Tran (eds.), New Scholarship on Champa (Singapore, 
2010). 
207 Li, 'A View from the Sea: Perspectives on the Northern and Central Vietnamese Coast', Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 37 (2006), p. 86-90. 
208 T. Li, ‘Introduction. The Tongking Gulf through History: a Geopolitical Overview’, in T. Li, N. 
Cooke, J.A. Anderson (eds.), The Tongking Gulf through History (Philadelphia, 2011), pp. 1-24; J.K. 
Whitmore, ‘The Rise of the Coast: Trade, State and Culture in Early Dai Viet’, Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1 (2006), pp. 103-122; Momoki, Dai Viet and the South China Sea trade, pp. 1-34. 
209 Lê Quý Đôn, Phủ biên tạp lục [Desultory Record of the Subjugated Border], c.1776 [Vietnamese 




passage from Guangzhou, a major port and trading city on the Pearl River in Southern 
China to trading ports in Northern and Southern Vietnam. While Hoian in Quang Nam 
province was the most famous trading port in Cochin-China, Thuan Hoa was a gateway 
to the capital of this kingdom which shared the same role as Son Nam in Tonkin in 
helping foreigners to connect with Thang Long by a river system. Importantly, the 
understanding of Chinese traders about sea routes to Vietnam showed their regular 
contact and long-term trading between the Chinese and Vietnamese. Northern Vietnam 
and China shared a common border and the land route was important for the trading 
relationship between the two countries. However, it was mountainous and mostly 
served the trade between provinces near the border. Therefore, the key interest was in 
the sea passage by which Chinese and Tonkin merchants could carry more goods, and 
which brought them in touch with a greater East and Southeast Asian trade network. 
Research about the East Asian trading network show that China and Vietnam had an 
extant trading relationship. During the Han dynasty (206 BC- 220 AD), Chinese 
merchants continuously traded the land and sea routes centred on Jiaozhi (Giao Chi or 
Northern Vietnam) although it was hard to pass the ‘narrow waters’ of the Tonkin 
Gulf.210  Various goods such as gold, silver, copper coins, aloes-wood, varieties of 
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fragrant wood, pearls, elephant tusks, and rhinoceros horn were purchased there by 
foreign merchants.211   
 The English in 1672 recognised that Tonkinese Mandarins used the geographical 
advantages of Tonkin to trade with China by both sea and land routes, and therefore 
could play the role of a broker to help the English to collect Chinese products.212 This 
understanding not only confirmed the importance of Tonkin’s position for making trade 
connections with China but also raised the role of English factors in Tonkin in 
discovering knowledge about trading network and partners to improve the EIC’s future 
in Tonkin and East Asia. The role of Tonkin as an intermediary in East Asia was made 
more important first because of the restrictive trading policy of the Chinese Ming 
dynasty and subsequently due to the Manchu-Ming and Manchu-Taiwan wars which 
lasted until 1684.213 Tonkin’s geography was thus key to the Europeans in making 
trading connections between China and Southeast Asia. 
While the Tonkin Gulf was famous among Chinese merchants, Cochin-China 
attracted foreign traders with its central position in the Asian world. 214  In South 
Vietnam, the Funan kingdom (1st to 7th century AD) became a commercial centre for 
Southeast Asia as it had close relations with India, West Asia and even the 
Mediterranean area.215 As Chapter 1 demonstrated, from the 1610s and 1620s, the EIC 
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knew about the Cochin-Chinese position in East Asia through Japanese, Dutch and 
English factors in Japan. In 1623, in consideration of how to establish trade with China, 
the Bantam Council stated that the Dutch fortification in Pescadores [in Taiwan] 
prevented the English from trading with China and other markets in East Asia and 
indirectly caused the English withdrawal of many factories in the areas. Bantam agents 
‘have demanded in writing that we [the EIC] might settle the China trade upon Polo 
Condore [Cochin-China] and the Liqueos according to the Contract [the Treaty of 
Defence between the governments of England and Holland in 1619] but received a 
frivolous answer, & nothing to ye purpose’.216 The quote shows the fact of the EIC’s 
presence in East Asia, but also of the strategic importance of Vietnam and the role it 
might play in EIC strategy. While the Bantam Council wanted to use the geography of 
Cochin-China with its well-placed island which would facilitate control of the South 
China Sea, the Court of Minutes in London had no serious intention to trade with this 
kingdom and more broadly China and East Asia at this time. This quote also illustrates 
the English overseas factors’ new viewpoint about the advantages of Cochin-China, not 
only in trade but also in the possibility of building a fortification to control the area. It, 
thus, clarifies the role of distant English factors in the ongoing discussion regarding 
East Asian trade, guiding the EIC on how to overcome recognised difficulties and to 
gain a foothold in the region. Their viewpoint provided the EIC with the foundational 
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knowledge to link itself with this kingdom in the late 1690s. Indeed in 1702 the new 
EIC took up the plan and established a fortification in Pulo-Condore.217  
 Historically speaking both Tonkin and Cochin-China had benefited from 
strategic geographical positions in the South China Sea, which had created for them a 
natural role as intermediaries in the East Asian trade for over a thousand years. Such 
long-standing links were valuable for Europeans in helping them to participate in the 
intra-Asian trade. This was especially important after both China and Japan restricted 
foreign trade in the mid-seventeenth century. The advantageous geography enabled 
Vietnam to become the substitute location for the Portuguese, Dutch, and then English 
to deal indirectly with China from the south or via the Chinese or Japanese who arrived 
in Vietnam for further trading.  
If Vietnam’s geographical location provided the Europeans with advantages in 
connecting with Chinese and other East Asian markets, its political crisis and new 
policies regarding overseas trade in the seventeenth century created real opportunities 
for European merchants to gain greater business in Vietnam through military alliances 
or trade in war-materials. Tonkin and Cochin-China’s internal needs from the results of 
civil wars shaped their foreign policy: a relatively open policy towards foreigners vis-à-
vis the policy in the previous centuries, creating open trading regimes in the seventeenth 
century. The establishment of the Mac dynasty in 1527 formally started the age of 
political crisis with continuous wars.218 After the Mac-Le war (1533-1592), the war 
between Trinh and Nguyen families broke out in 1627 as Nguyen Hoang, a young 
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brother-in-law of Trinh Kiem moved to Vietnam’s southern border.219 He tried to build 
a new independent state called Cochin-China by European using the Gianh River as a 
natural northern border. He constructed a sufficiently powerful army with new modern 
European weapons and well-defended garrisons and expanded overseas trade to shape 
the wealthy and independent kingdom as a way of balancing power with the Trinh 
Lords in Northern Vietnam, Tonkin.220 From 1627 to 1672 there were seven military 
campaigns between the two families, but all the Trinh campaigns were unsuccessful, 
and the two clans decided to sign a ceasefire in 1672.221 
Recognising the weakness of Cochin-China in both economic and military 
domains, the Nguyen Lords pursued new strategies by using European support to fight 
against Tonkin. Anticipating that European warships, guns, cannons and superior 
technologies would create huge advantages in the wars with Tonkin, Nguyen Lords 
imported European firearms through Japanese merchants. The trade of materials for war 
such as copper and brimstone also developed in Cochin-China. In 1617, Cochin-China 
invited the Dutch in Siam and Patani to trade, but they considered the risk of trading 
there and made no contact with this kingdom.222 The Portuguese were granted land in 
Hoi An to build a residence just like the Japanese and Chinese to encourage their 
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trading in Cochin-China.223 Cochin-China not only invited merchants to trade but also 
imported new technology and involved foreigners in the making of weapons, especially 
the Portuguese. 224  C. Boxer has shown that the Nguyen Lords regularly imported 
Portuguese weapons from Macao in the period 1627-1680.225 To develop the navy from 
a hundred galleys in 1618 to around 240 galleys in 1642, there is no doubt that Cochin-
China not only needed a strong economy but also support from foreign naval forces.226 
Alongside the policies of inviting foreigners for trade and military alliances, Cochin-
China was also attractive as it adopted a new tax system for overseas merchants. As 
Adams’ records indicate, the English were among the earliest foreigners to receive a 
special offer of free-trade from Cochin-China in the 1610s if they could supply weapons 
for this kingdom. 227  Adams records how in 1617, they were granted ‘[the king’s] 
goshuin or his Chope which is his seal to come with shipping yearly or to settle a 
factree in any part of his dominions’.228 Clearly, the English were welcome in Cochin-
China early in the seventeenth century, and would have had good trading conditions in 
return for providing weapons for the kingdom. The English factors in the Hirado 
factory, however, were facing difficulties at the time, mostly in finding silks for Japan, 
and had no chance to join in the arms trade. Therefore, opportunities that Adams spoke 
of were never realised. Cochin-China’s demand for weapons, however, remained 
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unchanged even after the end of the war with Tonkin. According to the reports on 
Thomas Bowyear’s mission to Cochin-China, as late as 1695 the English ambassadors 
in Cochin-China were again asked to supply cannons for the Nguyen Lords although the 
war with Tonkin had paused from 1672.229  
The Trinh Lords in Northern Vietnam also tried to import European weapons as 
they recognised that the Chinese military system was insufficiently powerful to make 
counterattacks against their rival.230 They, therefore, purchased guns from Macao and 
became one of the biggest customers of Macao in guns and cannons.231  When the 
Portuguese stopped trading with Tonkin, the Trinh quickly asked the Dutch for military 
and commercial supports in 1637 to battle with Cochin-China.232 Instead of restricting 
overseas commerce as the previous dynasties had done, the Trinh Lords then launched 
new plans for an open-trade policy to foster support from Europeans. In the fifteenth 
century, all foreigners had been forbidden from living near to the capital, Thang Long 
or near to the northern border with China.233  But in the 1640s the Dutch obtained 
permission to build a factory in Thang Long as they supported Tonkin in the war with 
Cochin-China. 234  From 1650, the Trinh Lords decided that Europeans, Chinese or 
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Japanese could stay in the Thanh Tri and Khuyen Luong villages, near Thang Long. In 
January 1683, the Court sent a letter to the Dutch Governor in Batavia to confirm that 
the Dutch had obtained privileged status in Tonkin as they had been granted permission 
to live in Thang Long.235 These events showed that the Trinh Lords had created good 
conditions for foreigners to stay and trade at Thang Long, the market with the greatest 
potential in Tonkin, provided they were willing to supply the goods that Tonkin desired 
(in particular weapons).  
The demand for guns and weapons only declined when the war with Cochin-
China was stopped in 1672. Thereafter Tonkin, however, still needed saltpetre and 
copper and these commodities became the EIC’s leading exports to Tonkin after the 
1670s. However, unlike Cochin-China, Tonkin never opened the trade door completely. 
Consequently, after the war with Cochin-China (1672), Tonkin’s overseas policy again 
became somewhat restricted just as the EIC was attempting to establish itself there.  
The new open-policy of both Tonkin and Cochin-China resulted in an 
advantageous environment for trade in the seventeenth century with the result that 
Europeans appeared in greater numbers. However, European companies gained 
different results from their engagements because of their differing commercial strategies 
and the timing of their contact with Vietnam. While the Portuguese and Dutch utilised 
the Vietnamese crisis to promote their own interests by trying to manipulate the various 
parties involved and gain profits from the weapons trade, the EIC obtained less of an 
advantage because they arrived in Vietnam (1672) just when there was a pause in the 
civil war. 
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Since the VOC was established with the dual purpose of promoting commerce 
and of fighting the Spanish and Portuguese, the Dutch pursued ‘trade by arms’ to gain 
control from their rivals in potential trading areas.236 Jan Pietersz Coen, a Dutch agent at 
Bantam in December 1614 wrote to Amsterdam that ‘in Asia, trade must be driven and 
maintained under the protection and favour of your weapons and that the weapons must 
be wielded from the profits gained by the trade; so that trade cannot be maintained 
without war, nor war without trade.’ 237  They were willing to use the military and 
developed the arms-trade in Asia. Vietnam was no exception to this policy as the Dutch 
provided weapons and directly participated in the Trinh-Nguyen wars in the 1640s.238 
The Portuguese not only supplied weapons but also served in the Cochin-Chinese 
government as high-ranking officers as doctors for the Lords, teachers for the Crown 
Prince and Princes, scientists, and military assistant.239 As a result, the Portuguese and 
Dutch gained privileges to trade in Vietnam and eventually generated a significant yield 
from commerce.  
The EIC, however, did not gain trading advantages in the same way as its rivals. 
The Company rarely used military methods to open trading in Asia in the seventeenth 
century. The Charter granted by Queen Elizabeth in 1600 confirmed that the EIC’s 
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intention in Asia was to trade, not to establish an English colony.240 It stipulated that 
‘the whole entire and only Trade and Traffick, and the whole entire and only Liberity, 
Ufe and Privilege of trading and trafficking, and ufing Feat and Trade of Merchandize, 
to and from the faid Eaft-Indies’.241 The Charter also confirmed that ‘in Defence of out 
Realm, or for Offence of our Enimies, or that it fhall be found needful to join to the 
Navy of us, our Heirs or Succeffors, the Ships of our Subjects, to be alfo armed for the 
Wars’.242 Consequently, force was rarely used to protect English ships, factories against 
the competition of other Europeans or to help the EIC in negotiations with Asian 
governments to enhance trade. The EIC exported weapons to some markets where 
necessary but tried to avoid participating in regional conflicts directly as this 
engagement cost a lot of money, time, and man while the effect was uncertain.243 In the 
1610s, English factors in Hirado did not involve themselves in the arms-trade with 
Cochin-China as the trading incentives were insufficient to induce them to become 
involved. They had found little silk there to substitute that from China, and they lacked 
the power and capital to meet the trading requirements of Cochin-China necessary to 
                                                             
240 Chaudhuri, The EIC, p. 13; Bassett, ‘English Trade in Asia’, p. 91. 
241 ‘Charter granted by Queen’, p. 19. 
242 Ibid, p. 20; B. Watson, ‘Fortifications and the Idea of Force in Early English East India Company 
Relations with India’, Past & Present, 88 (1980), pp. 70-87; E. Smith, ‘Naval Violence and Trading 
Privileges in Early Seventeenth-Century Asia’ International Journal of Maritime History, 25 (2013), pp. 
147-158; D. Veevers, ‘The Company as their Lords and the Deputy as a Great Rajah: Imperial expansion 
and the English East India Company on the West Coast of Sumatra, 1685-1730’, The Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, 41 (2013), pp. 687-709. They only used war or intervened into domestic 
issues in some places in India and Sumatra where the power of naval and war would help the EIC to 
open, maintain the trade. 
243 For example, the EIC was willing to provide weapons for Taiwan, but worried about getting involved 
in the war with mainland China in the 1670s. See D. Massarella, ‘Chinese, Tartars and ‘Thea’ or a Tale of 
two Companies: The English East India Company and Taiwan in the Seventeenth Century’, Journal of 




allow them to have free trade. Similarly, in Tonkin, there were few incentives to 
become involved in the wars or arms-trade. Unlike the Portuguese and Dutch, the 
English came to Tonkin during peaceful periods, before and after the Trinh-Nguyen 
wars (1627-1672). Consequently, during these periods, Tonkin did not make trade 
conditional upon the supply of weapons. Its policy towards foreigners in those periods 
was different from its policy during the years of conflict. The English thus only carried 
guns and cannons to Tonkin as extraordinary gifts or for a small trading trial (see 
chapter four). The English in Vietnam in the seventeenth century, therefore, played a 
very minor role in supplying weapons. Instead, they focused on peaceful trade through 
negotiations with local governments.  
While neither the strategic geography nor the more open attitude of the 
Vietnamese governments towards foreigners was enough to lure the English to invest in 
the region, Vietnamese natural and man-made products were key for its appeal to 
Europeans as those commodities played a role of substitutions in the regional trading 
system. 244  The commodities prompted and shaped Vietnamese trading relationships 
with foreign merchants as they crucially served intra-Asian trade, rather than Eurasian 
trade. For example, rice, the most significant product in Vietnam, was not in demand in 
Europe in the seventeenth century and only became involved in global trade from the 
mid-nineteenth century onwards.245 Sugar (mostly from Cochin-China) was also one of 
the famous products desired by the Chinese and Japanese in the seventeenth century in 
the intra-Asian trade, but the EIC only paid attention to this trade from the late century 
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onwards at the same time as it expanded its tea trade with China.246 In term of ceramics, 
these became a substitute for Chinese goods from the late sixteenth century onwards, 
and both the Chinse and Dutch exported lower quality ceramic products from Vietnam 
to Batavia in the seventeenth century.247 As was so often the case, however, the EIC 
lagged behind other merchants in catering to this demand. Even Vietnamese products, 
such as pepper, which were suitable for the European market, were not sufficient in 
quantity and quality for viable direct trading purposes. Therefore it was gathered by 
Chinese merchants in small amounts from various sources in Vietnam and then sold to 
the VOC and EIC in Batavia and Bantam who exported it to Europe. However, certain 
Vietnamese silks were produced in substantial numbers and became increasingly critical 
to the functioning of regional trade. It was the attraction of silks, which led to the arrival 
of Europeans in both Tonkin and Cochin-China in the seventeenth century. 
 Silks (both raw and piece-good) were the most famous Vietnamese merchandise 
traded in the seventeenth century as they could act as substitutes for Chinese silks in 
Japan and they were the key local product led to the presence of the English in Vietnam 
in the period. Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, a French traveller, went to Tonkin in 1638 
recorded that ‘the natives, both the rich and the poor, wear silk’.248 Indeed, silk was 
quite expensive and it mostly served the demand of local Mandarins and rich people in 
the country. Most of Tonkinese were farmers who worked on agriculture and they had 
insufficient money to buy silk-cloths. Initially, the emergence of silk weaving as 
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economic activity was to serve local people’s clothing needs while farmers produced 
silk between their two rice harvests or when they had free time. Silk production was a 
family enterprise, especially involving the women in free times. Because of the nature 
of the industry, it is hard to estimate how many people were involved in it. Hoang 
argued that it required about 20,000 households or 100,000 labourers while Li 
suggested three or four times that number since silk production was not the primary job 
of farmers.249  As a results of the Chinese political crisis, by the early seventeenth 
century the role of Vietnamese silks improved and changed considerably from being 
local products for domestic demand to becoming famous commodities produced to meet 
the growing demand of Chinese, Japanese and then European brokers who were seeking 
a substitute for Chinese silks. Nevertheless, Tonkinese silks still had low quality in 
comparison with Chinese and Bengali products because it was a cottage industry and 
depended on the weather. Because Tonkin’s farmers still focused on planting rice, silk-
weaving was only done with family-system in free time between their rice harvests and 
therefore its quantity and quality was quite low. Futhermore, as both farmers and traders 
did not want to become to rich which was dangerous for them and their family with 
threats from both officals and thiefs, they did not invest too much money in the silk-
industry.250 Importantly, Tonkinese silks were considered to serve as substitutes for 
Chinese low products to export to Japan, the most important market, labours in Tonkin 
had little reason to improve their work extremmely. The Tonkin Court also participated 
in producing silks and employed labourers to work in the state-owned factories which 
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were created to produce a considerable volume of silks for garments and general 
tributary trading, but the quality had no change. 251  They therefore were the main 
Tonkinese silk suppliers for the Chinese, Dutch and English merchants.  
 Silks were the product of both handicraft and agriculture beginning with the 
planting of mulberry trees. In Cochin-China, the cultivation of mulberries became 
widespread in the regions of Thuan Hoa, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Qui Nhon.252 
Tonkin, where mulberries were mainly planted near the capital, was particularly well 
suited to silk production. The mulberry trees could feed eight cycles of silkworms per 
year while Bengal where silk also became important, produced a maximum of five to 
seven crops per year in the seventeenth century before the English imported new 
technology into the Bengal silk industry. 253  In Tonkin, mulberries had the further 
advantage of growing in areas of hard ground, in the alluvial grounds of the Red River, 
which were unsuited to rice production to which the majority of the land was dedicated.  
 The blossoming of the cultivation of mulberries and silk weaving was the result 
of the developed agriculture sector, which readily met local food demands and allowed 
farmers to the luxury of employing their land for other purposes. Silk weaving, in fact, 
quickly became a traditional handicraft for low skilled families in Vietnam’s villages. 
There were three main steps in producing the finished silk cloth product: sericulture, 
silk reeling and throwing, weaving and dyeing silk. 254  As M. L’abbé Richard, an 
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eighteenth-century French traveller to Tonkin observed, mulberries there were ‘small 
shrubs, which are every year cut down...in the winter’ to help the new plant renew 
annually.255 There were two main periods of silk production each year: a significant 
‘summer’ season between April and May and a ‘winter’ crop between October and 
November, which produced crops of lower quantity and quality. Foreigners thus arrived 
in Vietnam from May to July to collect the best silk while the winter products were 
cheap. The English, who first had to call at Bantam, and other places in the Spice 
Islands for spices and pepper had difficulty reaching Vietnam in May, and, as will be 
discussed in chapter four, rarely had the best opportunity to obtain silks. They often 
arrived there to find that their European competitors, with a better trading position and 
network, had already traded for these. 
Europeans saw both Tonkin and Cochin-China as potential sources for silk in 
the seventeenth century. The Portuguese traveller, Tomé Pires, writing early in the 
sixteenth century, noted that Cochin-Chinese raw silk was ‘bigger and wider and finer 
taffeta of all kinds than there is anywhere else here and in our [countries]. They have the 
best raw silks in colours, which are in great abundance here, and all that they have in 
this way is fine and perfect, without the falseness that things from other places have.’256 
Although this comment about the standard of Cochin-China’s silks very much inflated 
the importance and desirability of the product, since Pires was urging the Portuguese to 
develop trading connections with Vietnam, it nevertheless demonstrates that the silk 
was valued by Europeans and continued to be understood as an important South 
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Vietnamese product. In 1617 Richard Cocks, the chief factor of the English factory in 
Japan reported to London that Cochin-China could supply a large quantity of silk for 
foreign merchants. 257  This report shows that the English in the early years of the 
Company understood the potential of Cochin-Chinese silks, even though theirs was 
indirect knowledge from the Japanese and Dutch in Hirado who traded with Cochin-
China before the English. However, they had limited sources of information to 
recognise that silks were more abundant in Tonkin than in Cochin-China. Information 
from both European travellers and merchants showed that Vietnamese silks in the 
seventeenth century were mostly exported to Japan as a substitute for Chinese products 
as the China-Japan trade link was interrupted by political reasons. In 1627, Alexandre 
de Rhodes, a French mission in Tonkin stated silks were the most important 
commodites the Chinese and Japanese collected and transferred to Japan.258 In 1637, 
Vietnam could supply 3,000 piculs (Chinese kilograms) of raw silk.259 From 1641 to 
1682, 40 per cent of Japan’s imported silk was from Tonkin.260 Tavernier showed that 
‘the chief riches of the country of Tunquin cofift in the great quantity of silks which 
they fell to the Hollanders, and other foreigners’ in exchange for silver from Japan.261 
Silks played the role of a substitute for Chinese silks to supply Japanese demand in 
                                                             
257 ‘Richard Cocks at Hirado to the East India Company in London, 1 & 14 January 1617’, in Farrington, 
Factory in Japan, vol. 1, p. 558. 
258  A.D. Rhodes, Historie du Royaume de Tunquin, (Lyon, 1651), [reprinted 1908] [Vietnamese 
translation], pp. 56-7. 
259 Thành, Vietnamese Overseas Trade, p. 116. 
260 S. Nara, ‘Silk Commerce between Vietnam and Japan in the Seventeenth Century’, in Hải Hưng 
province (ed), Phố Hiến: The Centre of International Commerce in the 17th and 18th Centuries (Hung 
Yen, 1994), pp. 160-175, p. 166. 
261 J.B. Taverier, ‘A new and singular Relation of the Kingdom of Tunquin, …’ in E. Everard (translated 
and published), A Collection of several Relations & Treaties Singular and Curious of John Baptista 




exchanging for silver and became the most attractive Vietnamese commodity in the 
regional trade in seventeenth-century. Therefore, silks were the chief exported good and 
the critical reason promoting Europeans, especially the English to establish a trade with 
Vietnam in the period. 
 Tonkin and Cochin-China’s commodities were not related to direct trade with 
Europe, but to successful trading in East Asia with Japan, China, and Southeast Asia 
and thus proved important to the EIC and its ambitions within the region. Vietnamese 
merchandise mostly served Asian orders, and the trade flourished as those products 
played the role of substitute goods even with their lower quantity and quality. The 
search for alternative goods led European companies to get involved in trade with 
Vietnam as one part of the intra-Asian trade to gather substitute goods and collect 
Chinese products from Chinese merchants sailing Vietnam regularly. The EIC mostly 
paid attention to the silk trade in Tonkin in the late century to collect substitute for the 
demand in Japan.  
 
Foreign merchants in Vietnam in the seventeenth century 
 
As a result of advantageous geographic, economic and political factors, both Tonkin 
and Cochin-China were attractive markets for regional traders and European companies 
in the seventeenth century. The preponderance of Chinese, Japanese, and later other 
European traders in Vietnam became the main encouragement for the EIC to voyage or 
establish trading relation there. The EIC started viewing Vietnam as a trading port with 
a supplementary role in its commercial link with Japan and China. Moreover, the 




in building relations with Vietnam. The first information-gathering contact with 
Vietnam was by English factors in Hirado and then Bantam in the 1610s and 1620s. 
Further understanding came through visits to Vietnam by other English individuals in 
the following decades. They acknowledged that the best option to trade with Vietnam 
was in the context of regional trade which had established Vietnam as a supplementary 
factor in the intra-Asian network and then an intermediary to connect with mainland 
China from the south.  
With its distinct geography, linking China and Southeast Asia, Vietnam had 
been the main station for Chinese traders over a lengthy period. Before the tenth 
century, Vietnam was a Chinese colony, supplying the Chinese Court with luxury 
goods.262 When Vietnam gained independence in the tenth century, their commercial 
relationship was not interrupted, but developed with the key role played by the Tonkin 
Gulf on the trade route from Southern China to Southeast Asia, South Asia. 263 
Vietnamese traders also traditionally went to Canton for merchandising by both sea and 
land routes.264 Communities of Chinese merchants gradually grew up in both Tonkin 
and Cochin-China and became the most potent settlement of foreigners there in the 
seventeenth century due in part to the Chinese maritime prohibition policy and in part to 
the change from the Ming to the Qing dynasty. They mostly stayed at important ports or 
cities such as the capital Thang Long, Pho Hien (Tonkin) and Hoi An (Cochin-China).  
                                                             
262 W.T. Keith, ‘The Birth of Vietnam: Sino-Vietnamese Relations to the Tenth Century and the Origins 
of Vietnamese Nationhood’ (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1976). 
263 Momoki, ‘Dai Viet’; Li, ‘A View from the Sea’; Whitmore, ‘The Rise of the Coast’; W. Geoff, ‘An 
Early Age of Commerce in Southeast Asia, 900-1300 CE’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 40 (2009), 
pp. 221-265. 




The Chinese existence in Vietnam was of greater historical significance as they 
were the most competitive merchants in the Vietnam-Japan silk trade, which 
encouraged European companies to try to participate in that trade.265 In the 1640s, the 
Chinese sent 28 ships from Tonkin and 94 ships from Cochin-China to Japan, more than 
had been sent from any trading ports in Southeast Asia.266 On these Chinese junks, 
various types of silk from Southern China, and musk arrived in Vietnam, and they 
became the principal re-exported commodities to Japan and Europe. Chinese traders 
also collected other Southeast Asian products from both Tonkin and Cochin-China. As 
W.J.M. Buch and Li argued, the Chinese loaded full the stock in junks when trading in 
Cochin-China with pepper from Palembang, Pahang, camphor from Borneo, and other 
regional goods (porcelain, ivory, wood) from other places in the South China Sea.267 It 
means that Cochin-China played a significant role both as a market in the area and as an 
intermediary for regional merchants for further trade. When the EIC arrived in Tonkin 
in the 1670s, the Chinese still kept their status and benefits as Tonkinese people had 
become used Chinese and Portuguese languages when trading with Europeans. 
Recognising this fact, in 1675 Gyfford asked the Bantam Council to send ‘a good 
honest Chinaman from Bantam who writes China well and is of a ready wit and apt for 
business’.268  This quote shows that the Chinese were important towards the EIC’s 
factory not only in Tonkin but also in Bantam as they worked for the Company and 
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helped in connection with Chinese merchants in the regional trade. The demand for a 
broker or interpreter who could understand Chinese clarifies the influence of Chinese 
merchants in Tonkin and the English desire to develop their trade with the Chinese there 
for the further aim of indirect connection with mainland China. Beyond that, this quote 
also indicates the fact that the English depended on brokers or interpreters who 
understood Chinese and therefore those brokers played a key role in the EIC activities 
in Tonkin and involved in the struggle between Tonkin factors. Although Chinese 
traders in Vietnam were competitors for the EIC in the silk-trade, they were helpful in 
helping the EIC to collect Chinese goods indirectly or become involved in indirect trade 
with mainland China. Vietnam thus was not only a pure market for Chinese business 
but also a depot where English merchants gathered Chinese products as they could not 
trade directly with mainland China because of the Manchu-Taiwan war.  
The presence of Japanese traders together with Chinese traders in Vietnam 
(mainly in South Vietnam before the 1650s) also demonstrates the advantageous 
position held by this kingdom in the regional trading. There was some initial local anger 
about the first settlement of Japanese traders in Vietnam. Letters from the Nguyen 
Lords in the 1600s and 1610s, however, show that local government had invited them to 
Southern Vietnam.269 Japanese trade with Vietnam, especially with Hoian flourished 
with the red seal system in the early seventeenth century. With thirty-six Shuin-Sen 
ships arriving in Tonkin and eighty-four junks sailing to Cochin-China in the period 
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1604 to 1635, Vietnam thus took a ‘prominent role’ in the Japanese trade.270 Hoian 
(Cochin-China) had been known as a well-regulated entrepot, a warehouse with many 
kinds of natural and Southeast Asian commodities for Japan. Besides buying natural 
raw silk, the most prized good, the Japanese purchased yellow silk, spun silk fabric, 
damask silk, longzhao, aloeswood, calambac, sharkskins, black sugar, honey, pepper 
and gold. 271  However, one-third of those goods exported to Japan were not native 
Vietnamese products. They were from Cambodia (lacquer), Siam (deerskin), Brunei 
(camphor), Indonesia (nutmeg), Fujian (hocking) and Canton (velvet).272 This meant 
that Southern Vietnam was a trading station in the East Asian world where Japanese 
dealers could purchase a full range of Southeast Asian goods from foreign salesmen 
trading in exchange for silver. Vietnam thus became an abundant source of Japanese 
silver, a resource that was vital for the EIC for financing its Eurasian and intra-Asian 
trade but required the Company first to break into the Vietnam-Japan trade.  
The first European merchants to come to Vietnam were the Portuguese who 
based at the trading centre of Macao. Although they went to North Vietnam in the early 
sixteenth century, the Le-Mar war (1533-1592) obliged them to leave the country.273 
From the early seventeenth century, they traded and introduced Christianity into 
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Vietnam. 274  In Cochin-China, the Portuguese established their regular commerce, 
especially with Hoian to get silk, sugar, pepper, and calambac. They sold modern 
weapons such as guns and cannons to the Nguyen Lords (see supra). In 1626, they 
began their relationship with the Trinh Lords in Tonkin. Their ships from Macao 
travelled to Tonkin to purchase Chinese goods and natural raw silk to sell in Japan at a 
higher price. This relationship lasted until the 1660s with at least one Portuguese vessel 
sailing from Macao to Tonkin every year.275 Even the English recorded that in 1673 one 
Portuguese ship called Tonkin for trading.276 The triangular trade between Japan, Macao 
and Tonkin or the silk-silver trade as it was known supplied silver for the Portuguese 
for their Eurasian trade. It is noteworthy that although the Portuguese were blocked 
from operating in Japan by the Sakoku Edict of 1635, they still maintained the Macao-
Nagasaki link as they owned ships to sail to Japan under the command of Chinese chief 
captains.277 The Portuguese activities in both the Tonkin direct trade with Japan (before 
1635) and the triangular trade Macao-Tonkin-Japan (1635-1673) therefore paved the 
way for the EIC to become involved in the Tonkin trade as a part of the regional trade 
although they did not establish a factory there. They provided the first example of 
European traders using Vietnam in the East Asian trade without a factory. Whether 
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supplying goods for direct or indirect trade, Tonkin’s role remained the same: an 
intermediate station in East Asia with stores of substitute silks for Japan.  
 Beyond the knowledge of using Vietnam through voyaging regularly, the 
Bantam’s factors who worked directly in the East Asian trading network learned more 
from the Dutch traders with the idea of establishing a factory in Tonkin. While the 
Portuguese focused only on the trading line Tonkin-Macao-Japan, the Dutch built a 
substantial intra-Asian commercial network with many trading ports, markets and 
warehouses to connect with the key market and utilise the regional system to supply 
capital themselves.  
 Figure 2.1 The Dutch intra-Asian trade model in the seventeenth century 
 
  Source: Hoang, Silk for Silver, Vietnamese-Dutch Relationship 1637-1700 
(Leiden, 2007) p. 126. 
Using this network, the Dutch drew on the resources of Tonkin to help them in 
both the regional and the Eurasian trade. Dutch dealers had traded with Vietnam from 
Hirado in the 1610s with little or no success. However, instead of abandoning this 




continue sending ships to Cochin-China in the next two decades despite obtaining the 
little apparent gain.278 The year 1637 witnessed a new chapter in the Dutch trade with 
Vietnam as they established a formal relationship with the Tonkin Court. From then 
until the 1660s, they and the Chinese were the most competitive merchants in the silk-
silver trade exporting goods from Tonkin to Japan.279 While almost all Tonkin silks 
(raw and wrought) were sent to Japan, a small part of silk, musk (from China), gold, and 
ceramics were taken to Batavia and then to the Netherlands. In this system, Tonkin 
participated in both the regional and Eurasian trade as its role was to sell silks in 
exchange for silver to cover the Dutch Asian trade in Tonkin, Siam, Java, Bengal and 
the Coromandel Coast. The operation of this system provided a stable source of silver 
until the late 1660s before the Japanese government prohibited the export of silver. 
From the 1670s, this system carried copper and even gold from Japan to Tonkin. At the 
height of the trade, the sale of Tonkin silks in Japan provided the Dutch with a profit of 
100 or 120 per cent.280 In return, they carried back to Tonkin nearly 130,000 taels of 
silver per year.281 Silk hence became the most exported commodity by the Dutch from 
Tonkin, and the silk-silver trade was the Dutch most successful model for business in 
East Asia.  
 As such, through the business activities of other merchants in Tonkin and 
Cochin-China, the English had fundamental knowledge of the attraction of Vietnam and 
how to get involved in the regional trade through Vietnam. Before the Tonkin factory 
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was established, there were two groups of overseas English who contributed 
information for the EIC. As chapter 1 demonstrates, those in Hirado acknowledged the 
presence and importance of the Chinese and Japanese settlements in Vietnam and the 
potential of Vietnam in the regional trading system in the first decades of the century. 
They, thus, were the main actors in providing the EIC with information and developing 
its knowledge about the East Asian trading network. This section demonstrates that the 
English factors in Bantam during their activities until the mid-seventeenth century 
witnessed the success of the Dutch in Tonkin with the silk-silver trade. They therefore 
became information suppliers in the 1660s to help the Court of Minutes in London to 
consider and choose Tonkin as an intermediate station in its commercial strategy in East 
Asia in the 1670s.282 The establishment of the Tonkin factory in 1672 and the EIC 
broader commercial strategy using this factory represented an upgraded version of the 
VOC Tonkin trade model. There exists, however, little in the way of primary 
documentary evidence to show precisely how the Court of Minutes came to know about 
the potential of Vietnamese trade or how they learned from the Europeans trading there. 
Most sources record that until the 1660s, the EIC was still considering supplementary 
places to support its primary market, Japan. Although, as we shall see, the Bantam 
factor, Quarles Browne provided guidance and advice to use Tonkin, this kingdom was 
only chosen because Samuel Baron, a half Dutch and half Tonkin gave a 
recommendation in 1670. All evidence indicates that London had limited knowledge 
about Vietnam and East Asia and that the Tonkin branch was only an experiment to 
allow English servants to learn more about the East Asian trade. 
 
                                                             




Overseas individuals and the process of establishing the EIC Tonkin factory 
 
This section discusses in greater depth how English and free skiled merchants in 
overseas areas contributed to the EIC’s process of settling factories in East Asia. It 
examines their role in collecting knowledge of commodities, potential markets, and 
trading chain to help the EIC to create a long-term strategy concerning East Asia in the 
seventeenth century. The thesis then evaluates the advantages of the EIC’s policy of 
using experienced servants in distant areas and how London depended on their 
knowledge in the decision-making process. Although, as discussed in chapter one, 
English factors in Japan and Bantam in the 1610s and 1620s knew about Vietnam, their 
knowledge was limited and imprecise for the EIC to consider Vietnam as a potential 
trading post in the English trading system in East Asia. The difference between having 
sufficient knowledge to engage with the trade but not enough information to establish a 
factory seemed to be important and was only overcome later in that century. Chosing 
intermediate markets, therefore, reflects not only the role of English overseas factors but 
also the importance of knowledge about commodities, trading network in the EIC’s 
commercial strategy in East Asia in the late seventeenth century. 
Vietnam, especially Tonkin only really appeared in the EIC’s strategy in the last 
quarter of the century as one part of the general trading plan with Japan and China. 
From the 1630s, London acknowledged that East Asian countries had closed trading 
relationships and that any English trading yield was to come from the regional trade. 
They thought ‘that without the Company can obteyne a trade to China, the trade to 
Japan will not bee worth the following for that the profitt wch is expected is not by the 




thence to the Southwards and home.’283 The EIC’s holders therefore partly understood 
the role of regional trade in East Asia with the flow of regional commodities and the 
hard situation of English goods there. Based on this evaluation, after receiving the new 
Chapter in 1657, the Company restarted trade in East Asia by preparing the ships 
London and Discovery for Japan and China, but no result since it was too late for the 
monsoon trade. 284  In the period 1658-1665, overseas agents in Bantam, especially 
Quarles Browne, the former chief of the Cambodia factory (1651-1656) played the most 
prominent role in supplying information and devising a plan for the EIC’s return to East 
Asia. Since Browne was one of the few overseas staff who had a general background 
knowledge about this area, he was made an agent in Bantam in early 1658. The EIC was 
planning to establish a factory in Japan and granted him the position of chief of the 
proposed branch with a salary of £200 per year.285 Browne immediately recommended a 
project to establish factories in Cambodia and Tonkin to support trade with Japan, but 
the Court of Directors remained unpersuaded without better information in 1658.286 As 
his plan was refused, the factory in Japan could not be founded and Browne was 
therefore failed to become chief of the proposed factory (but still worked for the EIC). 
This process demonstrated that London was unwilling to return to East Asia without 
better knowledge about this area. 
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In 1661, Browne offered new plan to trade with East Asia, which involved the 
establishment of factories in Cambodia, Japan, China, and Tonkin (this proposal again 
was submitted in 1664 as London required Browne a plan to trade with East Asia).287 
His proposal, however, was over-ambitious and mostly focused on Cambodian 
commodities and their attraction for the Chinese and Japanese as he had worked there as 
a chief factor from 1651-1656. Nevertheless, his knowledge about the commodities 
available in Tonkin, Japan, China and how to create a regional trade network was too 
poor to persuade the Court of Directors. Regarding Tonkin trade, he wrote that ‘the 
Dutch had a great trade for Japan, all sort wrought silk ffitter for that country bring them 
silver, then what is made in China: a great quantity of raw silk is made, fine great 
quantity of musk.’288 Browne only provided a general information about silk trading in 
Tonkin where the Dutch had a great profit from 1637, but gave no details of what kinds 
of silks were suitable for Japan or Europe, or about the availability of other 
commodities. Nor did he really set out how to establish a factory or how to trade in East 
Asia in a period when China and Japan were closed to foreigners. However, that 
London denied that proposal does not mean that the EIC gave up the plan to return East 
Asia. It simply lacked sufficient and persuasive information to make the EIC consider 
East Asian trade viable at that point. Therefore, London became actively involved in 
finding knowledge about East Asia. It ordered agents in Amsterdam to gather data about 
the Dutch trade in Japan and East Asia and information about which products might be 
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profitable in trading in East Asia for the EIC in 1663. 289  London tried to gain 
knowledge from various sources to create a comprehensive picture before deciding 
which country could serve as a suitable go-between for trade and to prepare for the 
setting up of new branches. This is in sharp contrasts to what London had done in the 
early years of the Company as at that point London depended completely on the 
knowledge provided by its overseas factors and ignored advice from outside merchants 
such as Adams in Japan.  
In mid-1663 the EIC again appointed Browne as a Bantam agent and instructed 
the Bantam Council to link small markets in the South China Sea by annual voyages 
rather than by setting up factories as Browne had suggested. London proposed that 
Bantam ‘making a tryall in a ship of or. Owne, of ye markets of Syam, Cambodia & 
Tunkeene and to touch at Macao, where for certeyne lyes a mass of China commodities, 
…, ye Portugalls not daring to transport them from thence for feare of ye Dutch.’290 In 
London’s opinion, the knowledge received was not sufficient to establish factories and 
maintain them, and its alternative method was to follow the Portuguese in making 
voyages in East Asia to collect substitute products to reduce the expense of establishing 
factories and risks of overseas trade. Above all, this decision demonstrates London’s 
active involvement in the process of returning to East Asia by experimenting just as it 
had done as the early years of the Company with annual trading voyages. It also 
confirms the dependence of London on Browne and other agents in Bantam since 
London merchants had no substitute option or first-hand knowledge with which to make 
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a final decision. London, thus, commissioned Browne to prepare a full report on the 
possibilities of trade in East Asia before making a final decision.291 Browne, however, 
rejected London’s idea of only sending voyages to the South China Sea, and still 
stressed the importance of intermediate factories in Siam, Cambodia (where they would 
obtain deer hides, sappan wood) and Tonkin (where raw, wrought silks were available) 
to supply Japan. He was even willing to establish factories in those places.292  
Browne’s negotiation with London illustrates the contradictory opinions 
between London and overseas factors about the trade in East Asia, which was created 
from their difference in experience, viewpoint and knowledge of the area. Moreover, the 
emerging situation highlighted the key role of distant factors in the EIC’s decision-
making process and their freedom given to these factors to drive the EIC’s overseas 
trade independently without instructions from London. On the other hand, it also shows 
that Browne and overseas agents were beyond the control of London as they tried to put 
in place another plan to trade in East Asia although London prevented them from 
carrying out the new project. This contradiction therefore illustrated that it was hard for 
the EIC to control overseas factors although in this case London succeeded ultimately in 
preventing the plan’s execution. However, the viability of Browne’s plan was never 
tested since the second Anglo-Dutch war (1665-1667) and Browne’s death in July 1665 
at Batavia meant that it was never put into action.293 Given Browne’s lack of knowledge 
of and comment on the political situation and trading policies of Japan and China and 
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the particular commodities of Tonkin, it seems probable that it could not have worked. 
He knew the market for commodities and the intra-Asian trade network, but even he 
lacked other aspects of knowledge fundamental to successfully establishing EIC trade in 
East Asia. 
 After the second Anglo-Dutch war, the EIC restarted the plan to return to East 
Asia, but it still considered the possible locations for factories. The new commercial 
development between Bantam’s Sultan and Luzon island coupled with the promising 
results of the negotiation between the EIC and Spain led to the EIC’s idea of using 
Manila again as a go-between to trade with China. 294  In 1668, the EIC formed a 
Committee to consider how to trade in East Asia with Japan, Manila and other parts of 
the South Sea and to collect useful information about ships, stocks, commodities, and 
seasonable business in those countries.295 London considered that the place to establish 
factories in East Asia was to serve the primary aim of procuring silver to cover the 
Eurasian trade and therefore focussed on the two options of Japan and Manila. This 
deliberation also illustrated the EIC’s desire of building a massive global network to 
link China, Japan with Manila and onwards to Spanish America. Accordingly, the 
Manila Committee was established in 1669 to negotiate with the Spanish Court about 
the EIC’s trade with Manila. However, the expectation of founding a factory in Manila 
came to nothing because no trading agreement could be reached with the Spanish. 
Instead, London had to consider Siam, Cambodia, and Taiwan as possible locations for 
factories. Unable to decide on a site, due to differences of opinion, London again 
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requested advice from Bantam and Surat.296 London still lacked knowledge about East 
Asian trade as experiences from the 1610s seemed to have proved insufficient, and the 
previous Bantam suggestion of regional trade was uncertain. Not ready to establish a 
supplementary factory, the EIC again sent the ship Advance to Cambodia, Taiwan and 
Japan in 1670 for a trial voyage although Cambodia was at war with Cochin-China and 
Taiwan conflicted with mainland China.297 Meanwhile, Bantam wanted to use Taiwan 
to link with mainland China as the two vessels, the Bantam and Pearl gained relatively 
good results in 1670, and the Dutch had been expelled from there in 1662.298  
London’s activities of asking advice from different sources and trying a further 
experiment in making trading voyages in East Asia highlight London’s responsibility 
during the process of returning to the region. These activities not only demonstrate 
English attempts to gain more experience in the trade there, revealing their limited 
knowledge about this area; but also show that London was still considering the idea of 
establishing supportive factories there. Consequently, London was slow to make a 
decision about finding alternative markets in East Asia and did not do so until 1671 
when it received reliable confirmation from external factors. 
 London’s decision to choose Tonkin as a supportive branch for Japan only 
became public with the appearance of Samuel Baron, a free merchant in Tonkin and 
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East Asia during that period. He was born in Tonkin around 1640, and was the son of a 
Dutch trader, Hendrik Baron, ‘a long-term resident’ of Tonkin and his Tonkinese 
wife.299 Following his father into trade, Baron had a background in both Tonkin and 
European trade in the late century. He appeared for the first time in 1670 in the EIC’s 
records with a suggestion to the EIC’s ambassador in Paris of how to open trade with 
Japan.300 The appearance of Baron, with his knowledge about Tonkin and its trading 
situation, was timely and fitted well with the EIC’s aim of identifying a supportive 
branch for a Japanese market. He was sent as the second factor in the voyage to Japan 
with a salary of £120 per year and the role of acting as an adviser in the English 
negotiations with East Asian countries.301 
 The EIC trust in Baron to establish a factory in Tonkin in 1671 was noticeably 
different from the EIC’s behaviour towards Adams in Japan in the 1610s. Both were 
free merchants, and both had direct and valuable information about distant trade in 
helping London to decide further trade in East Asia. However, while Adams faced 
problems of trust and personal relationships, and raised a disagreement about the way 
the EIC traded in Japan, Baron simply supplied information to London and did not raise 
any arguments about the way in which the EIC developed overseas trade. Baron’s 
presence, therefore, urged the EIC to make a final decision on establishing factories in 
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East Asia. This again shows London’s dependence on merchants with first-hand 
knowledge of the region, and on the importance of knowledge in the EIC’s process of 
expanding the trade in East Asia.  
By April 1671, the EIC had made a firm choice, selecting Tonkin as a go-
between rather than Cambodia which was in political crisis.302 By September 1671, 
preparations for the three ships Return, Experiment, and Zante Frigate were nearly 
finished for the voyage to Japan, Taiwan and Tonkin. In a letter to Bantam in late 1671, 
London explained that their information about the type of goods available in Japan, 
Tonkin and East Asia had in large been gathered ‘by comparing former proceedings in 
Japon wth the pticuler comodities vsual sent thither & advising with some experienced 
therein’.303 This meant that London decided to set up factories and send goods to East 
Asia based on the previous knowledge of English factors in Hirado in the 1610s, the 
suggestions of Browne and Baron and information collected from the Dutch. It shows 
how carefully the EIC prepared to return to East Asia in this period and the value it 
placed on the information about overseas trade experienced merchants provided. The 
role of skilled merchants was still valued, and the EIC’s policy of using skilled factors 
in the progress of settling and expanding the trade in East Asia had not changed in the 




The situation of Tonkin and Cochin-China in the seventeenth century created new 
opportunities for the EIC and other European companies to establish relations with them 
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and to make profits there. However, both were ideal only for regional trade either as 
intermediaries or depots and were not suitable for direct Eurasian trade. In short, the 
opportunity to connect with mainland China and to control sea-routes in the South China 
Sea, together with the existing trade of the Dutch in Vietnam were the main factors in 
influencing the English to establish a trading relationship with Vietnam.  
 English factors in East Asia had recognised to a degree the advantages and role of 
Vietnam in the intra-Asian trade in the 1610s by both direct and indirect approaches. 
However, the EIC’s knowledge about this trading area was limited until the 1660s. 
London only recognised the potential of Tonkin in response to the suggestion of 
Bantam agents and to the recommendation made by Samuel Baron who played a similar 
role to that of William Adams in Hirado in the 1610s. As a result, the activities of 
English overseas individuals in the next decades in Tonkin and Cochin-China represented 
their attempt better to understand the possible contribution this kingdom could play in the 
EIC’s commercial strategy. The emergence of figures such as Browne and Baron in the 
1660s also illustrated the EIC’s policy of using a network of overseas informers who 
had much more knowledge and experience than London about the nature of distant 
trade. This situation was not different from the 1610s with distantly located staff 
strongly affecting the EIC’s decisions about trading with transoceanic areas, but the 









CHAPTER 3. THE TONKIN FACTORY (1672-1697) AND THE ENGLISH 
EXPERIENCE OF MANAGEMENT AND DIPLOMACY 
 
This chapter examines how in establishing and maintaining the Tonkin factory the 
English drew on all available sources, including its own earlier experience in Tonkin, 
information from Bantam agents in the late seventeenth century. By analysing the 
interrelationships between London, Bantam agents and Tonkin factors, this chapter 
firstly explores the EIC endeavours to manage the principal-agent problem created by 
long-distance trade.304 Hence, the study identifies the complicated relationship between 
a small overseas factory (Tonkin) and a central power (London) and headquarters 
(Bantam/Madras), how the interrelationship between those positions affected the EIC 
structure in long-distant areas, and the result of the EIC attempts to manage overseas 
factories in the seventeenth century. The chapter also investigates the role of individuals 
in collecting knowledge and establishing and maintaining the factory. Critical attention 
is given to their diplomatic activities. London had only limited knowledge about both 
the politics and economics of the area and faced delays in delivering and receiving 
information on account of the vast distance between it and Tonkin. It could therefore 
only issue more general instructions. Company employees on the ground in Tonkin, by 
contrast, had direct, daily interaction with the Tonkin Court which provided them with 
invaluable information for establishing the Company’s factory. The chapter, thus, 
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argues that the EIC employees on the ground in East Asia played the leading role in 
creating a trading relationship with Tonkin. And the Tonkin Court, especially 
Mandarins who worked directly with the English became the main information-
suppliers for Tonkin factors before that information was sent to Bantam or London for 
further considerations and decisions. 
The chapter uses sources found in the British Library’s East India Company G 
series, which primarily relate to the Tonkin factory, and the E series concerned with 
communication between Tonkin, Bantam, and London. Although these sources 
provided rich evidence in certain areas of the daily trading activities, data about labour 
management in Tonkin was limited as it was a small factory under the role of Bantam 
with few factors. Moreover, the Court books (B series) show how little attention 
London paid towards this branch. Similarly, the series provide little information on the 
relationship between overseas servants and the Company, as they do not include private 
letters, which might show their kinship or friendship relationships. Nevertheless, reports 
and letters by various Tonkin factors to London and Bantam have been found in the 
records of Java factory (G series), and together these sources present the complex and 
controversial story of the Tonkin factory’s development. 
 
General information about the Tonkin factory  
 
The maintenance of the Tonkin factory can be divided in three different periods: 1672-
1675, 1676-1688 and 1689-1697. The first and last periods were the weakest and poorest 




Tonkin Court. The EIC’s trade was dynamic from 1676 to 1688 with a warehouse in 
Thang Long, the capital, and the Eurasian silk trade.  
 
  Figure 3.1. Timeline of the Tonkin factory (1672-1697) 
 
In the first period, the Tonkin factory was isolated due to the EIC’s failure in Japan and 
the third Anglo-Dutch war (1672-1674). Henry Dacres, the Bantam’s chief factor 
announced the information to Tonkin in 1673 that ‘since the Dutch have had 7 ships 
cruseing off this roade, that noe vessel of ours [the English] or the French can come 
in…’.305 Because the Tonkin factory was designed to exchange silk for silver in the 
regional trading system, this isolation made it useless. William Gyfford and Thomas 
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James, the chief and second factors of the Tonkin factory wrote to Bantam in August 
1673 that ‘it is now neere fifteen months… there hath bin noe opportunity to send us 
either from thence, Japon or Tywan, soe thar we are altogether in doubt how that designe 
prospers.’306 That there was no connection with Bantam, Japan or Taiwan made the 
Tonkin staff nervous, and they decided to make a voyage to Macao, Siam and Manila in 
1673-1674 to maintain the branch and find supportive markets for Tonkin. However, this 
voyage proved disastrous as the Spanish seized all the goods and threw the English 
traders in prison causing Dacres to blame Gyfford for private trade and demanded the 
closure of the Tonkin factory. Dacres reported to London in 1674 that ‘it will be a little 
purpose to continue that [Tonkin] factory since we cannot have any trade for Japan, but 
very requisite to get clear of long engagements, and to gather in all their debts, …., to 
withdraw that factory so soon as many order shall arrive.’307 As this quote illustrates, and 
as the previous chapters discussed, the existence and role of the Tonkin factory greatly 
depended on the EIC’s situation in Japan since silks from Tonkin were to serve Japan in 
return for silver and the EIC did not need to expend bullion brought from Europe. The 
EIC thought that that trade would be profitable as China forbade direct Chinese trade 
with Japan from the early seventeenth century, and especially after the Qing ‘maritime 
ban’ in 1655.308 Expecting to obtain the same success in trade with Japan as the Dutch 
and Chinese had done, London ordered Tonkin factors both to establish a factory and to 
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clarify the possibility of supplying silks for Japan and Europe.309 In a letter to Taiwan in 
1672, Gyfford and James expressed their hopes that the Zante Frigate would ‘receive a 
stock of silver & cashies’ from Japan for ‘the more efectual carrying on of the silk trade’ 
and argued that the Tonkin factory ‘must be supplyed with stock to buy silk suffitient for 
Japon…’.310 English individuals understood the importance of alternative silver from 
Japan and the dependence of the Tonkin branch on the English situation in Japan or its 
existence was to serve the main aim of Japanese trade. Consequently, as Japan refused to 
trade with the EIC, Tonkin’s envisaged role was useless; and it further lacked capital for 
its trade as London had sent no silver to Tonkin.311  
The Tonkin factory therefore barely survived in its early years, but after London 
envisaged a different purpose for it – namely not simply to support Japan but as a key 
player in the silk trade between Tonkin and London (the Eurasian trade), it enjoyed a 
dynamic period from 1676 to 1688 when English ships from London (and Bantam) 
regularly came to the factory. However, in this period Tonkin not only played the role 
of a regular market for London in the transoceanic trade, it became an intermediary in 
the regional network to collect silk, musk and other Chinese commodities indirectly and 
maintain the English expectation of connecting with mainland China. Tonkin allowed 
English merchants to build a warehouse in the capital after 1682 and the Company had a 
great opportunity to expand their trade in the country. Interestingly, the improvement in 
the situation of the Tonkin branch was in contrast to the EIC’s general situation in East 
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Asia, as other factories in Siam and Taiwan, and even the key factory in Bantam all 
closed. The new Sultan of Bantam favoured the Dutch rather than the English and 
expelled the EIC in 1682.312 The Siam factory proved to be fruitless and the Taiwan 
branch in 1681 also faced difficulties due to the Manchu-Taiwan war and, the small 
profit in trade resulting from the local government monopoly. 313  The English were 
forced out of Amoy (the Southern coast of China) when the Manchu conquered this area 
in 1680.314 Consequently, the Tonkin factory became increasingly important as the last 
branch in East Asia to keep in contact with mainland China due to its geography and 
age-old political and trading relations. It was expected to replace Taiwan in purchasing 
Chinese products for Europe as well as copper and tutenag for India.315  
The rebellion of three Feudatories in Southern China (especially in Yunnan, 
Guangdong, Fujian) from 1673 to 1681 resulted in difficulties in the Tonkinese-Chinese 
overland trade, however. Tonkin’s advantages were also short-lived because the 
quantity and quality of Tonkin silk were comparatively low, so the increase of Bengali 
goods and the new policy of China from 1684 to open fifty coastal ports in Fujian, 
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China.  
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Canton, Zhejiang, and Yuntaishan for foreigners meant that Tonkin silk became less 
desirable.316 The EIC quickly re-accessed Amoy and Canton and provided London with 
large quantities of Cantonese wrought silk, damask, and satin.317 The EIC’s investment 
in Tonkin therefore reduced, and its commercial ships from London to Tonkin were 
interrupted from 1683 to 1688 and stopped during the Nine Years’ War (1688 – 1697), 
although they still maintained a small number of English ships to China, especially to 
Amoy.318Consequently, both Tonkin’s roles as an intermediary and a regular market 
were no longer necessary.319 Like other supportive branches in the South China Sea, 
Tonkin was only exploited in the EIC’s factory system in particular periods to serve the 
important aim of connecting London with Chinese and Japanese products, and this 
function became unnecessary as core markets linked together.  
The last five years (1693-1697) were the most miserable time for the Tonkin 
factory in regards to both commercial and diplomatic relationships with the Tonkin 
Court. Inspectors from Madras found that the Tonkin factory was difficult to run 
without money or support from London and Madras. The old factors (Keeling and 
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Lemuel Blackmore), with support from local Mandarins, were uncooperative with the 
new staff from Madras, Richard Watts and Richard Farmer.320  The factory had to 
borrow considerable sums from local merchants, the Dutch and the King to keep trading 
and manage daily life before it was finally closed in 1697.321  
To sum up, the Tonkin factory existed for twenty-five years, but it only held a 
remarkable role as an essential part of the EIC’s regional and Eurasian trading networks 
for just over ten years. For twelve years of its existence (1672-1675, 1689-1697) this 
factory was isolated, without any extended strategy from London because of the two 
English wars with the Netherlands and France. Isolation undermined the Company’s 
regular trade in Tonkin and created problems of management as overseas factors had 
opportunities to undertake illegal trade. Moreover, the character of the monsoon trade, 
which meant English ships took around eighteen months to finish a voyage from 
London to Asia and back, caused all of the instructions and orders from London to be 
out of date, and thus of little use in the daily changing circumstances of overseas trade. 
As a result of the problems of timing, distance, and the isolation of the Tonkin factory, 
the role of overseas individuals was crucial to day-to-day operations with Tonkin’s 
people, knowledge gathering and creating the fundamental diplomatic and trading 
relationships. The Tonkin factory thus was a remarkable example of how the EIC 
engaged with distant trade in challenging periods, how London managed the 
administrative problem; how the EIC’s overseas servants connected and settled their 
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interrelationship, and how they contributed to the EIC’s expansion in East Asia in the 
seventeenth century.  
Finally, it is significant to note that one of the critical reasons that London 
insisted on keeping the factory over the twenty-five year period was for its indirect 
connection with China. Tonkin facilitated the EIC’s commercial strategy in East Asia in 
the seventeenth century, as it had no direct relationship with mainland China. The 
Tonkin branch aimed to provide substitute silks for Japan, but behind this role was the 
idea of linking with Chinese merchants and collecting Chinese goods. For example, the 
Tonkin factory was kept in 1676 to sell Tonkin silk to Europe, find an opportunity to 
link with Japan again, and partly to collect Chinese products (see chapter four). After 
the Nine Years War, although the EIC debated the maintenance of the Tonkin factory 
because its trade in both pelang and raw silk was no longer so valuable, London 
nonetheless decided to permit the factors in Tonkin a great deal of independence, 
instructing them to ‘sell and dispose all your goods, and to invest your money’ as 
London had no chance to send instruction and order to Tonkin during the war period.322 
The reason for the permission to continue trade rather than to close the factory related to 
the EIC’s continued desire to contact mainland China via Tonkin. Although China 
opened ports for Europeans after 1684, the EIC still found trade with China difficult 
because the Chinese remained wary of the EIC’s previous support for Taiwan. English 
ships called at Amoy or Canton a few times, but no regular relationship was established 
with the Chinese government. London even considered using Lemuel Blackmore, the 
second factor of the Tonkin factory in the voyage to China in 1695 to further attempt to 
connect with China even though he and William Keeling had operated illegal private 
                                                             
322 IOR/E/3/92, Letter book IX, London to our Chief & Council at Tonkin, 18 February 1690, p. 150. 




trade in Tonkin in 1690-1691.323 In London’s view, despite severe problems faced by 
the Tonkin factory, Tonkin’s advantageous geography and traditional relations with 
Chinese merchants, was always an option to help the EIC to contact mainland China.  
 
Administering the Tonkin factory 
 
The problem of principal agents, especially of their recruitment and management in 
overseas trade was one of the EIC’s most crucial issues in the seventeenth century.324 
Due to the problems of transportation and communication resulting from the distances 
involved in and the character of the monsoon trade, the Company could not directly 
administer either personal conduct or factors’ activities satisfactorily, and its distant 
factors were, as Chaudhuri put it, ‘wholly beyond the control’ of London.325 While the 
connection between Asia and London was limited and sometimes completely 
interrupted due to the character of overseas trade and the English wars with Netherlands 
and France, English traders tried to keep their own contacts in Asia by using family 
connections and creating their kinship and friendship networks in both Asia and 
Europe.326 The EIC Director in 1681 revealed that due to the EIC’s policy of allowing 
its factors to carry relatives to overseas areas, ‘there are many hundreds of families [of 
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English merchants]’ who stayed and traded in Asia.327 That English factors created their 
own networks in Asia and traded privately affected the EIC commerce as they used the 
Company’s offical capital and property to serve their private trade. To address this 
issue, the EIC applied some solutions of making a decent contract which allowed 
servants to carry out a private trade, putting an entry-level fee on employees or bonding 
to limit the Company’s cost of employees.328 The EIC also checked ships returning to 
Europe, used trading spies, employed honest and experienced factors, wrote letters of 
instruction, and established ‘presidencies’. 329  However, no managerial strategy or 
practice solved illegal private trade, cooperation, and interlopers satisfactorily. 330  In 
recognising itself ‘virtually powerless’ to stop the malfeasance, the EIC gradually 
allowed private trade in India, which expanded English trade in Asia by the late 
seventeenth century. 331  However, the allowance of private trade and the lack of 
supervision encouraged Company employee opportunism. For example, agents in the 
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Bantam factory undertook illegal and private trade on their own and even at the 
Company’s expense in 1663.332  
 The Tonkin factory offers a rich example of the EIC’s broader administration 
issues, regarding both the struggle between London and overseas servants, the EIC’s 
endeavours to manage overseas factors and factories, and the situation of private trade 
by overseas factors by the late seventeenth century. Moreover, this research provides 
evidence for the friendship and kinship connections of overseas factors with London, 
other servants, and especially with local people to explain how the EIC gained 
knowledge and created relationships with Asia. To clarify, the following section 
discusses two main subjects, (1) the relationship between London, agents in Bantam or 
Madras, and the Tonkin factory; and (2) the conflict between the Tonkin factors to 
become a chief factor. From then, the research seeks to find a fact that London was still 
hard to control overseas factories and servants; its policy of using experienced staff in 
distant trade; and the role of overseas agencies towards the EIC from Asia. 
 The research argues that before 1682, the Bantam factory, a headquarters of the 
EIC in East Asia, not London took a central power in the relationship with outlying 
factories in East Asia as a result of the accrued influence of the Bantam Council, and 
London’s limited knowledge and ability to administer overseas branches. The Bantam 
Council not only recommended Tonkin as a place to settle the supportive factory in the 
1660s but also made suggestions to London, and sometimes intervened in and decided 
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the employees in Tonkin. 333  Due to the Bantam factory’s power and position, the 
argument between the Bantam Council and new factors from London seems 
unsurprising, and it occurred before the settlement of the Tonkin factory in 1672. 
London chose William Gyfford, an experienced company factor, as master of the 
Tonkin factory (salary of £120/year), Thomas James as the second factor (£60/year) and 
Samuel Baron as adviser and inspector of English branches in East Asia (£120/year).334 
The Zante Frigate sailed from London to Bantam with those factors on April 1672 to 
obtain more goods and information before sailing to Tonkin. In Bantam, while they 
considered postponing the voyage to Tonkin until 1673 to wait for information from the 
English in Japan as they recognised the dependence of Tonkin trade on Japan, the 
Bantam Council decided to send the Zante Frigate quickly to Tonkin to catch the 
monsoon and find more opportunities for their trade. 335  Eventually, they arrived in 
Tonkin on the Zante in mid-July 1672, but Gyfford reported to London that he would 
not take responsibility for any miscarriage or ‘private interest’.336  
Through the case of Gyfford who had considerable experience working for the 
Company, this study reveals not only the EIC’s policy of using long-serving staff, and 
                                                             
333 For example, in 1675, London approved Bantam request of two writers for the Tonkin factory; and in 
1677 with 1 factor, 2 writers. IOR/B/29, Court Minutes, 4 November 1675, p. 365; Sainsbury, Court 
Minutes 1677-79, 13-19 July 1677, p. xvii. 
334 IOR/B/31, Court Minutes (1670-1672), 7 June, 30 June, and 23 August 1671; IOR/G/21/7, Java 
factory (1677-1707), p. 22; IOR/E/3/33, pp. 11-12; Winterbottom, Company Culture, chapter 1. The EIC 
paid 160 [Spanish] dollars for S. Baron to work as go-between and informer, and even an inspector. All 
information about W. Gyfford can be seen in H. Yule (ed.), Diary of William Hedges during his Agency 
in Bengal, as well as on his Voyage out and return Overland (1681-1687), vol. 2 (London, 1887), pp. 
clxxxv –cxc. 
335 IOR/E/3/33, S. Baron in Bantam to the East India Company in London, 4 June 1672, p. 42; Ma, 
English trade, pp. 61-64. Although Baron was ordered to go with Gyfford to Tonkin in 1672 by London, 
he was late and was then unable to go to Tonkin. 




their connections, but also wider issues in the relationship between London and Bantam 
in restructuring distant factories. Gyfford started working as the EIC’s factor from 1657 
in the Kásimbazár factory (Cossimbazar, West Bengal), and then Macassar (Makassar, 
Indonesia) until coming back to England in 1665. 337  Believing in his experience, 
London ordered him to be a temporary member of the Bantam Council before sailing to 
Tonkin in 1672. He was also allowed to ‘take his sister on the Zant Frigate to the South 
Seas’ in the same year. 338  During the process of establishing the Tonkin factory, 
Gyfford made a good connection with Baron, the EIC’s adviser in Tonkin and East Asia 
who had a rich knowledge about trade networks and commodities this area obtained 
from working with his father in Tonkin (see chapter two). After establishing the Tonkin 
factory, Gyfford showed his role on finding knowledge about commodities and trade 
networks of this kingdom. He also operated a project to find alternative silver for the 
EIC by sending a voyage to Manila in 1673. On the perspective of the competition 
between the EIC’s factories in East Asia, Gyfford’s attempts to link with Manila acted 
against Bantam. If this voyage was successful the position of Tonkin was more 
important than that of Bantam in the EIC East Asian trading network as Tonkin would 
have a regular supplier of silver from both Manila and Japan enabling it to become the 
English key factory in the area. When the venture proved disastrous, Dacres was 
therefore quick to blame Gyfford for private and rash trade and required London to 
recall him in 1675.339 However when back in London, Gyfford was supported as he was 
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the EIC’s long-serving employee and London was keen to limit the influence of Dacres 
and the Bantam Council in East Asia. After considering the journal of the Tonkin 
factory from 1672 to 1675, the Court of Directors decided that Gyfford did not do any 
illegal trade before and during his time at Tonkin and therefore that he could continue as 
Tonkin’s chief.340 In that record, from December 1672 Gyfford showed that Tonkin had 
potential commodities to create a trading link with other countries in East Asia, 
especially Japan and Manila in exchange for silver.341 Consequently, sending a voyage 
to Manila was Gyfford’s attempt to find supportive silver for the EIC, maintain the 
Tonkin factory and expand English trade in East Asia.342 London thus sent a letter in 
1676 to inform the Councils in Bantam and Tonkin the decision of keeping Gyfford.343 
Gyfford was also supported by his friends, Baron from East Asia and Robert Hooke in 
London. 344  Moreover, his experience of Asian trade was vital to the Company, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Directors] find how Mr Gifford and Mr James have drove a greater trade in Callicoes for Tonquin…. 
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especially in the EIC’s voyages to Tonkin and East Asia.345 Consequently, in December 
1680 London sent him back to Asia and granted him a promotion as the Governor of 
Fort St. George.346 As such, although the Bantam Council, particularly Dacres had an 
argument with Gyfford and blamed him for illegal trade in 1675, the Court of Minutes 
supported him and even granted him more power in the key factory in Madras.  
The Gyfford’s incident reveals two insights; firstly the complicated relationship 
between London and the Bantam factory during the process of building influence in the 
Tonkin factory as London tried to protect its choice (Gyfford) in the competition with 
Bantam Council; and secondly the EIC’s policy of using experienced factors. It showed 
that English servants had relatives or friends in both London and overseas areas, and the 
EIC needed their skills and knowledge of the distant trade.347 Sooner or later they would 
again serve the EIC in London or different destinations in Asia after being dismissed.348 
The issue of London’s dependence on long-serving servants was also reflected through 
another Tonkin employee, active at the same time as Gyfford, Nicholas Waite. He had a 
kinship with Lord Longford, brother of Gerald Aungier, an administrator in Bombay 
(1672-1677).349  He was ordered to run the Macao-Manila project in 1673 but was 
captured and put in prison by the Spanish in Manila. With his kinship in Bombay and 
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experience of working in Asia, after being held as a prisoner, he was paid £60 for his 
time and was asked to work again as a factor in Tonkin, or anywhere Bantam thought 
fit. 350  Eventually, he became Bantam’s agent and was then dismissed due to his 
misconduct at Batavia in 1683.351 
After the incident with Gyfford, the Tonkin factory continued to be subject to 
the (often) conflicting aims of London and the Bantam Council. London still had little 
power over distant factories in comparison with Bantam although it tried to send factors 
to Tonkin to manage the factory directly. The conflict continued immediately after 
Gyfford was recalled in 1675. In the same year, London ordered Benjamin Sangar, a 
Bantam agent, to become Tonkin’s new chief, while the Bantam Council contradicted 
this order and had sent him to Siam to establish a factory.352 Rather than Sangar, Dacres 
wanted Thomas James as a temporary chief and William Keeling as the second factor in 
Tonkin.353 We have no evidence to investigate who supported Sangar from London or 
why the Bantam Council put James in charge of Tonkin. It maybe that he had been the 
second factor (supporting Gyfford) in Tonkin from 1672. The conflict between the 
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Tonkin factors occurred quickly in late 1676 as the Tonkin Council claimed that James 
‘being sickly and crasie whereby, very unfit to undertake the troublesome management’ 
needed to be recalled, and a new chief factor was required. 354  Interestingly, the 
requirement of the Tonkin factory to change chief factor showed that although James 
was the principal factor and took responsibility of writing reports to Bantam and 
London, his power was weak within the Tonkin Council, and consequently he was 
asked to leave the position by other factors. It meant that while the Bantam Council 
contradicted orders from London, the Tonkin factors themselves were capable of 
denying orders from Bantam. However, the Bantam Council insisted on keeping James 
as it found no reason to dismiss him and had no replacement from London.355  
 In 1678, the administrative issue in Tonkin continued to be complex with open 
competition arising between old staff and new employees from London. 356  John 
Blunden, a mercer from London, was ordered to replace Keeling in the role of the 
second factor in late 1678 since London expected that Blunden’s knowledge and skill in 
the silk industry would help the factory during the developing period of the Eurasian 
silk trade. 357  Although London’s decision of sending a new factor to Tonkin was 
foremost to improve the local silk industry rather than find a way to manage the factory, 
it directly affected the role of Keeling in Tonkin and the structuce of the Tonkin factory. 
The Tonkin Council was glad about the arrival of Blunden to help with the silk trade but 
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did not believe his possibility of management and approve London’s decision to 
discharge Keeling’s position.358 The conflict between Tonkin factors around Keeling 
and Bluden, however, did not last too long because on 24 March 1679, Bluden died. It 
seems that the weather in Tonkin at that time between spring and summer was not good 
for new foreigner and Bluden died after being sick. 359  After the death of Bluden, 
Keeling tried to get back his power in Tonkin. He wrote to London directly in 1679 that 
‘Mr John Bluden whereby ye second place here is become vacant in respect. I [Keeling] 
have continued ever since ye Honble Compas hath been settled here. Therefore 
entreate…jusditious considerarion & favour relying wholy on you…for my 
advancement & promotion of ye second placs as being the nearest to it in the factory 
having before ye arrival of Mr Blunden…’.360 Keeling argued that he had worked for the 
factory from the early days and had achieved the position of the second factor before 
Blunden had arrived in Tonkin, and as a result, he required more assurances to make 
him the second in charge after Bluden’s death. Keeling’s letter shows clear issues: 1) 
the experience and knowledge of Keeling in trade with Tonkin and East Asia, 2) the 
desire of Keeling and overseas factors  more generally to improve themselves on the 
ground to gather different benefits in trade in Asia.  
 The Bantam Council also reacted to London’s activities and the death of Bluden 
by reasserting the Tonkin factory’s staffing structure in mid-1679. It asserted that James 
worked as the chief, Keeling was the second factor to keep go-down (warehouse), Ireton 
kept disbursement, Styleman and Tash kept a journal and disbursement of servants’ 
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wages and household stuff, Sheppard was a steward, and Blackmore helped in writing 
and keeping go-down. 361  Other new staff from London, George Tash, Lemuel 
Blackmore, and Thomas Sheppard were still on the Council as their first job was a 
writer and could not affect the role of Keeling and other previous factors in Tonkin.362 
Accordingly, that Keeling asked for position in the Tonkin Council and the Bantam 
Council settled a new Council in Tonkin showed that London still faced difficulty to 
control overseas factories and servants. Interestingly, from 1676 to 1679, the Bantam 
Council itself ordered significant replacements with different agents after Henry Dacres 
was dismissed in July 1676. Respectively, Arnold White, Abel Payne, Robert Parker 
from London became the chief agent of the Bantam factory in a very short-time (a 
round one year) before Francis Bowyer, the third factor during the periods of Dacres 
and A. White, took control in December 1679.363 It means that as London tried to re-
structure the factories in Bantam and Tonkin, the English factors there also reacted if 
possible to keep their power and benefit. The relationship between London-Bantam-
Tonkin therefore was noticealbe as London wanted to change while the Councils in 
Bantam and Tonkin wanted to maintain their position. It again showed the ‘beyond 
control’ situation of overseas factories more generally. London once again failed to 
administer overseas factories due to the influence of distant factors and factories. 
 The struggle among the Tonkin factors was complicated and unforeseeable with 
three different groups centred on Keeling, James, and Blunden. While the Bantam 
Council supported James; London backed Blunden but his task failed due to his sudden 
death. However, the materials which remain show that both James and Blunden did 
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notbecome actively invovled in the struggle to gain power in Tonkin. Their appearance 
was closely related to instructions from London or the Bantam Council while we found 
no evidence from their view to protect their position and power as Keeling did. It 
showed that there were several groups of shareholders in London competing to control 
the Company and they were the main reason for the instability of the EIC and its 
problem of weak manage towards overseas factories and servants. By contrast, 
Keeling’s faction refused both requirements from Bantam (complaining about James in 
1676) and London (dispuing Blunden’s appointment in 1679 and asking power after 
Bluden’s death). The position of Keeling thus raised a question of how he obtained the 
power and which emergence led him to to join in this tournament. In 1678 he was 
reported by James for ‘being negligent, and unfaithful’ and Blunden replaced his 
position in the same year, but he was not dismissed and still took a very important job 
of disbursement. 364  As the EIC’s documents showed none of Keeling’s kinship or 
friendship (as Gyfford, James or Bluden), the most compelling reason seems to have 
been his relationship with local people. Keeling was one of the longest-serving staff in 
Tonkin having arrived there in 1672. Thus, he had considerable knowledge about this 
kingdom; and built relationships with native people, especially in the most important 
period of the English diplomacy towards Tonkin Court (1672-1682). Their gift-
diplomacy was active and effective in this period, in which many times Keeling 
operated the job of sending gifts to the King or local Mandarins (including the King and 
Prince’s Dispatchers, the Governors of Thang Long and Pho Hien, their secetaries). The 
appearance of his Tonkinese wife in Tonkin records in 1693 also shows his particular 
                                                             




connections to Tonkin.365 It seems that he was thus secured by the Governor of Hien, Le 
Dinh Kien, who prevented Madras’ inspectors from investigating Keeling in 1694-1695. 
With those ties, Keeling played a crucial role in the English relationship with the 
Tonkin Court, and consequently, he gradually rose through the Tonkin factory 
hierarchy. Keeling’s case thus demonstrates how English overseas factors built their 
connections, and consolidated their power in distant areas, to become important parts of 
the EIC in the seventeenth century. They created themselves as ‘central powers’ in 
overseas factories, and that situation challenged the EIC and was a reason to explain 
why London found it hard to control outlying factors and factories. 
The conflict among Tonkin staff continued as Keeling became interim chief, due 
to his seniority in Tonkin by re-accusing James and forcing him to sail to Bantam in 
December 1681.366 It was the second time James was charged to leave the position in 
the Tonkin factory (the first was in 1676), and Keeling was successful in this accusation 
as his power base had increased. The letter of the Tonkin Council, signed by James, to 
Bantam in 1681 explained quite clearly this event as James could not control the factory 
satisfactorily and he was forced by Keeling to move to Bantam. ‘The Chief [James] 
unwilling to disort the Honble Compa service abruptly without the order at least your 
mission yo is now forced to take his passage for Bantam to known Mr Keeling hath to 
charge him with all for on easier former hee cannot know his charge now bee left in a 
capacity to justifce himself.’367 It demonstrated two issues in the relationship between 
English factors, firstly the extant conflict between them and secondly the increasing 
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power of Keeling over the years. In January 1682 Keeling explained more clearly the 
reason for this replacement. All issues related to the fact that James used 33,000 tales of 
silver of the factory to exchange for Tonkinese cash at a high rate and then invested in 
pelang (Tonkinese wrought silk) with an high price through the factory’s existing 
broker, Domingo while the Dutch obtained this product with a cheaper deal.368 Keeling 
disagreed with James both on the issues of using the interpreter, Domingo and on 
investing in unsuitable products at a high price. Interestingly, James’s report to London 
about the potential of Tonkinese silk in November 1680 can be seen as another reason 
for his discharge by Keeling. In that letter, James illustrated that the quantity and quality 
of Tonkinese silk were not as good as Chinese products.369 This information not only 
undermined the role of the Tonkin factory in the East Asian trade network but also his 
position in the factory. It seemed that Keeling (and possibly other factors) wished to 
protect the role of the Tonkin factory and his own ambition in connections with Tonkin, 
and therefore  discharged James. After this change, both London and the Bantam 
Council tried to intervene in the Tonkin factory, but agents from Bantam quickly got 
success while London’s opinion came late due to the problem of timing and distance of 
overseas trade. The Bantam Council sent William Hodges on the ship Tonqueen 
Merchant to become the chief in July 1682. In August 1682, Keeling again became the 
second factor with disbursement.370 As such, from 1676 to 1682, the Bantam Council 
intervened at least three times and changed the Tonkin factory’s staffing in 1676, 1679, 
and 1682 to maintain its influence there. Although Keeling had power and ambition 
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based on his relationship with local people, he could not succeed in the infighting 
against Bantam’s dominance.  
After the interference of agents from Bantam, arguments between Hodges and 
Keeling occurred continuously.371 While Hodges preferred Domingo who worked for 
the factory from 1672 as a translator, Keeling wanted a Dutch free merchant, Michael 
de Cruz. Hodges complained to the Bantam Council that Keeling was uncooperative 
and prevented the factory from using good labour in late 1682: ‘Mr Keeling prevented 
us [Hodges and George Tash] for ye future and little hope of prevailin with Domingo or 
any other worthy…’.372 Therefore, he dismissed Keeling and forced him to move out of 
Tonkin to Batavia, but was unsuccessful due to London’s interference.373 In detail, after 
receiving the news of Keeling replacing James to become Tonkin chief in December 
1681, London quickly supported Keeling in a letter to Tonkin dated October 1682.374 
Through the ship Smyrnaote, this letter was dispatched to Tonkin in August 1683 as 
Hodges had replaced Keeling’s position (August 1682) and wanted to discharge him to 
Batavia (December 1682). London’s letter changed the conflict situation in Tonkin 
completely as it helped Keeling to retake the chief role in Tonkin as Hodges had no 
support as the Bantam factory was closed in 1682. London stated that ‘if our agents and 
council at Bantam should have displace Mr Keeling from being chief at Tonqueen as it 
will be done without consent, so we do disapprove this order and hereby order and 
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appoint the said Mr Keeling to be the chief of that factory’.375 London attempted to 
prevent the agents in Bantam from imposing its power on the Tonkin factory as it stated 
that London disapproved any decision from Bantam to discharge Keeling.  
 After the Bantam factory closed in 1682 and Keeling retook the chief position in 
Tonkin with support from London in mid-1683, London’s attempts to manage the 
overseas factory system and the conflict between the Tonkin factors changed with 
advantages for London’s side. Due to the missing materials from the Tonkin records (G 
series) from 1683 to 1693, it is difficult to understand what took place in this period. 
However, brief records of the Java factory do help to illuminate the events that took 
place. London tried to reduce the role of the Bantam factory from May 1682 as the 
Committees Shipping considered using Bombay as the centre of shipping in East Asia 
rather than Bantam and English ships from Tonkin and other places in East Asia had to 
pass Bombay before sailing to London.376  
 In Tonkin, Keeling complained about Hodges, and blamed another employee, 
Tash for using the Company’s capital to trade with Tonkin brokers, corresponding with 
the Dutch, and using Domingo as an interpreter with a high salary while the trade was 
decreased.377 Therefore, Keeling dismissed Tash and Domingo in March 1684.378 By 
contrast, other factors blamed Keeling for mistakes in both business and behaviour. 
Tash charged him with replacing the factory’s interpreter Domingo, although he worked 
                                                             
375 Ibid, London found no evidence to discharge Keeling as other Tonkin factors required. Therefore, 
London ordered all staff to serve and respect Keeling as the main chief of the factory. However, Court of 
Directors took a little consideration about the Tonkin factory and there was no information of the 
discussion directly about Keeling and the struggle in Tonkin. 
376 IOR/B/37, Court Minutes (11 April 1682- 18 April 1684), 26 May 1682, p. 11. 
377 Ibid, Tonqueen general from Mr. Keeling, 7 January 1684, 26 December 1684, p. 90. 




well and had good relations with local salesmen.379 As Domingo stopped working for 
the English, they faced more difficulties in dealing with Tonkin weavers directly and 
lost 4,000 tales of silver as Tonkin brokers were bankrupt.380 Tash thought that it was 
hard for staff to work under Keeling’s direction as ‘Keeling has acted in all thing 
according to his own fancy, having turned out all the Council, he has not dealt 
faithfully…’.381 He also invested in the wrong silk and caused debts for the factory.382 
Tash’s arguments suggest that Keeling had become oppressive, deciding the factory’s 
activities unfairly and damaging the EIC’s property. Whether Keeling became a dictator 
in the Tonkin factory, it is impossible to say with certainty, but it is clear that Keeling 
had a deep relationship with a different group of merchants and that he became the 
factory’s chief was a chance for him to support his own trading partners in Tonkin 
rather than working through the long-serving Domingo.  
 Essentially, from 1681 to 1684 there were two conflicts between Keeling and 
James (1681-early 1682), and then Keeling, Hodges and Tash (12/1682-1684). In both 
instances, Keeling received support from London, eventhough late, through instructions 
and letters. London’s first letter to Tonkin in August 1683 was to prevent the Bantam 
Council for displacing Keeling, but its effect was to help Keeling to protest against 
Hodges in late 1682. London’s second support for Keeling in 1683 met the same issue 
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of timing as London’s letters dated September and December 1684 only arrived in 
Tonkin in late 1685.383 These said that through the previous letters on 2 and 4 October 
1682, and 2 July 1684, London ‘establish Mr Keeling according to his degree in the 
chiefship of that factory’ and in September 1684 London ‘still confirm if hee bee upon 
the place’.384 London also ‘have not displace Mr Hodges for any fault wee find in him 
but only because wee know it is Mr Keeling right and wee would have Hodges continue 
second there’, but in case Hodges desired to move, he would be sent to Fort St. 
George.385 It meant that London absolutely believed in Keeling, and Hodges could only 
save his position as the second factor if he supported Keeling. Keeling thus sent Hodges 
to Madras in 1686 on the Dragon as a man who ‘threw off all the Company’s 
business’.386 Eventually, the rest of Bantam’s group in Tonkin was moved out, and 
London partly succeeded in eliminating the indirect power of overseas headquarters to 
contact and manage distant factories directly via single individual.  
From 1686 to 1693, there was no noticeable conflict between the Tonkin factors 
while Keeling accrued more power because of Tonkin’s relative isolation from London 
and Madras due to the outbreak of the Nine Years War. In 1692, London tried to re-
contact the Tonkin factory and put all activities under the order of Fort St. George.387 In 
1693, two new members of staff Richard Watts and Richard Farmer were sent from 
Madras to Tonkin to investigate the factory and examine the investment of 30,000 
                                                             
383 Ma, English Trade, p. 187; IOR/G/21/7, Tonkin general 26 December 1684, p. 90; IOR/E/3/90, 
London to Tonqueen, 26 September 1684, p. 342. Keeling worked as the chief factor, Hodges was the 
second one; Henry Ireton was the 3rd place as go-down keeper; Tash kept expense account; Blackmore 
kept journal register. 
384 IOR/E/3/90, London to Tonqueen, 26 September 1684, p. 342. 
385 Ibid. 
386 IOR/G/21/7, Tonqueen general from Keeling and Blackmore, 10 December 1686, p. 95. 




Spanish dollars.388 Watts quickly replaced Keeling as Tonkin’s leader and recorded all 
the factory’s activities. A new conflict between the new and old staff broke out. 
Blackmore admitted that he and Keeling were driving private trade when Madras’ 
investigators surprised him near Achin, but when they were in Tonkin in 1694, 
Blackmore denied everything (see below). Watts and Farmer tried to persuade Keeling 
to pay money for the crew on the Pearl Frigate but to no purpose.389 Discovering that 
Keeling had all the factory’s documents and had moved to his own house with his wife, 
a Tonkinese woman, Watts decided to send him back to Madras in late 1693. 390 
However, it was hard as Keeling lobbied Tonkin’s Mandarins to get the permission for 
residence in Tonkin. Moreover, Chubu, the factory’s interpreter had a close relationship 
with Keeling and tried to help him.391 After few attempts, the factory sent Keeling to 
Madras in January 1695 and Blackmore moved out of Tonkin by 1697.   
 Beyond the struggles between Tonkin factors, the relationship between London, 
the Bantam Council (then the Madras Council) and the Tonkin factory reflects 
London’s attempts to control directly overseas factories and gradually eliminated the 
role of intermediaries in the EIC’s oceanic trading system. In East Asia, London faced 
difficulty as power of the Bantam Council was dominant and factors in Bantam tried to 
maintain their benefit and power not only in Bantam but also in East Asia. The greater 
autonomy of Bantam in the East Asian regional network led to problems associated 
with the system. Bantam was able to abuse its privileges, and there were numerous 
opportunities for dishonest servants and illegal cooperation between agents and 
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overseas factors and illegal private trade.392 In fact, the activities of the Tonkin factory 
was much dependent on the control of the Bantam factory before 1682. The progress 
London tried to send new factor to Tonkin or support Keeling to fight against the 
factions from Bantam was the progress London tried to reduce the power of the Bantam 
Council or broadly the position of a headquarters in the EIC’s overseas trading chain. In 
doing so, in September 1682 (as London had not known that the EIC was kicked out of 
Bantam by the new Sultan and the Dutch), London decided that Tonkin was under the 
supervision of the Presidency of Surat and the Government of Bombay, but that they 
had no real relationship except that Tonkin was ordered to prepare suitable goods for 
Bombay.393 As Bassett argued, trade with East Asia became more important for the EIC 
and London distrusted Bantam to manage this duty because its power was beyond the 
control of London.394 From late 1686, Tonkin was under the supervision of Fort St. 
George. To avoid Madras’s interference in the Tonkin factory as Bantam had done in 
the 1670s, and to protect Keeling in the conflict with other Tonkin factors, London gave 
special orders towards Madras about the Tonkin factory’s staffing order. After Hodges 
and Tash were dismissed in Tonkin by Keeling, London banned Madras from 
‘displac[ing] out chief Mr Keeling at Tonqueen, or resettl[ing] Mr Tash or Hodges 
there, who have unworthily mutinied against their chief’.395 It meant that London again 
confirmed the role of Keeling as the chief factor in Tonkin and supported his decision of 
discharging opposed factors. In late 1687 London confirmed to Keeling in Tonkin that 
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only the Court of Directors could organise the Tonkin factors.396 Another letter from 
London to Tonkin in November 1687 said that ‘…you two [Keeling and Blackmore] 
should share such by commission between you,… though you are under a 
correspondence with Fort St. George, you shall never be commanded by our council 
there out of our employment, nor neither of you, we have writ them wee will have none 
of you removed without our special order in writing.’397 Those letters showed the power 
of London and prevented Madras from creating a new power in overseas and affecting 
Tonkin by changing the order of the Tonkin Council, and protected London’s choice of 
staff in Tonkin from the Madras’ influence. As such, although Tonkin had a connection 
with Madras, the Tonkin Council would not be affected by Madras. Ma argued that 
London was worried about the unhappy relationship between Gyfford (the previous 
Tonkin leader, and the Governor of Madras from 1680) and other staff in Tonkin.398 
However, there was no record to show the problem between Gyfford and Keeling in that 
period. It seemed that the EIC’s attempts to avoid Madras’s influence in Tonkin were to 
restructure the overseas factory system and increase the role of London in managing 
distant factories. As Bassett argued, Madras was an experiment as a hub to supervise the 
EIC’s trade in China and the Spice Islands from July 1684 to replace the previous role 
of Bantam, but until the end of the century, London directly took this role.399 Moreover, 
to avoid illegal cooperation between Madras and Tonkin as Bantam-Tonkin in the 
1670s, the EIC decided to put Tonkin under the direct control of London. Accordingly, 
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in 1693 London forbade Madras to send ships to Tonkin without order.400 As such, the 
relationships between London and Bantam, then Madras were really under the term of 
management as London wanted to experiment with a better solution for controlling 
overseas factories. During that process, London tried to support and grant privileges for 
overseas factors under the direct control of London to undermine the role of 
intermediaries of Bantam or Madras. However, this policy created other negative effects 
towards the Company, as the Tonkin factors worked without a necessary monitor, 
especially during the Nine Years War and the issue of ‘adverse selection’ was 
unavoidable. 
 
Private trade in Tonkin  
 
As the previous discussions, the EIC had to use experienced factors to work overseas as 
London lacked of knowledge, information, and experience in trading with East Asian 
countries. Those factors were allowed to work independently in both management and 
trading. This policy therefore created both positive and negative results in trading as the 
EIC’s factors run both offical and private trade during their time in Tonkin.  
On the positive side, the EIC’s policies of using skilled employees and 
encouraging them to discover the nature of trade, potential commodities and trade 
network and, to drive overseas factories themselves were necessary and vital due to the 
English lack of trading experience in Tonkin. Accordingly, Gyfford was actively 
searching for the possibility of forging Tonkin’s links with Macao, Siam, Japan and 
Manila. From 1676, as the Tonkin factory served both regional and transoceanic trade, 
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its staff ran the country trade with orders from London or by themselves. For instance, 
London required the Tonkin factory to make a relation with Siamese salesmen in 1677 
to get yearly ‘40 or 50 tons of sappan wood the best & reddest sort’. 401  Captain 
Dedousy of the ship Formosa went to Siam for private trade in 1679.402 The EIC wished 
to re-create the Manila link and required Tonkin’s advice on trading and suitable goods 
for this market in 1679.403  London hoped that English factories in Taiwan, Amoy, 
Tonkin and Siam would form a satisfactory commercial connection to join and control 
the regional trade. 404  In 1685 London reconsidered a plan of collecting Japanese 
merchandises, copper and tutenague for both Europe and Madras through the Tonkin 
factory.405 In doing so, Keeling sent the ship Dragon to Canton and Lampacao to collect 
musk and pelang for the EIC, while crews of this vessel traded personally in Siam in 
1686. 406  The above example showed firstly the EIC’s allowance towards English 
merchants to become involved in the ‘country trade’ together with the Company’s 
activities, and secondly the necessity and importance of English private trade in Tonkin 
although it was small and irregular.  
Nevertheless, due to the limitations of the EIC’s policies of allowing personal 
trade and managing oceanic factories, the Tonkin factory witnessed examples of 
                                                             
401 IOR/G/12/17/4, Bantam to Tonkin, 29 May 1677, p. 205a. 
402 IOR/G/12/7/6, Tonkin General 14 October 1679, pp. 264a-b. After that trade, Dedousy was put in 
prison in Tonkin as he traded some monopolized goods. 
403 Ibid, Bantam to Tonkin, 20 July 1679, p. 259a. 
404 IOR/G/12/17/8, London to Bantam, 12 August 1681, p. 294b. 
405 IOR/E/3/90, The Court to Tonkin, 15 October 1685, pp. 506-07. Before 1684 this plan belonged to 
Taiwan factory. However, the Machu-Taiwan war led to the closure of the Taiwan factory and London 
hoped that Tonkin could replace this role in the intra-Asian trade. Meanwhile, London required Pryaman 
factory to send some pepper for Tonkin. After collecting sufficient commodities, Keeling sent a ship to 
Bencoolen and then Madras. 




unlucky trade (the Macao-Manila project in 1673-1674) or illegal private trade (in the 
1690s). Overseas factors used the Company’s capital without permission, sent ships to 
‘country trade’, missed the trading season and cooperated with private merchants. 
Accordingly, the EIC’s benefits reduced as its agents focused much more on private 
trade than official business.407 The failure of private trade damaged Tonkin through lost 
capital and ultimately resulted in the closure of this branch in 1697.408 Keeling and his 
activities demonstrated that the EIC’s management towards overseas branches would 
fail if London had no suitable structure to monitor those factories. The entire story of 
English private trade in Tonkin with the 100-ton junk Successful Venture was recorded 
in Blackmore’s letter to Surat in 1691.409 Keeling, Blackmore and Sams (a free English 
trader in Tonkin) bought the junk in 1689. In January 1690 it sailed to Siam, but the 
Siam’s government put Sams in prison because he was related to the EIC’s developing a 
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lousy relationship with Siam in 1687.410 After paying forty-five catties of silver to the 
local government in August 1690, Sams and the junk sailed to Malacca where the Dutch 
ill-treated the English salesmen and confiscated the goods. While Blackmore sent a 
letter to Madras asking for support, Sams returned to Siam with an expectation of better 
trade and stayed there until the end of the south-west monsoon (around October 1692). 
The junk faced the Madras’ inspectors on the way to Achin in 1693, but it was out of 
control and was then wrecked in the Cochin-Chinese channel in 1694. 
Blackmore’s complicated reports present a confused picture of the nature of this 
trade. In his first explanation in 1693, this voyage aimed to serve the Company’s 
regional trade.411 However, he also confirmed that in total £5,259:9:8 of cargo, almost 
all goods were Tonkin commodities and only some of them belonged to the 
Company.412 Blackmore financed 1,000 Spanish dollars himself.413 Noticeably, the EIC 
had 30,000 Spanish dollars in Tonkin, but Madras’s inspectors found no money left in 
1694. 414  Moreover, Madras and London knew nothing about this trade until they 
received Blackmore’s urgent letter after the Dutch ill-treated the English in 1691. All 
data about the private investment, the loss of the EIC’s capital, the appearance of a free 
English trader, and the secret of the voyage raised a hypothesis that Keeling and 
Blackmore ran both official and private activities, even illegal trade.  
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If Tonkin factors ran private commerce, the question is why could they operate 
such activity and what was the result. With around twenty-years experience in Tonkin 
and a tremendous relationship with both native Mandarins and merchants, Keeling had 
sufficient and significant knowledge to be advantageously involved in the intra-Asian 
trade.415 His great privilege was more potent after 1688, as London allowed him to 
dispose of all current stock in Tonkin himself over a few years to purchase better 
commodities since the Anglo-French war prevented the EIC’s connection with Asia.416 
That interruption and the lack of supervision from London created an excellent 
opportunity for Keeling and other Tonkin’s factors who undertook the country trade 
individually.417 The problem was how Keeling used and distributed the EIC’s property. 
 That Keeling and other Tonkin factors did their own illegal business with the 
Company’s capital affected the Tonkin factory negatively. That the private junk was 
wrecked at Cochin-China channel and no money left in the factory, made it difficult for 
Tonkin branch to trade and maintain living activities. English factors had to borrow 
money from the King, Mandarins and the Dutch from 1694 to 1697. Furthermore, 
knowing that there were around twenty Tonkinese men in the private junk, the King of 
Tonkin forbade all foreign ships to carry Tonkin people abroad.418 The English faced 
trading troubles as they had no native pilots or labourers on their vessels.  
                                                             
415 In 1683 although Tonkin silk was rare and low quality due to the natural disaster, Keeling could still 
purchase some good silks from his own ‘favorites’. IOR/G/21/7, George Tash from Tonkin, 31 December 
1683, p. 87. 
416 IOR/E/3/92, The Court to Tonkin, 24 May 1690, pp. 98-99; The Court to Fort St George, 18 February 
1691, pp. 135-36; The Court to Tonkin, 18 February 1691, p. 150. 
417 Ibid, The Court to Tonkin, 29 February 1692, p. 204. London complained that the EIC had not 
received any reports from Tonkin for a long time and they would send experienced staff to check the 
factory’s activities. 




The Court of Directors also considered the reports of factors from both Tonkin 
and Madras. In 1695, London wanted Blackmore as Tonkin’s chief instead of Madras’ 
staff if he was honest since he ‘has lived twenty years upon the place, and speak the 
language incomparably and we heartily wish he now here with us to send him upon 
China voyage’.419 It meant that although Madras’s inspectors considered that Blackmore 
operated an illegal private trade, London mistrusted that report and still needed 
experienced staff for its further trading. The dependence on skilful factors and the fear 
of Madras’s interference in the Tonkin factory’s order caused London’s concern about 
the responsibility of staff. In 1697, London mentioned that it received ‘some letters and 
papers from Keeling and Blackmore complaining of Mr Watts and Mr Farmer, 
concerning what we are not able to judge at present, but shall hereafter when we 
received result of your [Madras] enquiries and examinations particularly what is 
become of the 30,000 dollars…’.420 Accordingly, there was no clarification about the 
Tonkin private trade until 1697, and Thomas Lovell was sent to take responsibility of 
the factory as London mistrusted both Tonkin and Madras’ factors.421 He kept one of 
two keys for the factory’s warehouse and checked and signed all trading orders.422 In 
short, London still failed in managing overseas factories satisfactorily, and the illegal 
private trade, the EIC’s distrust towards distant factors, and the closure of the Tonkin 
factory were unavoidable. 
 
Diplomatic Activities  
                                                             
419 IOR/E/3/92, London to Fort St. George, 6 March 1695, p. 194. 
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London only concerned about the trade in Tonkin, but still thought that they had ‘great staff’ there.  
421 IOR/G/12/17/10, Fort St George to Tonkin, 11 May 1697, p. 481b. 





If the previous section partly shows the unexpected results of the EIC’s policy of using 
experienced individuals in far-flung areas, this part notes other perspectives about their 
role in making a relationship with local government to maintain the EIC’s position in 
Tonkin. This part argues that via connecting with the Tonkin Court, particularly with 
the King’s representatives and Governors of Hien and Thang Long, where the English 
stayed and traded, they had information and lessons about diplomacy in Tonkin and the 
way to treat well the King of Tonkin. Generally, creating a relationship with local 
governments to get privileges for settlement and trade was the first and most important 
job of English factors in East Asia. 423  Since Tonkin only welcomed foreigners 
reluctantly, forging relationships was complicated and required money, patience, and 
skills, which differed from those places where local governments really needed foreign 
merchants for profit and power.424 Accordingly, the English diplomacy and commerce 
in Tonkin were considered under ‘a system of gifts, perquisites and exactions’.425 Was 
Tonkin’s trade entirely under the pressure of gifts? How did the English perform 
diplomacy and commerce? What were the results? How did they learn from this 
diplomacy? Through answering those questions, the chapter seeks to highlight the role 
                                                             
423 Reid, The Age of Commerce, pp. 1-2; Kwee, ‘Chinese Economic Dominance’, p. 10; Berg, Goods 
from the East, p. 10; Massarella, The EIC in Taiwan, p. 415. In 1683, Taiwan factory presented Shih 
Lang and other Manchu mandarins to secure their safety in Taiwan and then get permission to continue to 
trade there and in mainland China.  
424 Bassett, The British in Southeast Asia; Farrington, Trading Places, p. 82. Mughal empire or Sultans in 
the Spices Islands were the noted evidence for the welcome of Asian people towards European merchants 
in the early modern times. By contrast, China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Tonkin followed the Confucian 
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of overseas servants in connecting with Tonkin officials to understand the local customs 
and identifying the right people/power to establish a relationship. It was they, not the 
Court of Minutes in London who played a key role in expanding the EIC commerce and 
power in Tonkin and East Asia broadly. 
 English factors fulfilled their responsibility by enacting diplomacy in Tonkin 
and then reporting to London and Bantam to obtain advice on gaining a better position. 
Tribute diplomacy and gift-diplomacy were existed in Tonkin through many dynasties 
under the influence from China. All foreigners had to report exactly why they arrived in 
Tonkin and how many goods they carried before sending the King and Crown Prince 
gifts for entry-fee and trade. Sometimes a fee was required in silver. 426  Moreover, 
Tonkin maintained a hard policy towards overseas merchants in a long time because its 
developing trend was in agriculture and most economic activities were to serve 
domestic demand. This fact and the political crisis from the early sixteenth century 
required the government of Tonkin to examine carefully foreigners under the demand of 
national security. The firm policy was particularly enforced during the Trinh-Nguyen 
war (1627-1672) as the Trinh Lord needed external supports of military and capital. For 
instance, the Dutch were ordered to maintain only a few factors in the capital in the 
1640s.427 In 1658 Tonkin strengthened control with overseas merchants by giving more 
                                                             
426 T.T. Nguyen, Overseas Commerce in Tonkin in the Seventeenth Century via the Cases of Thang Long 
and Pho Hien (Master Thesis of Hanoi University of Education, 1995), p. 31. This fact was also 
recognised by the English as they had to send silver for the King and Prince as the Dutch and Chinese 
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March 1674, p. 106b. 




power to Dispatchadores,428 appointing Le Dinh Kien [Unggia Thuoc in the English 
Tonkin factory’s record] as the Governor of Hien to command all foreigners.429 He 
advised the King to grant the order in 1669 to oblige all foreigners to trade in Hien, a 
small town. 430  As the Trinh-Nguyen war ended in 1672, Tonkin further restricted 
foreigners as it no longer needed outside support. Important Mandarins such as the 
Governor of Hien, the King and Prince’s Dispatchadores during their contact with 
Gyfford helped him to realise the difficult situation of foreigners in Tonkin. Gyfford 
then stated in 1672 that ‘the King was King of Tonkin before wee [the English] came 
and would be after we were gone and that this country hath now neede of any forreigne 
thing’.431 Accordingly, the EIC needed to apply reasonable treatment towards Tonkin 
Court to obtain privileges for residence and trade.  
 The EIC came to Tonkin late in comparison to the Chinese, Portuguese and 
Dutch. Therefore the Dutch became the key example for the EIC in creating diplomacy 
with the Tonkin Court. In 1673, the Governor of Hien, Unggia Thuoc mentioned to the 
English the necessity of gift that ‘[the Dutch] valued noe charge to accomplish their 
edesigne for at their first comeing they spent soe high that they made nothing of their 
first ships cargoe and had likewise a great loss yearly for three or four years.’432 Again, 
local Mandarins became an important chanel to provide the English useful information 
about the requirement of diplomacy and the necessity of gift-diplomacy in Tonkin. In 
                                                             
428 Dispatchadore, a Portuguese word, was the definition of Tonkin’s officers, as intermediary between 
the King or Princes and foreigners. They took care of all issues related to foreigners which included 
examining goods, seamen, checking the immigrants, sending foreigners’ letter to the King. 
429 Do, Pho Hien’s role, p. 49. 
430 A. Launay, Histoire de la Mission du Tonkin, Documents Historiques 1658-1717 (Paris, 2000), pp. 63, 
67 ; quoted in Do, Pho Hien’s role, p. 49 ; Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries, p. 18. 
431 IOR/G/12/17/1, 3 July 1672, pp. 6b-7a. 




1674, Gyfford required the Bantam Council ‘paid att a dearer rate than the Dutch and 
bee esteemed as other straingers not receiving ye privilege of Dutch till we settle as they 
have done’.433 They repeated an order in 1675 that ‘when we served him [King of 
Tonkin] as the Dutch do, we should have the same privileges as they have.’434 In 1677, 
the Tonkin factory required Bantam to send big cannons valued at £574 as gifts to 
please the King and improve its relationship with Tonkin Court.  
The English faced further problems because they failed to demonstrate that their 
real purpose was commerce before 1676 because they lacked commercial ships. With 
limited commodities for exchange, they were believed to be concealing their real goals. 
They seemed not to be traders like the Chinese and Dutch, but more like the French who 
had come to convert local people to the Christian faith while religion was sensitive and 
forbidden in Tonkin.435 Viewed with suspicion, and having substandard correspondence 
with Tonkin Court before 1676, the English were treated as the third merchants in 
Tonkin and received bad  commercial deals.436 They had to pay more than the Chinese 
and Dutch to get silks from Tonkin Court.437  
For these reasons, gift-giving diplomacy was necessary to maintain any 
relationship with Tonkin Court during the English settlement, especially at Hien (1672-
1682). Applying gift-diplomacy showed the English role in learning about and adapting 
to the natural character of Tonkin and using the right treatment towards the Tonkin 
Court to obtain a trading advantage. Their first job was to send a letter to the King and 
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Crown Prince to ask for free trade and a formal relation. In 1672, the Zant Frigate 
carried two letters from the Bantam Council with a demand for friendship.438 The main 
diplomatic approach was to present Tonkin Court with three kinds of gifts: entry-fee for 
the first time arrival in Tonkin in 1672; annual gifts in the New Year festival, the King’s 
birthday and the Mid-Autumn festival; and lobby-fees to obtain permission to build a 
factory in the capital. Although seen as important by the factors, such acts were 
sometimes thwarted as English ships did not arrive. The figures of this diplomatic 
system were various and changed over time. During the progress of gift-giving, the 
Tonkin Court shared different roles towards the EIC’s learning as some Mandarins 
supported the English to have a good position while others required money, gifts in 
pester ways. 
Entry-fee was paid in 1672 as the English firstly arrived to Tonkin to trade and 
establish a formal relationship. They presented gifts eleven times in whole years, 
especially nine occasions in July as the entry fee. Those who received the factory’s gifts 
in 1672 included the King, Princes, Governors of Hien and Thang Long, Ungia Thay, 
Ungja Deduckluck (the King and Prince’s Dispatchdores) and their secretaries.439 The 
King was always the primary receiver with the most expensive gift, including cloth, 
guns, amber and rose water, while the Crown Prince received the same types of goods 
but in less quantity.440 Gifts were mostly luxury goods as well as some more novel 
                                                             
438 IOR/E/3/33, Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to the ‘King’ of Tonkin, Henry Dacres and Council 
at Bantam to the ‘Prince’ of Tonkin, pp. 34-35. 
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blades, 12 agate hafted knives, 1 case amber hafted knives, 1 silver wired tweezers, 1 three-barrelled 
birding piece, 1 three-barrelled pistol, 1 staff gun, 1 large looking glass, 10 bottles of rose water, 2 sake 




products from Europe and India (rose water, guns, sword blades, looking glasses and 
clothes) alongside a considerable amount of broadcloth. Money was not given.  
Annual-gift was presented for the King, Crown Prince and some of important 
Mandarins in the Tonkin Court. There were two noticeable points related to annual-gift. 
Firstly, while the English tried to focus on important people such as the King, the 
Dispatchdores and the Governor of Hien, where the factory stayed; other local 
Mandarins tried to harass the English to receive gifts, small money if possible. The 
English frenquently had to carry a small gift to Mandarins in Thang Long before 
showing their proposal to trade in the capital or to ask permission to build the factory. 
During meeting, appointments with the Dispatchdores, Governors of Hien, Thang Long 
and other Mandarins, the English recognised the most significant officials who they 
needed to settle a good relationship to reside and trade well. For example, although the 
King was the most important people in Tonkin, the EIC need his Dispatchdores to send 
their trading proposals, asking priviledges, debt or even a presentation. The Governor of 
Hien, was necessary with the EIC over the factory’s existence because the factory lied 
on the place of Hien, all English ships arrived to Tonkin needed to stay at Hien before 
sending goods to Thang Long. Therefore, it was vital for the English to establish a good 
connection with those Mandarins although they asked for quite a few gifts or sometimes 
those Mandarins were in debt. Secondly, the number and sometimes the desirability of 
gifts decreased over the course of the EIC’s presence in Tonkin, especially after the 
English built a factory in the capital in 1682 and the Tonkin Court did not appreciate 
English cloths. The Tonkin factory, therefore, focused on fewer but valuable offers of 
cannon, guns, and Chinese silks. For instance, in 1679 the King received only three 




broadcloths, two caties of Chinese silk, one perpetuanas and two lanthozous.441 In 1693, 
the English presented gifts only to the King and Crown Prince.442  
The role of English factors was remarkable as they could maintain their trade 
and position in Tonkin in spite of the isolation and the decreasing gifts to Tonkin Court. 
The initial explanation was that they knew who was important and how to serve the 
Tonkin Court satisfactorily. They, therefore, established a good relationship with the 
local Mandarins, had a relatively good position in Tonkin, and built a warehouse in the 
capital after 1682. Moreover, as the Tonkin Court stopped providing silks for foreigners 
from 1678, the English expanded the trading cooperation with private traders and 
prevented them from depending on the supply of the Tonkin Court. The English, thus, 
reduced the number of gifts, focused gift-giving on the King who granted trading 
permissions, and the Crown Prince who would succeed to the throne in the future. They 
played a crucial role in gaining knowledge and building a good relationship with Tonkin 
government, which acted as a foundation for the EIC’s further trade. As such, the 
English had experience of the character of a Confucian state with details of diplomatic 
subject and time, types and measures of gifts. It was a useful lesson which helped 
enable the EIC to establish a formal relationship with Vietnam in the eighteenth 
century, and with other countries in the area.  
 The success of the Tonkin diplomacy in improving the trading position, creating 
good relations with native Mandarins and obtaining permission to build a warehouse in 
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442 IOR/G/12/17/9, 26 September 1693, pp. 326b, 327a. Even the Doctor of the Tonkin factory and the 





the capital, demonstrated the critical role of overseas factors who daily communicated 
with the native government to make the friendship with the essential people in Tonkin. 
Firstly they obtained a trading licence and received a small amount of land to build a 
warehouse at Hien in 1673. While the French were refused such permission in 1669 due 
to religious issues, the English at least formed their foundation. The period 1672-1675 
witnessed the crucial role of English factors who directly founded the factory and 
forged the primary relationship with Tonkin when they were isolated, and Tonkin 
gradually restricted foreigners. They managed to keep Tonkin branch without support 
from both London and Bantam in four years. Moreover, they received gifts from the 
Tonkin Court in 1672 with 50,000 [Tonkin] cash, some provisions, four jars of arrack, a 
small bullock as a native custom.443 The success in this period became the foundation 
for the EIC’s further and better relationship with Tonkin in the late 1670s and 1680s as 
they obtained the same deal as the VOC in exchanging silk for silver with the Tonkin 
Court, even better than the Dutch.444 Notably, the Tonkin factory acquired help from 
native Mandarins during their difficult period. The Governor of Hien was the factory’s 
representative in the capital to order a place for a warehouse or require other Mandarins 
to pay debts.445 He actually was a remarkable picture of Tonkinese Mandarins in the 
policy towards the English. On the one side, they helped the English in their 
responsibility and availability in return for gifts, money. On the other hand, they 
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required too much in dealing with the English and even made difficult for the English 
during their residence and trade in Tonkin.446 
 The most significant outcome of the English gift-diplomacy was to gain 
permission to build a factory in the capital in 1682. Moving from Pho Hien to Thang 
Long showed, firstly the better English position in Tonkin, secondly the success of the 
EIC policy of using skilled individuals, and thirdly the attention and attempts of London 
to find better conditions for EIC trade. English factors quickly recognised the difference 
between Pho Hien and Thang Long and insisted on building their factory in the capital 
in 1672. Hien was not a large commercial centre, but just a small town with mostly 
farmers, quite far from the capital. 447  It was a local market for natives and an 
intermediary point for overseas merchants with about 10,000 households in the late 
seventeenth century. 448 Accordingly, Hien was an unsatisfactory and problematic 
location for the Tonkin factory with little chance for commerce as almost all domestic 
salesmen, rich people, the Chinese and Dutch lived in Thang Long. By contrast, Thang 
Long was the most attractive city in Tonkin, a centre for Mandarins, wealthy people, 
workers, and merchants with their high demands for luxury and modern goods. It was 
one of the most crowded cities in Southeast Asia.449 There were eight large markets in 
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Thang Long with around 50,000 retailers, and accordingly, more customers than that 
traded daily.450 Those advantages and the superiority of transport with three surrounding 
rivers offered excellent conditions for the English to expand their trade in the whole 
kingdom.   
 During the progress of applying a permission to build a factory in Thang Long, 
the EIC received both positive and negative lessons from the Tonkin Court, but the 
most noticeable thing they learnt was that it took time and money to treat the King and 
the Tonkin Court to stay in Thang Long. In 1672, the English tried to find support from 
the Capon for permission and a convenient ground in or near the capital but failed due 
to Tonkin’s restricted policy towards strangers.451 Before 1676, the English could do 
nothing as there was no English arrived to Tonkin and the King considered them not 
merchants, but missionaries. The English thus patiently applied the gift-diplomacy and 
created a satisfying relationship with Tonkin Court to serve that goal. In 1677, London 
supplied 5,000 Spanish dollars and required the Tonkin factory to build a proper brick 
or stone warehouse on the riverside.452 However, this job did not progress as the Tonkin 
factory was only willing to lobby 200 tales of silver while the King’s Dispatchdores 
wanted much more money, 2,000 tales.453 He also mentioned that the King did not want 
some cloths, gold or popular gifts from the English in return for permission to stay and 
trade in the capital. In the following negotiations, the English increased their payment 
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capital. 
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first to 500 tales and then 1,000 tales with a cannon for the King in October 1678.454 
London again paid attention to this task by sending 5,000 rials of eight to Tonkin with 
the expectation that it would keep and develop the factory during the fruitful period of 
silk trade although it expected that 3,000 rials were enough for this issue.455 However, 
the English still did not receive permission since their gift-cannon broke in a trial. The 
EIC then hoped that one of the King’s wifes could help with the price of 4 tales gold, 
but she scared to give the King the English proposals and only promised to sell them a 
good land with a nice price.456 All failure demonstrated that it was hard for the English 
to gather any permission to trade or stay in Thang Long as the Tonkin Court followed 
the hard-policy towards foreingers. Luckily, with the appearance of Ungja Dew, the 
new King’s Dispatchadores, the negotiation was quick, and the lobby was reduced to 
500 tales of silver. On 10 March 1683, the English petition was submitted, and they 
received a place near the Red River, and a licence to build the warehouse in May ended 
their ten-year-entreaty.457 
 The figure below demonstrates two important things: the necessity to build a 
factory in Thang Long, and Dutch influence towards the English in Tonkin. The Tonkin 
factory in Thang Long was quite near the Tonkin Court’s Place to enable easy 
dailydirect contact with the Dispatchdores. In front of the factory was the main river of 
Tonkin, which helped the English to transfer all commodities through the reiver system. 
Meanwhile, this position was quite near and comfortable for the English to get 
information from the Dutch which showed that the EIC still followed its competitior as 
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the English had little experience in Tonkin. As such, the English attempts in around ten 
years were to get permission and position as the Dutch had got in Tonkin. 
 Figure 3.2. The EIC’s factory in Thang Long, Tonkin’s capital 
 
Source: S. Baron, ‘A description of the Kingdom of Tonqueen’, in J. Pinkerton (ed), A 




The story of the EIC management in Tonkin provides a new way of seeing how a small 
factory could affect the EIC structure and an excellent example of the Company’s 
limitations of overseas management, such as illegal cooperation, private trade, and 
conflicted relations. The chapter shows that although London tried to improve the EIC’s 
administration, it could be denied a fact that distant factories and servants were still out 
of control over the seventeenth century as the EIC agency and factories always worked 




manage Bantam and Tonkin before 1682, they began to accrue control in the later 
period of the Tonkin factory. Nevertheless, the private trade of primary Tonkin factors 
in the 1690s, and its far-reaching influence on the EIC and the Tonkin factory 
epitomised the failure of London to control oceanic factors and factories as London 
ceded power to its servants, without necessary and suitable observation methods.  
The Tonkin factory also reflected two other issues: the key role of English 
overseas individuals (and then information, knowledge) towards the development and 
expansion of the EIC in East Asia; and the necessity of diplomacy, particularly gifts in 
the EIC relationship with Tonkin and other countries in East Asia. London decided to 
establish the Tonkin factory with limited knowledge, and English factors’ task was to 
discover and learn the character of this country. The cases of Gyfford and Keeling 
showed different ways in which English distant factors served the EIC by maintaining 
and improving the English position in Tonkin over the period of twenty-five years and 
broadly expanding the EIC’s trade in East Asia. Tonkin factors also showed their vital 
role by directly negotiating with Tonkin Court, altering their behaviours towards the 
King, Princes and Dispatchdores in the consultation about the permission to build a 
warehouse at Thang Long, and adapting the gift-diplomacy to alter the quantity and 
quality of presents. In return, the Tonkin Court, particularly the Governor of Hien or the 
Dispatchadores, provided the English useful knowledge about the diplomacy in Tonkin 
and how to work well with the officials there. The chapters argues that knowledge from 
the connection between the English and Tonkin people was fundamental for the EIC’s 
success in Tonkin. Using skilled factors in Tonkin, therefore, demonstrated its 





CHAPTER 4. THE EIC’s TRADING EXPERIENCE THROUGH THE TONKIN 
FACTORY (1672-1697) 
  
By studying a range of the EIC’s commercial strategies and activities at Tonkin, this 
chapter demonstrates that the English adapted their trade in response to knowledge 
learned from Dutch experiences and the advice of its overseas staff. In doing so, they 
created regional and transoceanic trading networks, which merged in Tonkin. More 
particularly, the chapter underlines the contribution of distant agency towards the 
maintenance of the Tonkin branch, by showing how they promoted new commercial 
plans and drove the trade indirectly and directly. The EIC officials in London gave 
general instructions and ordered the business while officials in Bantam provided advice 
and ‘special’ orders until 1682, and the Tonkin factors directly ran the EIC’s projects on 
the ground. It was the factors who applied the plans regarding Japan’s silk-silver trade, 
the Manila project of finding a substitute source of silver, and of entering into a 
Eurasian trade network to maintain and raise profits from Tonkin and East Asia. The 
main object of the EIC’s commercial plans in Tonkin was the silk trade, which the EIC 
perceived as a means of facilitating a large-scale transoceanic trading chain.  
 By illustrating how the trade worked on the ground on a daily basis in Tonkin, 
the research offers arguments about the position of overseas factors in Tonkin who ran 
the English trade directly with and without instructions from London, and the EIC’s 
ability to adapt in various matters such as the nature of imported and exported 
commodities, types of investment and types of partnership. The chapter also provides 
evidence about the role of the Tonkin Court and Tonkinese merchants who connected 




commodities and partners together with the way to deal with local merchants 
satisfactorily. Furthermore, by looking at the EIC’s overseas trade, this research 
provides a clear discussion of how the EIC exploited supplementary markets to serve its 
key desire to create an effective distant trading network and to show the role of 
intermediaries in the EIC’s commercial strategy in the seventeenth century. The chapter 
demonstrates that the EIC connections in East Asia greatly depended on creating a 
regional trading system, in which small markets such as Tonkin, Siam and Taiwan 
bridged the link with mainland China and Japan and gave the EIC an alternative means 
of enlarging its influence in trade. The EIC kept the Tonkin factory for twenty-five 
years, even though it produced few direct economic benefits, because of its essential 
role as an intermediary. Tonkin provided an important stepping stone, building trading 
networks in and knowledge of the region, such benefits ultimately allowed the EIC to 
move beyond using intermediaries in the late seventeenth century, to consider direct 
trading links at its end.  
Data for this chapter comes from London’s instructions, Bantam’s letters to 
Tonkin, Tonkin’s journal registers and diaries, the brief records of Bantam Council and 
those held by the Java factory. However, these sources are insufficient to evaluate the 
EIC’s trade in Tonkin due to the lack of materials in important years, especially from 
May 1680 to December 1681, and the period 1683-1693. During these years, data was 
taken from and compared with the VOC’s records in Tonkin and through the records of 
Tonkin’s Mandarins although these were not precise as foreign merchants arriving in 




avoid paying full tax.458 In general, the materials in the 1670s are more complete while 
those in the 1680s and 1690s have proved harder to collect and confirm due to the lack 
of materials, especially during some of the critical years: 1681, 1685, 1688, 1693, and 
1697 when there was limited information available to examine and explain the 
Company’s activity in Tonkin. The research based on these records draws a general 
picture about the English trade in Tonkin. 
 
The EIC’s commercial strategies in Tonkin 
 
Learning from the Dutch commercial model, the EIC tried to create a regional and 
oceanic trading network in East Asia as they established the Tonkin factory in the 
1670s, in which Tonkin respectively played the role of a supplementary market, then an 
intermediary in the East Asian system and a part of the large commercial chain. 
London’s instructions to Bantam in September 1671 showed its expectation and 
knowledge about the potential of Tonkin in terms of commodities and its connection 
with Japan and other ports in Asia.  These instructions state ‘Wee would have you take 
notice, that our cheifest end of undertaking the Japon trade if for the vent of cloth, and 
other English manufactures, and for the procuring of gold, silver & copper for the 
supply of other our factories in East Asia, yt wee may not send gold & silver from 
hence.’ 459  In general, London wished Japan would provide a market for English 
products and capital of the EIC’s regional trading system. Capital from Japan would 
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become the foundation for the EIC’s overseas trade and therefore the maintenance of 
supportive markets in East Asia including Tonkin was greatly depended on the EIC’s 
situation in Japan. Accordingly, no money was sent to East Asia in 1672 while clothes 
were valued at 83 per cent of exported goods, and other goods (weapons, lead, coral, 
amber) played a tiny percentage.460 Based on the number of ships London wanted to 
send to each country (three to Japan, two to Taiwan, only one to Tonkin), Tonkin was 
considered to have less potential than the other two markets.  
  
 Figure 4.1. The EIC’s central supposition of Tonkin trade in 1672 
 Source: IOR/E/3/87, Company to Bantam, 21 September 1671, pp. 479-480. 
  
It is clear that the EIC wanted to build Tonkin as a part of a regional and long-distant 
trade linked East Asia, India, and Europe. In the East Asian trading system, the main 
role of Tonkin was to supply silks (including Chinese products collecting in Tonkin and 
local substitutes) to exchange for silver in Japan. Broadlly, London wanted to connect 
                                                             




Tonkin with both India (providing gold) and Europe (being a market for English goods 
and exporting luxury commodities to London). As such, in the first plan, the Tonkin 
factory played two roles of a supplementary market for Japan and a regular market for 
India and Europe, but the main trend was the silk-silver trade with Japan. This model 
was builded from the Dutch model of regional trade and London expected that potential 
goods would be collected from Tonkin and Taiwan and carried to Japan. From there, 
they were transferred to Surat and Madras for further trading while a ship from Japan 
returned Taiwan and Tonkin to supply capital. In this system, Tonkin would supply 
(Chinese) musk, substitute silks to Japan, tutenague and other commodities to India and 
Europe.461  The Bantam Council, with fundamental knowledge on the ground, gave 
Gyfford more detailed instructions to trade in Tonkin. Following, Tonkin would provide 
silk for Japan, manufacturer and musk for England, gold for India and be a market of 
pepper and English manufacturer.462  
 The plan in 1672 showed firstly the EIC’s lack of knowledge and trading 
experience in East Asia. London kept trying (and failing) to sell English cloths and 
European re-exported goods to cover part of the expense of distant trade. Such 
misplaced plans and assumptions were formed due to the limited information they 
collected from overseas agents and the VOC. These misunderstandings were not only a 
problem for the Tonkin factory as London plagued other English outposts in Taiwan 
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and Japan with limited instructions rather relying on the current information.463 Despite 
London’s optimism, English textiles (mainly woollen textiles) were unsuitable in the 
hot and wet climate in Tonkin and remained unsold.464 When making the instructions to 
Tonkin in 1671, London still had an unclear idea about the value of Tonkinese goods to 
the Eurasian trade, except for the silk-silver trade with Japan. In fact, the most 
significant problem the EIC faced in trying to access East Asian trade was knowledge. 
This problem was similar to the misstep that the Company had made in evaluating the 
potential of East Asian markets in the 1610s. Although the Bantam factory had been 
running for more than fifty years, the Bantam Council had never paid close attention to 
East Asian trade since they had mostly focused on the spice trade and India. Therefore, 
although Bantam agents had general information about trade in East Asia, they had no 
detail of potential exported and imported products in each country. This fact had shown 
clearly in Browne’s commercial plan in the 1660s (see chapter two). Therefore, the 
EIC’s exported goods to East Asia in 1672 were an experiment while the choice of 
returned goods from Asia was based only on knowledge obtained from the VOC and 
English overseas agents. After the Tonkin factory was established, overseas factors 
needed to find and learn more about the trading system to maintain the English presence 
there. For that reason, Farrington argues that the EIC and its factors were ‘poor 
merchants’ who did not ‘appreciate the difficulties involved’ of long-distant trade.465  
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 Secondly, the figure shows that due to the limited knowledge, the English 
trading link was uncertain as London only desired to connect to those places in Asia 
with ‘luxury goods’ but had no explicit data about those products or how to create and 
develop the trading chain.466 There was only one clear objective: the Tonkin silk-silver 
trade with Japan as the Dutch model meant that the English collected Tonkinese silks 
and Chinese silks in Tonkin to provide Japan’s demand in exchange for silver to cover 
the capital of the EIC’s overseas trade. However, this system exposed less effective 
results from the 1660s.467 London did not seem to understand that the Shogun had 
banned the exportation of silver out of Japan from 1668 onwards.468 Hence, London still 
expected the silver-flow in East Asia and sent no bullion to East Asia in 1672 and hoped 
that selling European goods in Japan, and sending products from Tonkin and Taiwan to 
Japan would create sufficient currency for the trading system. In contrast, Bantam 
agents understood the role of cash in Tonkin’s East Asian trade and used their good 
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relationship with the Sultan of Bantam to borrow 10,000 Spanish dollars from him to 
support the Tonkin factory, but this money was insufficient.469 This episode shows the 
role of overseas agents in helping London to settle and maintain factories in East Asia, 
but also the importance of knowledge about the nature of overseas trade in establishing 
the EIC’s position in East Asia.  
 The EIC’s plan for a Tonkin-Japan link faced problems from the outset, 
however, for while the factories were settled in Tonkin and Taiwan, English merchants 
were ill-treated and refused to stay and trade in Japan. The Dutch merchants had 
deliberately and successfully undermined the possibilities of English trade in Japan, by 
making the Japanese concerned about the possibilities of English proselytism by 
instilling a belief that the English would follow the example of the Portuguese.470 In 
1639 the Portuguese were forced out of Japan for religious reasons since their trading 
relationship with the Japanese had always had a missionary element to it. 471  They 
sought to negotiate with Japan three times in 1640, 1647 and 1685 but were 
unsuccessful. 472  The Dutch used this fear of Catholic missions to prevent the EIC 
gaining a trading partnership by mentioning to Japan the marriage between King 
Charles II of England and the Portuguese infant, Catherine in 1662 and the supposed 
English plan to bring Catholic priests to Japan.473 Japan thus refused the English. This 
failure to create a formal trading relationship with Japan showed a crucial flaw in the 
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EIC’s plans. Although Japan was a central market and a key supplier of silver in East 
Asia, London and the Bantam Council had limited information about their 
disadvantages in Japan with the Dutch competition, and the Japanese closed policy 
towards Europeans. Consequently, the difficulty of the English in Japan together with 
the EIC’s problematic aspirations and its limited knowledge caused the Tonkin factors 
to adapt and drive distant trade themselves to formulate another commercial plan to 
maintain the factory as they recognised the potential of this kingdom in the regional 
trade and the connection with mainland China. The Manila project of finding a 
substitute source of silver and a network for Tonkin trade thus epitomised the English 
learning about the trading network and the role of distant individuals to drive the trade 
on the ground in the seventeenth century. 
 If the establishment of the Tonkin factory witnessed how London and Bantam 
agents adapted from the lessons of the Dutch, the Manila project in 1673-1674 
examined how English individuals drove the trade independently in a new environment. 
Broadly, it shows both positive and negative effects of the EIC’s policy of using 
knowledgeable servants in overseas areas. The chief factor in Tonkin, William Gyfford, 
in particular, operated daily trading and carried out the wishes of the EIC.  
 On the positive side, Gyfford contributed the EIC’s experience of overseas trade 
by providing a detailed suggestion about Tonkin’s position in the regional trading 
network in 1672 based on the information collected from local and foreign merchants in 
Tonkin. He advised London to create a land-trading-route between Tonkin and China to 
utilise the role of Tonkin’s Mandarins.474 Regarding sea routes, he not only expressed 
the importance of Japan but also proposed a new plan to create another trading network 
                                                             




and find substitute silver from Manila. Gyfford acknowledged that Tonkin was part of 
the regional trading system centred on Japan.475 He advised that two small ships could 
sail from London or Bantam via Jambeo (now Jambi, Sumatra, Indonesia) to collect 
pepper and then arrive in Tonkin in March or April annually. 476  Significantly, he 
attempted to build a trade link between Tonkin and Manila, which illustrated how 
overseas factors contributed to the EIC in East Asia by providing trading knowledge 
and driving the factory independently under challenging periods.   
 Trade with Manila had been one of the EIC’s long-term aims, which started in 
1644 with a voyage by the Seahorse to find silver for Asian trade, but it failed.477 At 
that time, London judged that ‘if the Manila trade were followed from Bantam, wee [the 
EIC] might out of a small stock every year from thence bee supplyed from the 
Maneelaes and Macaw per via Bantam with 50,000 rials of eight in gould and in twoe 
yeares tyme wee will undertake that the Company need send noe more 
stockehether,…’.478 London evaluated the high potential of Manila in supplying the EIC 
with a regular source of silver, around 50,000 rials per year and believed that that 
money was enough to balance its trade in East Asia. In 1645 Madras sent another ship, 
the Supply, to Manila but it also failed. In the 1660s the trade with Manila was again 
discussed in London. Andrew Richard, the Governor of the Company stated that: ‘the 
freedom of trade to be granted them at the Spanish plantation and factories in the 
Philippines and Molucca Island may advance the trade of England greatly by helping 
forward the sale of considerable quantities of English goods and manufactures and in 
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return furnishing the Company with gold and silver, with which these factories abound 
by reason of their trade with Indian goods from other parts fit for sale in Europe and 
thus prevent the exportation of so much bullion.’479 The English highly valued free 
trade with Manila, as it had the possibility to become the main English source of silver 
for trade in East Asia. However, the conflict between England and Spain in this period 
prevented the EIC from obtaining trading privileges in Manila. Bantam agents also 
recognised the importance of Manila in the late 1660s as they tried to sell Indian cloth 
in Manila and Mindanao indirectly through the trade of the Sultan of Bantam.480 It is 
noteworthy that from the 1670s Madras also traded with Manila in the pattern of 
‘country trade’. 481  Those attempts of London, Bantam, and Madras created the 
possibility of expanding the English ‘eastern part of the South Seas trade’ to compete 
with the Dutch.482 Beyond the issue of a silver supplier, it seems that the EIC wished for 
a massive international network to link with Manila and then Spanish America if the 
negotiations with Spain about free trade in Manila were successful. With this in mind, 
the Gyfford’s project to link Tonkin and Manila was the continuation of the EIC’s 
previous desire for obtaining silver and creating a global trading chain although London 
had not instructed Gyfford to voyage to Manila.  
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Figure 4.2. Gyfford’s suggestion of Tonkin’s availability in the regional trade in 
1672 
Source: This figure is built from the report of Gyfford to the English East India 
Company, 7 December 1672, in IOR/G/12/17/2, pp. 46a-b; 48a-b. 
 
Like the officials in London, Gyfford believed that the Manila-Macao-Tonkin link was 
as important as the Japan-Tonkin link because Tonkin products were suitable for Manila 
and Manila could supply a regular source of silver for the English. However, Gyfford 
not only served the EIC’s existing target but also tried to extend its position in the area 
by learning from the Portuguese. He stated in 1672 that ‘if your Honours would get an 
allowance of the King of Spain to trade from here [Tonkin] to the Manila, it would 
prove as beneficial to you as the Japon trade, …because it takes off all the popular 
commodities of this country’. 483  In Gyfford’s eyes, the Manila-Macao-Tonkin link 
helped to collect both Chinese products (as Chinese merchants traded there regularly) 
                                                             




and silver exporting from the Spanish-America through the system of the ‘Manila 
Galleon’ to finance the transoceanic trade. 484  As such Tonkin provided white raw 
pelang, velvet, musk, and porcelain in return for white wax, sugar candy, brimstone, 
silver (rials of eight).485 Moreover, he believed that the Tonkin factory could collect 
sugar, damask, satin, Chinese silks, chinaroot, tutenague from Macao (on the link with 
Manila) to exchange with Tonkin raw hockins, velvet and raw white silk.486 Gyfford 
proposed that English ships from Tonkin should sail to Macao and then transport their 
goods to Manila in exchange for Mexican silver or be dispatched to Japan for the silk-
silver trade. In this system, Manila became the EIC’s main silver supplier for English 
factories besides the capital from Japan. Indeed, before the 1650s, Manila was the 
second supplier of silver in East Asia (supporting Japan).487 After the 1650s, Manila 
replaced Japan to became the biggest silver-provider in the area. From 1651 to 1675, 
Manila received 147 tons of silver from Spanish America, and 375 tons in the period 
1676-1700. 488  The growth of the Manila market and the Japanese prohibition on 
exporting silver from 1668 meant that obtaining trading permissions in Manila was vital 
for both the Tonkin factory and the EIC. Therefore, in 1674, Gyfford again requested 
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that the Company re-negotiate with Spain to trade with Manila. He stated ‘it must be 
continued to have a factory at Manila which is as proper for yt agent for commodities of 
this place as Japon itself.’489 If this plan ran well, the position of Tonkin in the EIC’s 
trading chain would completely change as it became the principal place to collect 
money for the English trading system in East Asia. Tonkin, hence, would become a 
central hub for the EIC, rather than a supplementary market. Following the above 
suggestions, Gyfford proved his crucial role by not only promoting a new trade network 
but also identifying specific Tonkin goods suitable for Manila. 
With the above idea about the trading network in the China Sea, when the 
Tonkin factory was isolated as the third Anglo-Dutch war was broken in 1672, Gyfford 
decided to send Nicholas Waite to Macao and Manila for a trading experiment. As a 
supplementary factory, the Tonkin factory depended on the EIC’s situation in Japan, but 
in this period, they received neither information from there nor instructions from 
Bantam and London. Tonkin factors were also worried about the continuing existence 
of the branch as the Dutch traders arriving in Tonkin informed them that the English 
were defeated in Europe. To maintain the trade and find the link with other markets and 
another origin of silver for the English, Gyfford decided to trade with Macao and 
Manila through the Portuguese ship. Waite carried a stock of goods, including 626 tales 
of silver and some unsold English goods from Tonkin. With these resources, he tried to 
buy Chinese products (white pelang, damask, white silk and tutenague or chinaroot). 
Importantly, through a trade with Macao, Gyfford hoped to find an indirect connection 
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with the English in Bantam.490 Unfortunately, the ship missed the monsoon in August, 
did not call at Macao. It then sailed to Cambodia and Siam in December 1673.491 In 
August 1674, Waite tried to return to Tonkin on the French vessel, but it was late as the 
Dutch controlled all sea routes. The ship then lost the way and called at Manila where 
the Spanish put Waite in prison and confiscated all the English goods since Spain still 
kept the trading monopoly there, and had refused the EIC’s negotiations to have 
permission to trade there.492 In prison, Waite sent a letter to Gyfford to report the 
situation of the voyage. But the Tonkin factory only knew about this failure when the 
letter arrived on 19 August 1675. This unlucky voyage ended Tonkin’s hope of trade 
with Manila and caused severe problems. With the conflict between Dacres (in the 
Bantam Council) and Gyfford (see chapter three), and Gyfford’s plan of finding a 
substitute source of silver was without orders from London and Bantam, Dacres accused 
Gyfford and Waite of performing a rash commercial strategy and considered closing the 
factory.493 Therefore that Quiason argured that Dacres had a significant influence on the 
Manila project, and that Bantam consigned goods to Manila via Tonkin factors is 
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problematic.494  Dacres suggested to London in 1674 that ‘it very probable that by 
affactory in Tywan, being scituated where Tonqueen, Macaow, Manila, and Japon lye 
round about it, some considerable advantage may be found out at one tyme or another’ 
but received no response from London, and Gyfford had already undertaken to create 
the Manila link a year earlier.495  
Gyfford’s project showed both positive and negative effects from the EIC’s 
policy of using skilled staff as London had little experience in overseas trade. The 
positive side, as the above discussion indicates, is Gyfford’s attempts to expand the 
English trade in East Asia and to identify specific types of commodities and trade 
networks via the point of Tonkin. The damaging issues were from Gyfford’s possibility 
of evaluating the particular situation of overseas trade to make a right trading decision 
as he had power and privilege to drive the Tonkin factory himself. Firstly, Gyfford’s 
activity was beyond the control of London, and even Bantam. It was somewhat similar 
to the way Browne reacted to London’s order about the East Asian trade in 1663 as he 
was willing to settle factories in Tonkin, Siam or Cambodia without agreement and 
support from London. It was the downside of the EIC’s policy of using skilled staff in 
East Asia as Gyfford operated a new trading plan without asking permission from 
London. Secondly, he seemed to act in accordance with his own desires rather than 
taking into account the EIC’s prior dealings with Manila. In both letters to London in 
1672 and 1674, he understood the importance of re-negotiating with Spain to obtain free 
trade in Manila. Clearly, Manila was the unique outpost of the Spanish in East Asia, and 
it was hard for the English to share the trading monopoly there. However, he enacted 
the project without instructions or support from both London and Bantam and with the 
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predictable outcome that the Spanish in Manila ill-treated the English. Thirdly, Gyfford 
decided to make the voyage without careful preparations as the Tonkin factory faced 
difficulty due to the Anglo-Dutch war and the lack support of the English from Bantam 
and Japan. It meant that Gyfford had no choice, but voyaged to Macao and Manila to 
find another chance to maintain and develop the Tonkin factory. Unluckily, those issues 
and the bad weather in Vietnam caused difficulty for the English to complete the 
voyage. Consequently, Dacres blamed that Gyfford acted rashly and damaged the 
Company’s capital. The failure of Gyfford's plan thus illustrates both advantages and 
disadvantages the EIC faced as it chose to use skilled staff in the overseas areas. 
Although Gyfford tried to make profit for the EIC, he could not succeed without useful 
knowledge about the trading situation in the area. 
 After the above failure, rather than following Dacres’ suggestions, the EIC was 
unwilling to close the Tonkin factory and settled Tonkin as a regular market to furnish 
silks for Europe. 496  With the ambition of creating an oceanic trading system and 
expanding the English position in that network, Tonkin became a hub in the Eurasian 
trade, but still kept the role in the regional system. This plan thus showed London’s 
ability to adapt Dutch models of commerce to their own ends, and its attempts to exploit 
the advantages of silk trade to create a global trading chain. 
 There were a few reasons why the EIC continued to maintain the Tonkin factory 
in the mid-1670s. As the Dutch captured English ships in Asia in the war 1672-1674, 
London had limited information about the trade in Tonkin and East Asia and kept 
expecting to sell English and European products in the area.497 London persisted in 
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trying to create a regional trading network as at least it tried to contact Japan twice in 
1677 and 1682 through Chinese brokers in Tonkin and local officials.498 Importantly, 
Tonkin was essential to connect with mainland China as the EIC had no direct trading 
line with this market and Tonkin had advantageous geography. Moreover, through the 
Dutch experience in trading with Tonkin, London realised the potential of Tonkin silk 
in Europe.499 Gyfford’s suggestions from 1672 played a significant role as he evaluated 
that Tonkin could provide London with (Chinese) musk, chinaroot, and Tonkinese silks 
(pelangs, hockin, load, the thua).500 He sent some samples to Bantam via the Zant 
Frigate, but the Dutch captured them. The Bantam Council also emphasised the 
potential of Tonkin silks for Europe.501 Musk and pelangs were famous in Europe, and 
Tonkin raw silk proved vital for the English silk industry, which was growing after the 
1650s and much depended on imported materials and skills from France, Italy, 
Levant.502 Over the century, the value of English imported silks increased gradually: 
£118,000 (1622), £175,000 (1640), £263,000 (the 1660s) and £344,000 (by the 1690s), 
                                                             
498 Sainsbury, Court Minutes 1674-76, p. 259; Court Minutes 1677-79, 7 March 1677, p. xvii; Massarella, 
A world elsewhere, p. 365. In 1677 Surat Presidency considered that the EIC could ask supportive letters 
from King of Siam to Japan to open the relation with Shogun government. 
499 IOR/G/12/17/3, Bantam to Tonkin, 3 June 1676, pp. 151a-b; Bassett, Factory at Bantam, p. 336. In the 
letter to Tonkin, the EIC repeated the VOC’s considered investment in white, wrought silks and musk.  
500 IOR/G/12/17/1, Tonkin to London, 7 December 1672, p. 46b; IOR/E/3/33, pp. 10-11. Load or Loas 
was a kind of Tonkinese wrought silk. The Thua was silk textile in Tonkin. Hockin was a Tonkinese 
yellow silk. Peling/ Pelang was a kind of Tonkinese wrought silk. 
501 IOR/E/3/33, Extracts of Letter from the Agent in Bantam to the Company in England, 5 October 1674, 
pp. 291-292. 
502 Chaudhuri, The Trading World, p. 344; N. Rothstein, ‘Canterbury and London: The Silk Industry in 





accounted for 23-29 per cent of imported goods.503 However, the EIC only played a tiny 
role in this trade, with 0.48 per cent of its imported commodities from Asia.504 Such 
demand persuaded the EIC to invest in the silk trade in Bengal, China, Persia, and 
Tonkin. Because Chinese silk was challenging to obtain, Tonkin provided substitutes 
although the quantity and quality of Tonkinese silk were less than Chinese products.  
London began this plan by ordering 30 to 40 bales of Tonkin white silk, 4,000 
pieces of pelangs, 1,500 pieces of damask and 2,000 ounces of musk in 1674 as a 
trial.505 London’s idea of supplying Tonkin silks for Europe illustrated the EIC’s desire 
to build a Eurasian trade via the point of Tonkin, not its rash reaction to keep the Tonkin 
factory after the previous failure. In September 1675, the first positive signal appeared 
as 113 pieces of Tonkin woven silks were sold in London. 506  The Company then 
ordered the Tonkin factory to provide more: 300 pieces of velvet, 4,000 pieces of 
Chinese damask, 1,000 pieces of satin, and 25,000 pieces of Tonkin silks.507 London 
hoped that the quantity of Tonkin white silk and other wrought silks could meet the 
demand in Europe.508 In 1676, the Court of Directors twice discussed the continuation 
of the Tonkin factory seriously debating, ‘how to trade & improve, manage with least 
                                                             
503 C. Clay, Economic Expansion and Social Change: England 1500-1700, vol.2 (Cambridge, 1985), p. 
125; P. Linda, ‘Creating a Silk Industry in Seventeenth-Century England’, Shakespeare Studies, 28 
(2000), pp. 225-226. 
504 N. Steensgaard, ‘The Growth and Composition of the Long-Distance Trade of England and the Dutch 
Republic before 1750’ in Tracy (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires, p. 114; Chaudhuri, The Trading 
World, table C.16, 17, 18, pp. 533-536. In the 1660s, the value of imported raw silks was only £1,251 in 
total of £263,000 from imported commodities from Asia. 
505 IOR/E/3/88, Company to Bantam, 23 October 1674, p. 138. While white silk, pelang were Tonkinese 
products; damask and musk were original from China. 
506 Sainsbury, Court Minutes 1674-76, 8 September, 21 September 1675, pp. 212, 220. 
507 IOR/E/3/88, Company to Bantam, 6 November 1675, p. 243. 




charge’, eventually deciding to give this branch more factors and writers.509 Ships and 
money were regularly sent to Tonkin from 1676 to 1683 to get the permission of trade 
and build a warehouse in Thang Long.510 Interestingly, besides Tonkinese products, the 
factory also provided London with Chinese musk, damask and other silks which were 
supplied by Chinese merchants sailing to Tonkin yearly. In some years, London 
required Tonkin to link with other East Asian countries to provide products for both 
London and India. Tonkin thus played two roles as an intermediary to collect regional 
commodities and a regular market to trade with London. The role, however gradually 
ended as China opened commercial ports for foreigners in late 1684, and the re-
appearance of Cantonese musk and silks quickly dislodged Tonkin products. 
Eventually, its closure was as unavoidable as was that of other small factories in East 
Asia because the EIC withdrew from its plans to become involved in the intra-Asian 
regional trade, and turned its attention to a direct global trade among Europe, India and 
China. Nevertheless, for the period 1676-1688, the EIC successfully used the Tonkin 
factory with its intra-Asian trade connections, to supply silk for Europe. As a result, the 
below section will focus on discussing Tonkin’s trade in this period. 
 
The English commercial activities in Tonkin  
 
The EIC’s exported goods to Tonkin illustrate precisely how the Company operated 
overseas trade, what kind of experience it obtained, and how it changed to adapt to 
distant areas and from which they could gather trading knowledge. As the first Charter 
                                                             
509 Sainsbury, Court Minutes 1674-76, 5 January, 11 October 1676, pp. 259-260. 
510 IOR/G/12/17/3, p. 151b; IOR/G/12/17/4, p. 202a; IOR/G/12/17/5, p. 227. In 1676 London sent to 




in 1600 said, the EIC ‘have not yet experienced of the Kinds of Commodities and 
merchandizes, which are or wil be vendible, or to be uttered in the faid Parts of the Eaft-
Indies, and therefore shall be driven to carry to thofe Parts,…, which are likely to be 
returned again into this our Realm’.511 It meant that the EIC could export goods to Asia 
to find the best solution and if the result was unexpected, those goods could be returned 
to England without blame. The EIC exported three types of commodities to Asia: 
woollen textiles (mostly broadcloth), metals, and luxury products.512 Their main aims 
were to support the English textile industry and serve the Asian demand for war and 
luxury goods.513 Most of those goods appeared initially in small quantities in Tonkin as 
it was a supportive market.514 With limited knowledge about trade in Tonkin and East 
Asia, the EIC’s exported goods in 1672 were experiments. Textiles, from England 
(broadcloth) and India (dungarees, Cambay cloth and chintz) made up more than 50 per 
cent of its stock to Tonkin. Also, London sent weapons as gifts, materials for war (lead, 
brimstone, guns, knives) and luxury merchandise (coral, ivory and looking glasses).515 
                                                             
511 ‘Charter granted by Queen’, p. 14. 
512 Chaudhuri, The Trading World, p. 220; EIC and Export Treasure, p. 26. In fact, those commodities 
were not only original English goods, but also came from Spain, France, Venice, Leghorn, Amsterdam 
which showed that the EIC’s trade in Tonkin was one part of global trade. 
513 Besides the above aims, commodities in the long-distance trade demanded the requirement of financed 
imported goods from Asia. Therefore, most commodities were valued such as exotic spices and precious 
metals, silk. K.H. O’rourke, J.G. Williamson, ‘When did Globalization Begin?’, European Review of 
Economic History, 6 (2002), pp. 23-50, p. 26. 
514 Until 1663 English exported goods to Asia held a tiny 6 per cent of English external trade as the EIC 
only had some ports in India and Bantam. The EIC’s return to East Asia from the 1670s could not make  
higher rate for the EIC’s export to Asia as the main market of China and Japan still closed with English 
merchants. The value of the EIC’s goods to Japan and Taiwan were six and five times respectively higher 
than that to Tonkin in 1672. 
515 IOR/G/12/17/1, pp. 7b-8a. They included 29 bales English cloth, 8 bales Stuffs, 1 chest Looking 
glasses, 1 chest Seases and weights, 10/16 chests Brimstones, 257 piculs Lead, 10 Great guns, 4 Casks of 




The EIC’s policy of exported goods in Tonkin was contrary to the Dutch and Chinese as 
they carried mostly Japanese silver, copper, arms and Asian products.516  
 By anasying the data of the Tonkin factory and the Court of Minutes in London, 
the research argues that three new trends in the EIC’s exported goods to Tonkin 
gradually appeared after 1676 including (1) increased transportation of money, (2) 
Asian products progressively replaced European goods, and (3) the arms-trade was 
considered by London and overseas agents. Those trends illustrated how the EIC 
adapted to change in investment and commodities to maintain the existence of the 
Tonkin factory to access the silk trade. They also demonstrated the role of overseas 
individuals in collecting information from Tonkinese merchants and brokers and 
suggesting new policies and London’s adaptations to the requirements of Tonkin trade. 
New strategies emerged from new understandings about the demands and possibilities 
of Tonkin trade. 
 It is difficult to calculate and evaluate precisely the EIC’s investment in or yield 
from Tonkin in this period, because of the missing source material from significant 
years and the variety of currencies (such as pounds, Spanish dollars, real of eight and 
tael) used in extant documentary evidence. British pound sterling was rare in Asian 
commerce while the Spanish dollar was an international currency. Moreover, in the 
South China Sea, tael silver, a Chinese standard silver was a popular type of money. 
Most of London’s instructions, however, used pounds or dollars while Tonkin factors 
used tael in their reports. We know that 1 Spanish dollar or 1 peso was equivalent to 8 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
2 bales Chintz, 2 bales Chintz gungam, 1 bale salampares, 1 chest Corral, 1 bale Salloesjunah, 1 bale Fine 
English cloth, 1 box Knives, 1 tale Musters, 618 piculs pepper, 159 piculs sandalwood, 38 bales Drugs.  




reals (or rials, piece) of eight while 1 pound was equal 20 shillings or 240p.517 From 
1660 to 1760, one tael silver was 6s. 8d., and 1 Spanish dollar was 5 shillings or 0.75 
taels.518 That information gives us the way to unify accounting numbers in the materials 
to re-create the general investment trends and the gap between monies investment and 
results gained. 
 
 Figure 4.3 The EIC’s investments and its exported goods from Tonkin 
Source: IOR/G/12/17/1-10, the Tonkin factory records (1672-1697); IOR/G/21/7, Java 
factory (1677-1707);  IOR/E/3/87-92, Letter Book IV-IX (1666-1697), Buch, ‘La 
Compagnie’ (1937), and Ma, English trade in the South China Sea. 
                                                             
517 P. Shepard, ‘The Spanish Dollar: The World’s most famous Silver Coin’, Business Historical Society. 
Bulletin of the Business Historical Society (pre-1986), 1941, pp. 12-16; Reid, Age of Commerce, pp. 379-
380. Real or piece of eight was one bit or one-eighth of Spanish dollar, equivalent as 0,0255 kg silver 
while a tael silver was 0.04 kg.  
518 Chaudhuri, The Trading World, p. 471. Followed the above instructions, we can see that £1 was equal 

















































































The EIC’s investment in Tonkin shows London’s changing acknowledgement of the 
importance of silver or cash in overseas trade and how it adapted to meet that 
requirement. The Tonkin factory explicitly argued for the EIC to recognise how little 
income was to be gained from exporting English goods to East Asia. The EIC tried to 
adapt by exporting silver, and then other types of Asian products (from India and 
Central Asia) to Tonkin.519 Exporting bullion and commodities from Europe, engaging 
with the intra-Asian trade, and borrowing capital from India were the three main ways 
to maintain the EIC’s trade in Asia. Exporting silver from London to Asia was the most 
popular as the EIC’s products had little market in Asia and its regional trading network 
partly satisfied the capital demand. 520  However, in 1672, London seemed to 
misunderstand the role of money in trade in Tonkin and East Asia as it still hoped to 
obtain capital from Japan to cover its regional trading and sent no money to Tonkin.521 
London only changed its view about exporting silver to Tonkin after receiving 
fundamental knowledge and suggestions from Gyfford about the necessary and 
compulsory of cash in Tonkin. As the English plans to obtain alternative silver from 
Japan and Manila failed, the EIC had no choice but returned to the traditional means of 
                                                             
519 From 1592 onwards, the gold: silver ratio varied from 1:5.5 to 1:7 in China, whereas in Spain it 
fluctuated from 1:12 to 1:14. Chinese desire of silver was always high because of the growth of economy 
and demand for war. Therefore, European Companies found profits in exporting silver to China. F. 
Gipouloux, The Asian Mediterranean: Port Cities and Trading Networks in China, Japan and Southeast 
Asia, 13th-21st Century (Cheltenham, 2011), p. 140; R.V. Glahn, ‘Money Use in China and Changing 
Patterns of Global Trade in Money Metals, 1500-1800’ in Flynn and Giraldez (eds.), Global Connections, 
pp. 187-205. 
520 Chaudhuri, EIC and Export Treasure, p. 24; The EIC, pp. 124-125; The Trading World, table A. 7, p. 
177; Berg, Goods from the East, pp. 23-25. From 1671 to 1675, the silver the EIC exported to Asia 
double the amount compared to 5 years before and its peak in 1681-1685 with 240,952 kg of silver, more 
than 10 times the period 1666-1670.  




exporting silver from London to Tonkin. There were also two trends in the EIC’s 
investment which showed how London adapted to the situation of Tonkin trade. Firstly, 
money carried to Tonkin was higher than exported goods. For example, in 1677 more 
money was sent to buy silks and in 1678 the value of bullion was eight-times higher 
than the value of exported goods.522 Secondly, the value of investment depended on the 
market of Tonkin silks in London and the external effect of Chinese products. The 
investment peaked in 1679 with more than 13,000 Spanish dollars from London as 
Tonkin played an important role to supply Tonkinese and Chinese silks for London.523 
Recognising the role of cash in the Tonkin trade and desiring to compete with the 
Chinese and Dutch as the silk trade increased, London also encouraged the Tonkin 
factory to borrow money from the local government. 524  However, as the English 
focused more on Chinese silks in Canton and Amoy in the 1680s, the EIC’s expenditure 
in Tonkin after 1679 decreased, and after 1687 the investment was naught (there was no 
information about investment in 1688, 1693, 1697 even though English ships arrived in 
Tonkin at those times).525 In general, the change of the value of the EIC’s investment, 
                                                             
522 IOR/G/12/17/4, Bantam to Tonkin, 29 May 1677, pp. 201b, 204a, 205a-b, 268b; IOR/G/12/17/5, 
Bantam to Tonkin, 5 June 1678, p. 227a. 
523 IOR/G/12/17/6, 5 July 1679, p. 254b. The Company ordered Bantam to prepare 70,000 dollars for 
Tonkin, with 50,000 of money and 20,000 of goods. Surat, however, thought that the money was too 
much for Tonkin and it sent only 35,000 dollars. This change not only applied for the Tonkin factory but 
it seemed that the EIC’s investment for both Taiwan, Amoy, Siam and Tonkin increased. For example, in 
1677, London decided to provide 80,000 dollars for those factories, and in 1678 the provision was 
100,000 pieces of eight. Sainsbury, Court Minutes 1677-79, 12 June 1677, 25 September 1678, pp. 95, 
208. 
524 IOR/E/3/90, The Tonkin factory, 20 September 1683, p. 82. In 1683 the Court wanted English factors 
to take a loan of 10 or £20,000 if the interest was less than six per cent per year 
525 IOR/G/21/7, pp. 93, 95. In this record, it was also confused with the EIC’s money in the ship Dragon. 
This ship carried out 75,457:1:2 tale silver of goods or 88,000 reals of eight while it also presented that 




particularly from 1672 to 1686 showed how the English adapted with requirements in 
Tonkin to gain access to silk and other Chinese products there. The value was only high 
when the factory played the roles of intermediary and crucial nodal point within the 
global trade. It reduced as China opened the country in late 1684 and the quantity and 
quality of Tonkinese silks could not meet London’s requirement. 
The English outlay in Tonkin was relatively little compared with their rivals. 
While the Dutch sent silver (copper from the 1670s) from Japan, the Chinese carried a 
lot of Asian goods for exchange, the English had to send silver directly from London to 
Tonkin as their broad and woollen clothes were not suitable for the tropical weather in 
Tonkin, and their plan to obtain silver from Japan and Manila failed.526 From 1672 to 
1700 the VOC’s investment in Tonkin reduced, but it still invested more than 100,000 
guilders per year, equivalent to more than 40,000 Spanish dollars, higher than the EIC’s 
value except for the years 1678, 1685, 1687.527 The English Tonkin factory was settled 
with only five servants and 10,000 Spanish dollars in 1672, while the VOC had around 
fifty soldiers and slaves brought from Batavia and at least 170,000 Spanish dollars.528 
As the VOC’s original capital was greater than the EIC’s, its investment in Asia, and 
particularly Tonkin, was also greater.529 Without a substitute source of silver, money 
from England to Asia comprised between 65 and 90 per cent of the EIC’s exports from 
                                                             
526 Chaudhuri, EIC and Export Treasure, p. 29. From the first half of the seventeenth century, the EIC’s 
employees appreciated that English broad cloth was a high price in East Asia but not in high demand.   
527 Hoang, Silk for silver, appendices 3, p. 226. Especially in 1671, 1672, 1675, 1677, their imported 
value was more than 300,000 guilders. Their capital was mostly reduced in 1678, 1685-1687 and after 
1692 as Tonkin silks was no longer available for Japan market. 
528 Ma, English Trade, p. 89. 
529 J. De Vries, The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600-1750 (Cambridge, 1976), p. 130; 
Erikson, Between Monopoly and Free Trade, pp. 3-4; Furber, Rival Empires, pp. 38, 192, 237. The EIC’s 
initial money was £68,373 from two hundred investors while the VOC’s initial capitalization was 6.5 




1601 to 1760, but it was still less than the VOC’s investment in Asia.530 In 1650, the 
rate of the two Companies’ investments in Asia was 0.9 and 0.5 millions of Spanish 
dollars, and in 1700 it was 2 and 1.5 million.531 In the 1660s, the VOC’s power in Asia 
was one of the key reasons that the EIC lobbied the English government to grant the 
new monopolised trading chapter in Asia.532 Together with the Dutch, the Chinese were 
highly competitive with the English in Tonkin. From 1671 to 1685 the Chinese carried 
780,000 dollars to Tonkin, less than the VOC who carried more than 1,000,000 dollars, 
but more than the EIC’s investment, of around 13,000 to 27,000 dollars per year 
(maximum 370,000 dollars in this period, nearly a half of the Chinese investment).533 
Moreover, the Chinese were favoured by the Trinh Lords in Tonkin and had more 
privileges than either the VOC or EIC.534 In brief, the lesser investment in Tonkin gave 
the English little chance to compete with their rivals, and they always received less 
Tonkin silk, or other products, than their competitors. 
Just as in investment, the EIC’s exported goods to Tonkin also changed from 
1676 with attempts to find a market in Tonkin and reduce the money transferred from 
London. This change firstly started from the realisation of the Tonkin factors who 
worked on the ground and understood the demand of Tonkin. Recognising the limited 
market for English cloth, in 1673 Gyfford only ordered a low quantity of 100 bales for 
                                                             
530 O. Prakash, ‘Financing the European Trade with Asia in the Early Modern Period: Dutch Initiatives 
and Innovations’, Journal of European Economic History, 27 (1998), pp. 331- 356, p. 334. 
531 L. Blusse, ‘No Boats to China’, p. 53. 
532 A.A. Sherman, ‘Pressure from Leadenhall: The East India Company Lobby, 1660-1678’, A Business 
History Review, 50 (1976), pp. 329-355, pp. 329, 333. Dutch ship captains, merchants, bankers, financiers 
were acknowledged to be the finest and most efficient in the world. 
533 Iioka, Tonkin-Nagasaki Silk Trade, pp. 240, 242. Broadly, from 1633 to 1685, the Chinese carried a 
smaller quantity of silver to Tonkin than the VOC did. Details, the Chinese junks imported 2,100,300 
taels of silver while the VOC carried 4,366,131 taels of silver. 




the Tonkin Court, while other goods were ordered in higher amounts such as 500 peculs 
(Chinese weight, 1 pecul/picul is equivalent to 60,382 kg) pepper, 200 peculs saltpetre, 
20 peculs brimstone, 10 great guns. 535  Interestingly, unwrought metals and war-
materials were in high demand in Tonkin. Furthermore, Gyfford required commodities 
from various origins, mostly from Asia (Japan, Macao, Bantam, Cambodia, Manila and 
India) instead of English commodities to build the Tonkin factory’s role in the regional 
trade. Gyfford’s suggestion thus demonstrated how English overseas factors were 
important in the EIC’s trade by providing useful knowledge about the possibility of 
exported goods from the ground. The changes from London’s perspective started in 
1676 as the second English ship to Tonkin carried more saltpetre, pepper, rose water, 
lead, brimstone, and less English cloth.536 The primary trend of the EIC’s exported 
goods was the decrease of English cloth and the increase of Asian products and war-
materials.537 This situation continued in 1677 when only ten bales of cloth, and more 
money was sent to buy silks.538 In 1678, the change was more evident as European and 
Asian goods had the same value of 8,000 Spanish dollars.539 Bantam agents were also 
                                                             
535 IOR/G/12/17/1, p. 48a-b.  
536 IOR/G/12/17/3, pp. 160a-b: 43 bales broad cloth, 3 bales stuffs, 196 bags saltpeter, 10 bales alibanum/ 
allibannies [from Bengal, Bihar, Orissa], 10 bales cotton, 5355 catties brimstones, 6394 catties allum, 
54346 catties pepper, 3000 green shott pisger, 14 bury batoratay, 2 chests rosewater, 3 pigs butter, 3 
casks wine arrack, 1 cask lampe oil, 200 catties wax, 20 caniftor Julor, 1 bale cotton yearn, 1 chest plate, 
36 amber hafted knives. 
537 IOR/G/12/17/6, 30 July 1679, p. 263a. English cargo was checked by Tonkin officers included only 4 
tales of broad cloth, 3 pack perpetuanar, 20 bales of putchuck, 183 peculs pepper, 89 peculs brimstone, 1 
chest rose water.  
538 IOR/G/12/17/4, Bantam to Tonkin, 29 May 1677, pp. 201b, 204a, 205a-b, 268b. Tonkin ordered for 
the year 1678 100-150 peculs brimstone, a lot put-chuck, 30-40 peculs coral, and small quantity of 
broadcloth. Put-chuck was dried, fragrant, spicy root of Saussurea costus, a species of thistle, used for 
burning as incense or in medicine as a stomach tonic, diuretic, and expectorant.  




creative in their trade, they sent a big cannon in 1677 and transferred 897 bags of rice in 
1682 due to Tonkin’s high demand for food after the flood.540 As such, after 1676, 
London, Bantam agents, and Tonkin factors played distinct roles during the EIC’s 
changes of exported goods. However, servants in Tonkin played an essential part as 
they learned from trading on the ground in Tonkin to provide the EIC with valuable 
knowledge to make the final decisions about trading.  
From the early 1680s, those changing trends were visible in the records of the 
Court of Directors which indicated that London also adapted with the change of trade in 
Tonkin and East Asia. London asked Tonkin for suggestions of Indian goods available 
in Tonkin and to prepare local products for Bombay in 1682 to develop the regional 
trade.541 The EIC wanted to carry more Asian goods to Tonkin and build this factory in 
the link with both Southeast Asia and India as London ordered the EIC’s shipments 
called at Acheh or Priman before sailing to Tonkin and in return, those ships sailed 
through Malacca to Bombay before coming back London. The Committee of Shipping 
also ‘desired to send 80 arms to Tonkin’ but we have no more information of how it 
worked since the Tonkin records for 1683 are missing.542 In 1684, Tonkin gave London 
a suggestion of ‘what goods from Surat are proper’ for Tonkin, but unfortunately, we 
again have no detailed list.543 The Rainbow came to Tonkin in 1685 with a lot of Indian 
goods, brimstone and saltpetre.544 After the Tonkin factory came under the supervision 
of Madras, the adaptation of English exported goods to Tonkin was clearer with new 
consideration of English factors in Madras. The Prospect from Madras in 1686 carried 
                                                             
540 IOR/G/12/17/8, Batavia to Tonkin, 9 June 1682, pp. 292b, 295b.  
541 IOR/E/3/90, Letter book VII, London to Chief and factory at Tonkin, 2 October 1682, p. 84. 
542 IOR/B/37, Court Minutes (11 April 1682 – 18 April 1684), 22 September 1682, p. 40 
543 IOR/G/21/7, Tonkin general 7 January 1684, p. 84. 




iron guns, long cloths and saltpetre.545 The Madras Council carried more Indian and 
Persian commodities to Tonkin in the system of ‘country trade’.546 Remarkably, the 
Pearl Frigate from Madras in 1693 operated both private and official trade. It carried 
Indian clothes, copprica/ copra? (Malayan dried coconut kenrels), Persian carpets, some 
private goods (saltpetre, brimstone, rosewater) which meant that they carried diverse 
commodities from India, Europe, Persia, Malaya.547 That Madras sent ships to Tonkin 
helped this market to become involved in Madras’s existing ‘country trade’ system 
which covered both the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.548 As a part of the intra-
Asian trade, Tonkin received more Asian goods than European products as English 
factors in Madras understood the demand of the Asian market. Beyond the fact that 
more Asian goods were sent to Tonkin, there is no doubt that London still treated 
Tonkin as a part of the intra-Asian trade though from 1676 Tonkin was seen as a regular 
market to provide silks for Europe. This situation presents the way the EIC tried to build 
and develop both Asian and global trading networks, in which small markets still played 
a significant role. 
Successful trading in Tonkin and East Asia was also dependent on other factors 
outside of commodities, such as the distance, communication and climatic conditions.549 
                                                             
545 Ibid, p, 95; 3 December 1687, p. 114. In 1688, the Rainbow transferred 20 guns, but the King of 
Tonkin took only 7 and the rest was sent to West Coast with high price and high demand. 
546 IOR/E/3/91, The Court to Fort St George, 7 January 1687, p. 41; IOR/E/3/92, London to Fort St 
George, 18 February 1691, p. 136. 
547 IOR/G/12/17/9, p. 325b. There were Indian cloths: Moorees - a plain white cotton cloth from South 
India and Masulipatam, used as a base for chintz making. Serasses was an Indian cotton cloth, perhaps 
from Surat. Sallampores was a medium quality cotton cloth from South India and Masulipatam, plain 
white or dyed blue. Mulmul was a thin variety of muslin (cotton material). 
548 See more detail of Madras’ country trade in Bassett, ‘British ‘country’ trade, pp. 625-643. 
549 More information about monsoon winds and trade, see Loo Yen, ‘Effect of Climate on Seasonal 




Monsoon or trade-winds blew one way for around six months and therefore created two 
main difficulties for the EIC, namely the problem of long-distance trading and the 
specific seasonality of entry to Tonkin. It took English ships around eighteen months to 
complete a voyage from London to Tonkin and back, in which they could only stay at 
Asian ports for fewer than six months.550 The timing, distance of overseas trade and the 
seasonality of Tonkin silk (see chapter two) required English ships to arrive in Tonkin 
between March and June at the latest July each year and to leave before October to 
enjoy good trading conditions. If they did not adhere to such time frames, ships would 
not arrive in, or depart from Tonkin safely due to the inclement weather.  
 The English expected to send ships to Tonkin annually, but they were not 
always able to achieve this goal.551  The change in the number of English ships to 
Tonkin demonstrates how the EIC adapted to climatic conditions to trade with Tonkin 
and East Asia. Twenty-one ships (both official and private) called at Tonkin over a 
period of twenty-five years, amounting to nearly one vessel per year. Sometimes Tonkin 
received only a frigate (from Bantam and Madras), a small vessel instead of a great ship 
since this market had little product with which to load a big English vessel fully.552 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
frontiers, 6 (2015), pp. 817-823; C-Y. Huang, ‘Surface Ocean and Monsoon Climate Variability in the 
South China Sea since the last Glaciation’, Marine Micropaleontology, 32 (1997), pp. 71-94; C.B. 
Thurston, An Economic Geography of the British Empire (London, 1924); R. Hall, Empires of the 
Monsoon: a History of the Indian Ocean and its Invaders (London, 1996). 
550 R. David, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18th (London, 1962), p. 258. 
551 IOR/E/3/87, Company to Bantam, 21 September 1671, p. 479.  
552 W. Barbour, ‘Dutch and English Merchants Shipping in the Seventeenth Century’, The Economic 
History Review, 2 (1930), pp. 261-290, p. 261. There were two kinds of ships in the English navy and 
commerce: great ships and frigate. Great ships had been invented, a build of enormous ships, carrying as 
many as 120 brass guns, around 800. The frigate, by contrast, was swift, nimble, unencumbered, 




When considering the possibility of this market, London planned to send one ship to 
Tonkin yearly. Gyfford in 1672 also confirmed that the best way to trade with Tonkin 
was to send two small vessels there to collect good for Japan and Bantam. The first 
period (1672-1675) was a difficult time as neither ships from London nor Bantam called 
at Tonkin since England was at war with the Dutch, who were already the most 
powerful European nation in the region with modern warships and soldiers, controlled 
Asian sea-routes and captured many English ships.553 English ships sailed to Tonkin 
yearly in the period 1676-1688, except for the years 1684 and 1687 as the quantity of 
Tonkin silk decreased due to the lousy weather and London’s limited demand for 
Tonkin products.554 As a small market, a single yearly ship kept the English trade in 
Tonkin regular and regulated. However, the sudden appearance of three ships in 1688 
made it more difficult for the EIC as the price of local goods rose quickly while the cost 
of English commodities (cloths, pepper, saltpetre, brimstone, lead) went down.555 The 
last period (1689-1697) was during the Nine Years War, and the EIC’s ships to Tonkin 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the water than the great ship, with decks flusher. Originally a Dunkirk type, she was adopted into the 
navy of Charles I, and developed effectiveness in the Interregnum.  
553 Chaudhuri, ‘The English East India Company’s shipping (c. 1660-1760)’ in J.D. Bruijn, F.S. Gaastra 
(eds.), Ships, Sailors and Spices: East India Companies and their Shipping in the 16 th, 17th and 18th 
Centuries (Amsterdam, 1993), pp. 49-80, pp. 75, 78. The war also resulted in the fact that no English 
came back Europe from Asia in the period 1672-1675 while the EIC sent there more than 10 ships per 
year.  
554 Chaudhuri, ‘The EIC’s Shipping’, p. 75. If we see Tonkin as the EIC’s regular market as Erikson’s 
argument, this role only appeared in around twelve years (1676-1688) with the idea of Tonkin silks for 
Europe. This fact presented the role of Tonkin as a regular market of the EIC with the high demand of 
Tonkin silks. However, this role seemed not quite important as the EIC’s ship from London to Tonkin 
was only one per year while its ships to other ports of Asia gradually increased to twenty-four totally.  




and Asia again decreased. 556  In 1689 the Modena was prepared for Tonkin, but 
eventually, it could not be dispatched.557 While these power dynamics played a factor, 
the real reason that the Tonkin factory faced problems, was from the decreased profit 
from Tonkin’s silks in Europe after China opened the country for foreigners in 1684, the 
re-appearance of Cantonese silks, and the exported increase of silks from Bengal.558 
This lack of profit meant that the last two ships were only to inspect the Tonkin factory 
(1693) and close it (1697).559 
From 1676 to 1682, English ships mostly came from Batam with London’s 
orders and instructions, or from London via Bantam to Tonkin. In return, Tonkin 
merchandise was exported to Bantam and then transferred to London. After Bantam was 
closed in 1682, London adapted by sending ships from London to Acheh, Bencoolen, or 
Priaman to collect pepper and other spices before arriving in Tonkin, which meant that 
the EIC still maintained the intra-Asian trade.560 This trading line also meant that the 
EIC tried to manage the overseas trade by sending ships directly to Tonkin and 
restricted the trade between Tonkin and other agents in the EIC’s hubs in Surat and 
Madras. 561  London also blamed Madras for dispatching the Prospect to Tonkin in 
                                                             
556 Chaudhuri, ‘The EIC’s Shipping’, p. 75; IOR/E/3/92, London to Our Chief & Council at Tonkin, 24 
May 1690, 18 February 1691, pp. 98, 130. London stated that they tried to send ships to Asia, but the war 
prevented all commercial attempts and only 2 small ships arrived in India. As such, while the EIC sent 
around 14 ships to Asia (1670-1679) and more than 20 ships (1680-1686) annually, in 1687 this number 
sharply reduced to 5 ships and it never gained 10 ships until 1698.  
557 IOR/E/3/92, p. 98-99; Ma, English Trade, p. 211. 
558 IOR/E/3/92, London to our President & Council at Fort St. George, 18 February 1691, pp. 135-36. 
559 IOR/G/12/17/10, Madras to Tonkin 11 May 1697, p. 481b. 
560 IOR/G/21/7, Tonkin general, 18 January 1686, 10 December 1686, pp. 93, 95. The Dragon was sent to 
Lampacao island (Lampacau, in the Pear River Delta, China) and Canton to collect silks and musk, while 
the Rainbow arrived in Bencoolen to fill with pepper. 




1686.562 Consequently, although Madras still interacted with Tonkin, it only sent private 
ships to Tonkin without London’s instructions other than the two frigates dispatched in 
1693, 1697 to inspect and close this branch. The only aberration in this pattern occurred 
when the Anglo-French war disrupted London’s ability to control Tonkin directly, and 
Madras was allowed to send ‘country ships’ to Tonkin and try to ‘get what you 
[Madras] can’ from this market until the war ended.563 
The amount of shipping to Tonkin showed how little attention the EIC paid to 
this market and its weakness, especially in wartime, to compete with its rivals. English 
ships in Tonkin were less common than either Chinese and Dutch.564 This was part of a 
wider trend, as more generally, English ships in Asia were fewer than their rivals.565 
While the English sent twenty-one ships to Tonkin, the VOC had thirty-five ships, and 
the Chinese owned thirty-six junks, nearly double the EIC’s number.566 However, from 
1676 to 1688 all of them had the same number of ships (seventeen). The difference 
occurred in the two war-periods. From 1672 to 1676, the Dutch controlled all Asian sea 
routes, and the VOC’s ships still arrived in Tonkin regularly together with Chinese 
junks (with thirteen ships respectively) while the English were isolated and had only 
                                                             
562 Ma, English Trade, p. 203. 
563 IOR/E/3/92, London to Fort St George, 18 February 1691, p. 136. 
564 Sainsbury, Court Minutes 1674-76, p. vii. In 1676, thirteen English ships dispatched to East Asia, but 
only one to Tonkin.  
565 F.S. Gaastra, J.D. Bruijn, ‘The Dutch East India Company’s Shipping, 1602-1795, in a comparative 
perspective’ in Ships, Sailors and Spices, pp. 177-208, p. 182; Kwee, Chinese Economic Dominance, pp. 
11-14; P-K. Hui, ‘Overseas Chinese Business Networks: East Asian Economic Development in Historical 
Perspective’ (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, State University of New York, 1995), pp. 48-55. From 1670 
to 1700, the VOC’s ships to Asia were nearly double the EIC’s ships, especially from 1690 to 1700, when 
it was three times as much. Chinese merchants worked in the South China Sea as carriers and they were 
key players in the inter-island trade. They thus were important with both the VOC and EIC who could not 
directly trade with China mainland.  




two ships.567 From 1680 to 1697, eighteen Chinese junks visited Tonkin before sailing 
to Nagasaki while both the VOC and EIC’s ships went down sharply.568  
 
The EIC’s silk trade in Tonkin 
 
The EIC’s investment and exported goods created relatively successful results for the 
Tonkin factory between 1676-1688 with the primary return of silks (both native and 
Chinese) and other Chinese products while other Tonkinese commodities (ceramics, 
gold, natural products) played little role in the EIC’s trade. The value of the EIC’s yield 
from Tonkin increased after 1676, and it was higher than the EIC’s investment in the 
same period. Notably, the Figure 4.3 showed that in 1683, its yield was double its 
investment while in 1682, this rate was tripled. Although we cannot calculate explicitly 
how much they achieved after paying wages and transportation fees, at least the above 
data showed that English merchants found profit in Tonkin.569 The value of Tonkin 
exported goods to London was more than doubled in four years 1676-1679 and peaked 
                                                             
567 In fact, Dutch ships in Tonkin reduced gradually from the late 1670s, but sharply from 1679 with only 
one ship annually while there were 3 ships in Tonkin per year in the 1650s and 1660s. It showed that 
Tonkin silk trade was not attractive after Japan prohibited exporting silver from 1668. Chinese junks 
never came to Tonkin annually, but the number was high with 3 or 4 which came together in the same 
year. The above information again showed that the EIC went to Tonkin in the unsuitable time as Tonkin 
silk gradually lost its position in East Asia. 
568 Iioka, Tonkin-Nagasaki Silk Trade, p. 82. Chinese Tonkin junks mean Chinese junks from Ningbo, 
Guangdong, Amoy or other Southern China areas called at Tonkin for trade and then sailed to Japan. In 
1687, there were 7 vessels from Canton, Amoy, Taiwan to Tonkin. See IOR/G/21/7, Tonkin general, 3 
December 1687, p. 105. 
569 1676 was a special year as the Flying Eagle carried double value in comparison with the EIC’s 




in 1679.570 From 1681 to 1683 this value was quite high and achieved the highest point 
in 1686, although the general trend was to drop and the investment was so low.571 After 
this year, the trade in Tonkin was smaller, and there was no trade during the Anglo-
French war. The English trade in Tonkin with the main subject of silks demonstrated 
the role of Tonkin factors in evaluating the potential for trade and driving it 
independently during challenging periods, and the responsibility and adaptation of 
London through its decision to continue or stop the silk trade with Tonkin.  
 The role of the Tonkin factory in both the regional and global trade was evident 
as it supplied native silks as substitutes, and Chinese musk and silk collecting from 
Chinese merchants in Tonkin to London.572 English individuals firstly discovered the 
potential of commodities in Tonkin by distinguishing types of native silks. In 1672, 
Gyfford identified Tonkin silks which included baas, chomongees (or chiourons by 
Dutch), lyng or pelangs (plain and flower), hockin or lua, the thua (loa in Portuguese), 
Thea Ming Whing and raw silk, while famous Chinese products in Tonkin were velvet 
and musk.573 In detail, ‘bass a sort of silk made here very good for Japon, both raw & 
diet of a pure color’, while ‘Chomongoos was a sort of wrought silk called by the Dutch 
chiourons, they are well flomish long ½ well broad & better vety good for Japon’, 
‘Pelangs or  Lyngs plained & flowers for merchadise… good for Japon’, ‘white hockins 
or lua a few are proper for Japon they are…long & broad… they maybe painted at 
                                                             
570 IOR/G/12/17/6, 15 December 1679, p. 267b. 
571 IOR/G/21/7, 10 December 1686, p. 105. 
572 Chaudhuri, The Trading World, p. 55. In the late seventeenth century, the EIC found little strategic 
commodities in Asia and its commercial area was also not much expanded. Besides spices in the Spices 
Islands, Indian textiles, gold, silks in Persia, China, India, and Tonkin were one among the main imported 
goods.  
573 IOR/G/12/17/1, Tonkin to London, 7 December 1672, pp. 45b-46a. More explanation of Tonkinese 




Japon’, ‘The Thua in Portuguese called Loa both flower & plain’, ‘The Lua plain the 
silk much twifres proper for yt coaft for woomans badgoods.’ Interestingly, most of 
those producs were raw and simple silk piece-good. As the previous mention, the 
English silk industry was developed and it need raw materials from both Europe and 
Asia. For such reason, Tonkinese raw silk became the main interest of English factors 
as they arrived into Tonkin. Moreover, Tonkinese silks were low quality as most of 
them were to serve Japan where the Japanese used them as replacement for Chinese 
commodities. This section discusses how the English exploited those silks to serve their 
global target from the late 1670s, which factors affected this commerce, and the role of 
substitute products in Tonkin and the core Chinese goods in the EIC’s commerce. 
Furthermore, the research argues that rather than following the Dutch model of using 
Chinese goods to fulfill Japanese orders, the EIC experimented by using Tonkin silk as 
a product for European markets. 
Although experimentation was begun in 1674, the EIC started formally to order 
various types of Tonkin raw and wrought silks for London in 1676.574 Its first success 
was in 1677, as ten bales of raw silk and 7,500 pieces of Tonkin wrought silks were 
sold in London, together with Chinese products.575 Immediately, London reacted the 
development of Tonkin trade by restricting private trade on some products such as 
Tonkin pelangs, raw silk and Chinese goods of damask, satins, musk; and encouraged 
                                                             
574 IOR/G/12/17/3, Bantam to Tonkin, 29 June 1676, pp. 158b-159a. Those were 300 pieces of velvet (a 
cloth made from silk with a thick and soft surface), 10,500 wrought pelangs, 5,000 choes/ chios plains, 
2,500 hockins (yellow silk textile in Tonkin), 2,000 penniascoes?, 1500 loes plain, 2500 loes, 1000 Thea 
Ming Whing, 4,000 right China damasks 15 yards long or 30 yards long, 1000 plain white satins 15 yards 
long, and 8-10 bales of fine white raw silk. Pelangs, Loes, Chios, Thea Ming Whing were kinds of 
Tonkin’s silks. 




its factors, and free English merchants to import other sorts of silk.576 London clarified 
its monopoly on some valuable commodities to avoid a loss of capital and the 
competition of private merchants, while also delivering a variety of silks to London. 
Furthermore, London decided to employ John Blunden, a mercer in London with 
experience in the silk trade as the second factor in Tonkin from 1677 to improve the 
quality of Tonkinese silk.577 He was also instructed to buy ‘twenty patterns of several 
sorts of silk’ to take to Tonkin as samples.578 This action thus demonstrated the way 
London engaged in the Tonkin silk trade and adapted to make it better. London then 
quickly ordered some types of Tonkin silks such as white plain, pelangs, hockin, Thea 
Ming Whing, and Chinese velvet, damask and satin.579 The trade was seen to have 
potential as many of these products were sold in London in 1678.580 Bantam agents 
evaluated that Tonkin pelangs would be more profitable in London and ordered 20,000 
pieces of pelangs while London only wanted 16,500 pieces.581  
However, Tonkin goods were hard to sell in London in 1679 as little Tonkin raw 
silk, pelang, hockin, and Thea Ming Whing was available in March and only raw silk 
and cotton yarn in September.582 As with the market for cotton, demand was dependent 
on sustained supplies being made available. Moreover, in April 1679, some Tonkin 
                                                             
576 Ibid, 13 July 1677, 28 September 1677, and 19 October 1677. 
577 IOR/B/34, Court Minutes 1676-1678, 27 July 1677, 1 August 1677, pp. 291, 294. 
578 Ibid, 28 September 1677, p. 351. 
579 IOR/G/12/17/4, Bantam to Tonkin, 29 May 1677, pp. 210a-b; IOR/G/12/17/5, A list of Tonkin silks 
maybe returned the EIC, pp. 230b-231a; IOR/E/3/88, A list of goods to be provided at Tonqueen, p. 243.  
580 IOR/B/34, Court Minutes, 5-7 March 1678, pp. 451. 
581 IOR/E/3/88, Letter book V, 5 October 1677, pp. 466-67. 
582 IOR/B/35, Court Minutes (19 April 1678 – 16 April 1680), 11 March 1679, 10 and 25 September 




silks were returned by a customer Alderman Bathurst, due to their quality.583 London 
reacted quickly by pausing to build a warehouse in Thang Long ‘until it appears how 
the trade may turn to account of which a further trial to be made’.584 It also reduced the 
amount of Tonkin imported silks, paused in ordering some types of Tonkin silks as 
hockin, lua/ loas, Thea Ming Wing, lua whaes, and ordered 2,000 pieces of new silk, 
Thea Gauze as a trial. 585  Moreover, it requested the Tonkin factors to be more 
enthusiastic in participating in the silk trade and, sent another mercer, Thomas Reeves 
in 1681, to Tonkin to increase the quality of Tonkin silk industry.586 London also sought 
to encourage the Tonkin factory to connect to China for more products as the Taiwan 
factory was in debt. This situation showed two issues of the English silk trade in 
Tonkin, firstly the quality of substitute silks, and secondly London’s ability to adapt 
quickly by stopping trade in poor products, trying new ones and new markets, and 
finding new means to improve the quality of Tonkin silks to meet the demand of 
London. The change in the EIC’s trade was clear as London stopped ordering Tonkin 
wrought silks and focused on Tonkin raw silk to serve the English silk industry. The 
situation thus improved slowly in 1680 by selling 19,000 pieces of silk.587 However, the 
                                                             
583 Ibid, 15 April 1679, p. 212. 
584 Sainsbury, A Calendar of Court Minutes, 1677-79, 24 October 1679, p. 306; IOR/E/3/89, Company to 
Bantam, 6 November 1679, pp. 8, 9, 10. 
585 IOR/G/12/17/6, pp. 258b-259a. 
586 IOR/E/3/89, Company to Bantam, 25 August 1680, pp. 227-228; Company to Bantam, 5 January 
1681, p. 296. 
587 IOR/B/35, Court Minutes, 11-12 March 1680, pp. 410, 411, 413; Bassett, Factory at Bantam, p. 356. 
However, as Bassett argued, Tonkin silks found little profit, even loss in market (pelangs) while most 
Chinese damasks, satins and wrought silks sold well. This again put the Tonkin factory on the 
circumstance of preparing to withdraw. In comparison with the VOC, it only purchased pelangs and musk 




EIC’s attempts to import new technology and improve Tonkin’s silk industry were 
unsuccessful, and from 1684, these silks proved difficult to sell in London.588  
The EIC’s trade in Tonkin in the 1680s witnessed London’s adaptation to 
changes in imported commodities to maintain the factory and the Company’s trading 
system in East Asia in competition with other Europeans. There were two main changes 
in the English imported goods from Tonkin, firstly the reduction of Tonkinese products 
in comparison with the increase in Chinese commodities, and secondly the English 
focus on Tonkinese raw silk rather than wrought silks. In general, the trading trend after 
1680 was that London ordered from Tonkin various commodities from different sources 
such as Chinese products, gold (from Vietnam and Japan), vermilion copper (from 
Japan), and tutenage (from Southeast Asia) for both Europe and India.589 Accordingly, 
Tonkin’s role of providing silk for London in the transoceanic trade decreased, while its 
function as an intermediary in the regional trade to collect more Asian products 
increased. Acting as an intermediary became ever-more important as the factories in 
Amoy and Taiwan were closed in the early 1680s. At the same time, Chinese silks 
proved to be of a consistently higher quality than Tonkin’s products and the Tonkin 
factory was required to focus mostly on gathering Chinese goods there. London ordered 
more Chinese musk, chinaware, lacquer in Tonkin with the hope of selling at new 
markets of Leghorn and Genoa.590 In 1684 London only ordered Tonkin’s pelangs, and 
                                                             
588 IOR/B/38, Court Minutes 1684-1687, p. 91-92, pp. 119, 121. However, the problem here is that the 
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589 IOR/E/3/90, London to Tonkin, 26 September 1684, pp. 343-344; London to Tonkin, 15 October 1685, 
pp. 506-07. 
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Chinese musk and lacquer while in 1685 it wanted only Chinese musk.591 This trend 
thus demonstrated that London’s experimentation of providing Tonkin silks for Europe 
was unsuccessful and London quickly adapted by paying attention to its role as an 
intermediary in the regional trade to gather Chinese goods.  
From the external perspective, the re-appearance of Chinese silks and the growth 
of Bengali products in the EIC’s import, together with the political change in China had 
a significant influence on the EIC’s trade in Tonkin. In 1680, James reported to London 
that ‘they [silks] were not procurable, not to be made here [Tonkin], nor nowe will 
undertake them, but judge they may bee better procured in China’. 592  This report 
demonstrated the main issue of the silk trade in Tonkin, the better quality and quantity 
of Chinese silks in comparison with Tonkin products as silks were not produced 
satisfactorily in Tonkin. Again, English overseas individuals played an important role 
towards the EIC as they recognised and provided London knowledge about the fact and 
situation of silk in Tonkin. It also demonstrated that some of Tonkin factors at any rate 
were putting the interests of the Company first rather than protected their position and 
job in overseas. Moreover, from 1681, English factors in Amoy found that Canton’s 
pelangs and wrought silk were better than Tonkin’s products. London thus collected 
more Chinese goods with 14,000 damask and 4,000 pieces satin.593  The growth of 
Chinese silks in the EIC’s trade related to China’s open policy after 1684. This policy 
allowed the English to trade directly with mainland China, and therefore even the 
                                                             
591 Ma, English Trade, pp. 192-193. Court Minutes also acknowledged the fact that pelang Nanking, 
satins, flowered silks met high demand in London. IOR/B/38, Court Minutes 1684-87, 17 and 20 March 
1684, pp. 92-93; IOR/E/3/90, The Court to Tonkin, 15 October 1685, pp. 506-507. 
592 IOR/G/21/7A, Letter from Thomas James and Council in Tonkin, 1 November 1680, pp. 38-43, p. 39. 




intermediate role of Tonkin served no purpose.594 English ships sailed to Canton and 
Amoy more than Tonkin and obtained cheaper and more suitable commodities there, 
making more Chinese products available in London after 1684.595 Chinese raw silk 
grew from nearly 1 per cent of the EIC’s imported silk before 1685 to 17 per cent 
(1689), 9.9 per cent (1690), and 16.6 per cent in 1691.596 Alongside Chinese silks, 
Bengali products increased their position in the EIC’s trade due to their adaptation to 
London’s requirement. In 1670, like Tonkinese goods, Bengali silk seemed unsuitable 
for the English market, but it quickly changed and played the chief role in the EIC’s 
imported silk. In 1677, profit of silks from Bengal was significant, as their price fetched 
at £1.15 per great pound.597 This growth was remarkable as in 1681 Bengal had 12.5 per 
cent of the EIC’s imported silk, in 1683 14.6 per cent, and by 1694 18.1 per cent. 
Overall in the period, 1696-1705 silks from China and Bengal comprised 13.56 per cent 
of the EIC’s imported goods, and Tonkin’s silks began to play a lesser role in the EIC’s 
trade.598 This fact illustrated the position of the Tonkin factory as peripheral market and 
Tonkin silks as substitutes in the EIC’s strategy. When the English built a trading 
relationship with core markets in China and India, the role of Tonkin’s silks, and the 
Tonkin factory itself was immediately unnecessary. However, it is noticeable that in the 
1690s most of Bengal’s silks which still served London were of low quality, while in 
the eighteenth century Chinese silks were required to improve to be suitable for 
                                                             
594 Iioka, Tonkin-Nagasaki Silk Trade, p. 79.  
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London’s fashion industry.599 It meant that the appearance of products from China and 
Bengal was not the main reason which led to the decrease of the English silk trade in 
Tonkin from the early 1680s and we need to consider other internal reasons for this 
decline.  
From the English perspective, although the English in Tonkin worked actively to 
adapt to the requirements and nature of Tonkin trade, they could not wholly surmount 
the problem of the late arrival of English ships. They always arrived in Tonkin late in 
August or even October due to the distance of the transoceanic trade and their calling at 
Bantam or other places in the Spice Islands to collect pepper and spices for both formal 
and private trade, while the best period for silk trade was in summer due to the 
seasonality of Tonkin silk industry and the monsoon trade. English merchants thus were 
late and had little time to fill the EIC’s requirement and compete with the Chinese and 
Dutch, while Tonkin salesmen could not supply a high quantity of goods in the short 
period. Accordingly, the English obtained less silk than their rivals, and it was the lesser 
quality with ‘winter silk’ although they tried to deal with local traders to take more 
commodities. For example, in October 1676 the Tonkin factory only received 7,000 
taels weight of raw silk from both the King and Prince as their payment for the EIC’s 
commodities.600 James decided to find substitute silks from private traders in Tonkin, 
especially from the English broker, Domingo, by investing the money received from 
Tonkin Court (2,470,344 Tonkinese cash), but this endeavour had poor results, as the 
timing was quite late.601 The trade was more difficult from 1677 when Tonkin Court 
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restricted giving silk to the Europeans as return presents. Tonkin factors thus purchased 
gold and musk to send back to London as they believed that gold was profitable on the 
Coromandel coast, while musk was always in high demand in Europe.602 In 1678, the 
EIC took only 350 catties of raw silk from the King, and this number reduced to 150 
taels (nearly 10 catties) in 1682. 603  The English staff therefore always adapted by 
purchasing more items of high demand in London such as pelangs, raw silk and musk in 
1679 or gave money earlier for private traders to collect goods before English ships 
came in 1680. 604  As a result, the EIC’s trade with private bookers, Domingo and 
Monica Dabada was quite good, including both ‘summer’ and ‘winter’ silks, but the 
quality of English trade could not better than the trading summer season.605  
From the Tonkin factory’s perspective, the character of Tonkin’s silk as a 
special substitution for Chinese silk, whether serving for the Japanese or European 
trade, was the main reason which affected the EIC’s trade.606 The EIC imported both 
Tonkin raw and wrought silks, but London quickly recognised that they were unsuited 
for customer’s demand and the fashion industry in London. Tonkin only produced white 
plain and simple wrought silk, while London’s fashion required flowered silk, satin, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(white, blue, gallon, red, brown – 200 of each), 500 pieces hockins (white, red, blue, yellow, brown – 100 
of each), 500 pieces Thea (white, black, yellow, blue, red – 100 of each), 500 pieces Thea Ming Whing 
(white, black, blue, red, yellow – 100 of each), 1000 pieces plain thea (black: 600; yellow: 400). 
602 IOR/G/12/17/4, The Tonkin factory, 8 November 1677, p. 214b. 
603 IOR/G/12/17/6, p. 256a; IOR/G/12/17/8, p. 302b. 
604 IOR/G/12/17/6, 21 July 1679, 10 January 1680, pp. 262b, 272b. 
605 IOR/G/12/17/5, p. 246b; IOR/G/12/17/6, p. 263b; IOR/G/12/17/7, p. 272b. Information of trade in 
1680 is limited as there was a gap missing in the EIC’s records between June 1680 and December 1681. 
606 Chaudhuri, The trading world, pp. 345-346; Bassett, Factory at Bantam, pp. 343-355; H. Bugge, ‘Silk 
to Japan: Sino-Dutch competition in the silk trade to Japan, 1633-1685’, Itinerario, 13 (1989), pp. 25-44, 
p. 32. Data of the VOC showed that the price of both Chinese and Tonkinese silks were equal in Japan as 




velvet and damask.607 Tonkin’s silk was low quality since it had not improved beyond 
the traditional, labour-intensive form. 608  As a result, the VOC limited exporting 
Tonkin’s silk to Japan from the 1650s and increased Bengali goods as a better 
replacement.609 The English attempts to import new technology to adapt to the Tonkin 
silk industry were not effective as the Tonkin labour system was different from London 
and Tonkin labourers had little reason to change. Making silk was only a part-time job 
for the Tonkinese farmers when they finished their rice-crops; and the Tonkin Court still 
focused on agriculture, not industry or commerce to serve foreign merchants. 610 
Consequently, in 1682, the Tonkin factory reported to London that the benefits from the 
Tonkin trade were less because native traders could not cover a huge trade and the silk-
technology was so poor. 611  The silk industry which depended significantly on the 
weather had no advantages to compete with the improvement of Bengali and Chinese 
silk. As a result, Tonkin’s products were useless in the English market in the late 
seventeenth century. 
Besides the character of Tonkin’s silk, natural disasters negatively influenced 
the EIC’s trade as the Tonkin silk industry was labour-intensive as well as weather 
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dependent. As records showed, the EIC’s investment decreased suddenly when Tonkin 
encountered floods (1679), drought and famine (1681), hunger and epidemic (1682), 
famine and floods (1683).612 Mulberry trees were planted outside the dykes and on the 
land banks were regularly affected by floods. With too much water, the mulberry trees 
died, and the silkworm stopped. Moreover, due to natural disasters, Tonkin’s farmers 
faced famine, and they destroyed mulberry trees to plant rice, sweetcorn or potato for 
food. In 1681, a massive drought caused hundreds of deaths, and the second famine in 
1682 killed more in the famous provinces for producing silk in Tonkin.613 Without 
labour and mulberry trees, in 1683, 1684 and even until 1686 silk was very rare in 
Tonkin.614 Noticeably, Java records about Tonkin trade from 1682 to 1686 repeated 
many times the term of ‘insufficient silk’ or that ‘silk was rare and dear’ due to natural 
disasters. Consequently, the quality and quantity of Tonkin silk diminished, and the 
EIC’s competition with the Chinese and Dutch was more serious and its trade with 
Tonkin’s silk was less effective than with silks from China and Bengal.  
 
Tonkinese people and the English trade 
 
Alongside the issues of what the EIC did in Tonkin and how English merchants traded 
there, the chapter also tries to answer another part of the connection story between the 
EIC and Tonkin:  the position Tonkinese people played in the process of the English 
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learning to trade in Tonkin. While the King and the Tonkin Court showed their role in 
term of diplomacy, who could help the EIC in trade and whichh lessons they provided?  
 Interestingly, again the King, his relative and Mandarins supplied the EIC first 
information about trading in Tonkin, particularly its difficulty in dealing with officials. 
The King monopolised the trade in Tonkin and all foreigners had to serve him before 
selling any products to local and other foreign merchants. 615  Gyfford reported to 
London in 1672 that ‘leade brimstones salpecter guns… or English cloth we can sell to 
noe other but ye King…’.616 This report showed two problem the English faced in trade 
in Tonkin that the King’s monopoly of trade in important products and the limitation of 
selling weapons and some kind of raw materials as the Tonkin Court did not create any 
danger from local people. For those reason, trade in Tonkin was not a popular trade, but 
rather a special kind of exchange wherein the King could take some defined 
commodities and pay later on his own terms price. In return, the English got payment in 
silk and Tonkinese cash. The King and Prince also wanted to take silver from the 
English at a lower price.617 This policy not only provided more silver for Tonkinese 
demand but also caused negative effect for the English as they had little silver to trade 
directly with private merchants in Tonkin while they had to wait long tine to receive 
low-quality silk from the Tonkin Court. The power of the King was noted that ‘as for 
foreign traders, a newcomer suffers, besides hard usage in his buying and selling a 
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thousand inconveniences; and no certain rates on merchandise imported or exported 
being imposed, the insatiable mandarins cause the ships to be rummaged, and take what 
commodities may likely yield a price at their rates, using the King’s name to cloak their 
griping and villainous extortions, and for all this there is no remedy but patience.’618 As 
in Taiwan, English factors found little profit in Tonkin trade as the King put his dear 
price and monopolised in vital commodities.619 
 Because the King and his Court were the richest and most power in the 
kingdom, the EIC quickly recognised that they would trade regularly with them 
although their profit was limited with issues of monopoly.620 That the English had to 
serve the Tonkin Court first as soon as English ships arrived to Tonkin was popular and 
repeated. For example, in 5 July 1672, the Dispatchdores came to visit the English and 
ordered goods for both the King and Crown Prince including brimstone, lead, amber 
knives, ivory, great guns, coral, and some kind of English broadcloth.621 A few days 
later, Mandarins started to order goods for themselves with smaller quantity in 
comparison with the King and Prince. The EIC records showed that in 1672, 
particularly from July to September, English goods were only bought by the King and 
officials. In this year, the Court purchased more than ten occasions English 
commodities with the major products of English cloth, guns, amber and knives, coral, 
and put-chuck.622 In 1673, the King and Prince also were the most valuable customers 
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with a value of 4,559 tales silver.623 Interestingly, while the King wanted English goods 
for his own demand, his officals bought commodities for their demands and for re-sale 
as they worked as merchants as well. As a result, they provided the English with 
information of types of commodities suitable for exporting to Tonkin.  
 The situation of trade with the King and local officals not only provided 
knowledge of the type of goods that were in demand, but also taught the English lessons 
about collecting debt and treating the Mandarins. They took goods without direct 
payment and the debt was only paid as they received salary from the King. As a result, 
in the first few years, the English faced difficulties as Tonkinese Mandarins were in 
debt and they paid with monopolised price.624 As previous mentioned, the English got 
paid in the third rank in comparison with the Chinese and the Dutch until 1676. That the 
English had to visit Thang Long anually asking for repayment of debt became costly.625 
The Governor of Hien, therefore became more important with the EIC not only because 
he provided them a land in Pho Hien, but also because of their representation in the 
Tonkin Court to collect debt from other Mandarins. This fact caused the English 
disappointment in trading with local Mandarins but they had no choice as the 
Mandarins had power to influence the English trading future in Tonkin. In brief, trade 
with the Tonkin Court provided the English information about their real demand and 
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how hard to deal with their power. As a result, the Tonkin factors tried to sell English 
goods more for local merchants.  
 Due to the monopolised policy of the Tonkin Court, the English had no chance 
to deal with Tonkinese and foreign traders without allowance from the King. Moreover, 
local merchants had relatively little power, were few in number and had insufficient 
money to make big deals with European traders. They were only the fourth in Tonkin’s 
personal rank with small-scale privileges, and if they were rich, they had to pay heavy 
taxes or faced danger from both government and thieves.626 As Nguyen’s argument, the 
definition of rich and powerful in Tonkin was not closely related to money, but to rice-
fields and cultivated lands. Tonkin merchants, instead of re-investing in commerce, 
bought land and worked in agriculture.627 Baron stated that ‘there is not a Tonqueenese 
merchant that has or had ever the courage and ability to buy the value of two thousand 
dollars at once, and to pay it upon the nail.’628 Accordingly, Tonkinese merchants were 
not the main English trading partner, and there were no ‘big name’ or long exchange 
between the EIC and local traders. 
The role of Tonkinese merchants was only noticeable from the late 1670s, as the 
Tonkin Court gradually reduced their interest in English goods. Problematically, the 
number of local merchants dealt with the factory was limited and changed through the 
time. Due to the character of Tonkinese traders, ‘small’ local brokers, traders had no or 
little reseve fund and therefore there was no ‘big name’ who could maintain the long 
and large exchange with the English. Different names of merchants in Tonkin appeared 
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in the Tonkin factory’s records, but their trade quite small and alternative. In the first 
years, the Tonkin factory traded with ‘a Siamese woman’ and Antonio Dabada while 
Domingo Hien Tho became the main partner in the late 1670s. The English trading 
activities with private traders in Tonkin were recorded rarely. For example, in 1673 the 
English sold pepper to Nicholas Vermeer, a Dutch merchant.629 In 1675 and early 1676, 
they sold silk for Domingo Hien Tho and the Chinese, as no English ship arrived in 
Tonkin.630 In 1677, Monica Dabada exchanged saltpetre and brimstone for musk with 
the English.631  From 1683 to 1692 we had no information about the factory’s brokers or 
local tradesmen but at least we know that Keeling did not trust Domingo Hien Tho as 
interpreter or trading partner.632 In the 1690s, the EIC did very tiny trade with Monica 
Dabada, Chubu, and Ba Nhung or Ba Cung as London sent no more goods to Tonkin 
due to a low profit of this market.633 As such, Tonkin provided a big knowledge for the 
EIC about trading partner that instead of trading with local merchants, they had to 
cooperated more with the King and Mandarins in the unbalanced exchange due to the 
King’s molopolistic policy.  
Another issue the EIC faced was to collect debt and to trust private merchants on 
trading. As cash was important in trade, and Tonkinese brokers had little fund to 
produce goods, the English had to pre-pay to order from local people. By contrast, the 
English had to accept later payment from Tonkinese merchants after selling their goods. 
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As a result, the EIC faced problems of risk in trade and ‘bad debt’ as in their exchange 
with Tonkinese officials. In the first years in Tonkin, the English had horrible 
experience with ‘a Siamese woman’ and Antonio Dabada as one of them was bankrupt 
and refused to pay her debt while the other delayed to pay.634 Tonkin factors several 
times asked the Governor of Hien for help, but like to deal with Tonkinese officials, it 
was hard to collect debt. With this lessons, the Tonkin factory dealed all issues of price 
and way of payment before putting any order in the next cooperation with Tonkinese 
merchants. They had to chose trust traders and expected good results in trade with them 
as local law and officials seemed not to help the English or any foreingers. However, 
sometimes the English still got risk in trade with Tonkinese brokers as they had to pre-
pay to complete with the Dutch and Chinese in ordering silk for the next arrival ships.  
The Tonkin Court and merchants in Tonkin also supplied the English a lesson 
about types of commodities. If English cloth and luxury goods were exported to Tonkin 
in 1672 as the EIC wish and expectation, wrought metals and materials were popular 
from the late 1670s after they gathered useful information. Due to the situation of 
Tonkin, the English trade of wrought metals and materials (saltpetre, brimstone, and 
lead) was profitable while the trade of broadcloth and weapons was small, existing 
mostly to serve the King’s habit, rather than for real business. More than 90 per cent of 
Tonkin natives were farmers who worked in the field all day, and therefore they did not 
need English broadcloths. The hot and wet climate was not suitable for woollen 
materials for much of the year, so English products only served the King, Mandarins 
and wealthy people in winter. The wars with Cochin-China had stopped from 1672, and 
therefore the King of Tonkin just needed a small number of guns as a gift or luxury 
                                                             




goods, while unwrought metals were necessary for their daily life and were welcomed 
by both the Court and private merchants. As such, while the English mainly purchased 
silks (both native and Chinese products) in Tonkin, their exporting goods were not 




In conclusion, the Tonkin factory’s main activities occurred in the 1670s and 1680s, and 
they were extremely dynamic in around the twelve years from 1676-1688 when the plan 
of supplying silk for London was entertained. During that time, both the Court of 
Directors and English overseas factors made attempts and alterations to maintain the 
Tonkin factory, while other EIC’s branches in East Asia closed. That the EIC sought to 
preserve and develop Tonkin trade through various commercial plans, was evidence of 
how the EIC learned from previous experiences and their daily experimentation to 
create their own success in small and supportive markets in East Asia, and of the 
necessity of peripheral market in the EIC’s commercial strategy in the area to connect 
with core market of China.  
 Tonkin in the seventeenth century was important towards the EIC’ improvement 
as it provided lessons on both terms of commodities, trading network and learning 
process from direct trading experimentation. These were lessons about investment, the 
type of imported and exported goods and trading partnership. That the EIC recognised 
the significance of silver or ready cash in Tonkin and overseas trade, was a significant 
change in their trade, while the appearance of Asian products and a connection with 




and private trade, with the aim of creating a regional trading system. For that reason, 
although the Tonkin factory’s achievement was not fruitful, it is worth evaluating the 
English attempts to maintain and enlarge their trade and to consider the Tonkin factory 
as a case to study how the EIC learned and understood transoceanic markets from the 
view of the outlying market. 
 The chapter analyses the EIC’s lessons from experience and also provides a 
comprehensive view of the interrelationship between main markets, China and Japan, 
and the supplementary place of Tonkin. The Tonkin factory survived due to the EIC’s 
primary aim of trade with Japan, and subsequently China, although within some years 
this factory was to serve the Eurasian trade. Tonkin became of more significance for the 
EIC to collect Chinese goods, and to open a gateway to mainland China from the south. 
However, it seemed that while the English in East Asia recognised the role of small 
factories as Tonkin in the EIC’s trading system, the Court of Minutes in London paid 
less attention to Tonkin. The data of the English shipping and investment indicated that 
in comparision with their rivals’ presence in Tonkin or to the EIC’s treatment of other 
factories in China, India, the role of Tonkin was subordinate. The fact of English trading 
in Tonkin showed that a small factory played its roles as substitute and intermediary in 
some periods and its necessity and significance only stopped as the EIC found a means 
to connect with core markets directly and effectively. The Tonkin factory thus was 
evidence of the EIC’s policy change from using outlying factories in distant areas to 
connecting directly main markets in the last decade of the seventeenth century and 





CHAPTER 5. THE ENGLISH CONNECTIONS WITH COCHIN-CHINA IN 
THE 1690s AND EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 
This chapter argues that the EIC, and particularly the Madras Council, enacted 
remarkable changes in their contact with Southern Vietnam in the 1690s to serve their 
aim of connecting India and China. Instead of viewing Cochin-China as a regular 
market for London, as they had with Tonkin in the 1670s and 1680s, the Madras 
Council considered it an ideal site to build a station along the sea-route from India to 
China, which they could use to control and protect the long-distance English trading 
network in the area. To fulfill this plan, the Madras Council needed to establish a good 
relationship with the native Court and therefore turned its attention to diplomatic 
activities. Nevertheless, the Company also went beyond what were now traditional 
methods of diplomacy and looked to establishing fortifications and a colony in Cochin 
China. By exploring the changes that the EIC enacted in Cochin-China in the 1690s, 
this chapter investigates the different ways in which London and Madras evaluated the 
potential of overseas countries and established a connection with them. English attempts 
to link Southern Vietnam to a more extensive network in the 1690s, were part of the 
EIC’s new strategy towards East Asia which involved trying to establish fortifications 
and colonies to control distant trade and enlarge the English position. Through 
examining the Company’s view of Cochin-China and its position in the South China 
Sea, the chapter argues that English overseas individuals continued to play essential 
roles in the EIC’s expansion in East Asia, but that they started to operate in new ways at 




 As the previous chapters demonstrated, the English faced difficulties when 
trying to connect with Cochin-China in the seventeenth century. Firstly, their three 
voyages from Japan to Cochin-China in the 1610s obtained unexpected results as the 
two English men had died and they collected little silk. Chapter Two shows that from 
1623 English agents in Bantam had a distinct view about the position of Cochin-China 
in the South China Sea: they saw it as a well-placed station to control all sea routes 
around the area, rather than an intermediary post fuelling trading connections, as was 
the case with Tonkin. As early as 1627, Cochin-China was again revived in the English 
consideration as they sought a means of indirect trade with mainland China to compete 
with the Dutch position in East Asia. English agents at Batavia believed that this 
kingdom had more advantages than Taiwan in its connection with mainland China, and 
the English had a chance to settle a factory or a fortification on the island of Cochin-
China. Henry Hawley, the Batavia president wrote to London in consideration of the 
place to establish indirect trade with China that ‘the harboure of Cochin-China are far 
more secure than Formosa [Taiwan]; are doubtful whether the King will permit them to 
fortify on the main, but will not be opposed on the island of Champello [now Cu Lao 
Cham, Southern Vietnam]…’.635 However, the EIC’s general situation before the 1650s 
was largely to focus on India and the Spice Islands because of its main aim of obtaining 
spices and the weakness of its capital reserves. As a result, the EIC paid little or even no 
attention to Southern Vietnam and East Asia in this period. In 1671 the English faced 
disaster related to Cochin-China as the ships Advice and Bantam Pink from Bantam to 
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Taiwan and Japan were lost near Pulo-Condore island due to the bad weather. 636 
Nevertheless, with the potential of this market, the EIC’s desire to expand trade and 
influence in East Asia, and its changing strategy in the late century, Cochin-China was 
again considered in the 1690s, by the Madras Council. The role of Madras’ factors was 
to create a view from the ground of this distant area, commenting on the potential for 
‘country trade’, a new proposition, distinct from long-distance overseas trade.  
 
Reasons for the English mission in Cochin-China  
 
The most important reason which led to the English mission in 1695 was the Madras 
Council’s search for an intermediate station in the East Asian trading network and the 
Company’s continued desire for a stable connection between India and China.637 At this 
point, the Company was more aware of and became keen to be involved in country 
trade. After China opened many trading ports for foreigners in 1684, both the English 
official and private ships from Madras arrived in Amoy, Canton and other Chinese ports 
more frequently.638 In this system, China provided porcelain, alum, sugar and silk, and 
Madras worked as a broker to transfer goods from China to Bengal, Surat or Persia.639 
China and Chinese commodities were always essential and had potential in the EIC’s 
commercial strategy in East Asia, but from the late seventeenth century onwards the 
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trade-route between India and China became significant to the EIC’s development as 
the Company wanted to connect its two main core markets in a comprehensive system. 
However, it seems that the Chinese government was obstructive and the trading 
conditions remained complex.640 For example, the English arrived in Amoy in 1684, but 
local officers refused the trade since they had previously supported Taiwan. They were 
thus required to transfer guns, weapons and lead as gifts for the Emperor of China and 
to come back in 1685.641 Due to the limited access to China directly and indirectly 
through supplementary factories (they were closed in the 1680s), the English trade with 
mainland China in the 1690s was fragmentary.642 At the same time, the Tonkin factory 
which played the role as an intermediary to collect Chinese commodities and connect 
with mainland China became difficult to maintain. As a result of such changes, the 
English needed other options by which to acquire Chinese products. London had 
considered voyaging to China with experienced and skilful staff and asked Madras to 
keep Lemuel Blackmore as chief of the Tonkin factory in 1694 to maintain the indirect 
link with mainland China (see chapter three). Moreover, London’s decision to close the 
Tonkin factory in early 1695 prompted the Company to consider other substitute ports 
in the South China Sea to act as intermediaries. The Madras Council, therefore, viewed 
Cochin-China as one possible option because of its trading and geographic potential.643  
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Beyond the role of an intermediary, Cochin-China was in the EIC’s view with 
the hope of controlling regional trading routes; a strategic aim made more forceful by its 
adoption of using force in overseas countries.644 The loss of its factories in Cambodia, 
Siam, Taiwan, Bantam, (and soon Tonkin) between the 1660s and 1680s caused 
problems for the EIC’s position in East Asia as they had no presence in the South China 
Sea to compete with other Europeans. At the same time,  the Dutch controlled Batavia 
and the Spanish had authority in Manila. Therefore, the need for a place to manage the 
trading routes around the South China Sea became ever more significant. The Madras 
Council hence perceived Cochin-China to be ‘a convenient place for building a dock 
wherein our [English] ships may be laid and repaired, or new ship built’ due to its 
geographical position in the South China Sea.645As such, this kingdom was not only 
valued for its geographical position and trading potential, but also the possibility of 
building a dock, or further a fortification to control the South China Sea and to secure 
the English presence in East Asia. However, the Company considered the presence of 
the Dutch in Cochin-China as they wanted to avoid direct competition with them. As 
discussed below, the Madras Council considered discovering the relationship between 
Nguyen Lords and the VOC after the war in the 1640s.646 If the relationship was still 
tense, it would be satisfactory for the English to reside and build a place to confirm their 
position and influence in the area.  
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Besides the great ambitions of the EIC’s strategy to link India and China and to 
control the East Asia trading routes, the mission to Cochin-China also reflected the 
Madras Council’s own desire to create and develop a ‘country trade’ system in Asia.647 
The involvement of Madras’ agents was key here, as these individuals lived on the 
ground and held the knowledge, power, relationships and ambition to become involved 
in the complex Asian trading system. Madras agents were an important new component 
in how the English approached Southern Vietnam in the 1690s. Madras from the mid-
seventeenth century was one of the principal centres of English private trade with the 
increase of a number of English merchants there.648 Until the late century, this factory 
had the ‘largest fleet of private ships’ to serve both short trade with other ports in India, 
and long-distance trade with China, Manila, and Persia.649 The Madras Council were 
heavily involved in the intra-Asian trade especially from the early 1690s, since Indian 
textiles could find a reasonable market in East Asia, in exchange for other luxury 
commodities, and therefore Southeast Asian ports were frequented by the English.650 As 
in the previous discussion in chapter four, the influence of Madras towards Vietnam had 
changed from the outbreak of the Nine Years War. Before 1688 London tried to restrict 
Madras’s power towards Tonkin in both issues of principal management and trade, but 
private trade still occurred in some years. Due to the war with France, London could not 
manage distant factories and allowed Madras to be involved in all the Tonkin factory’s 
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activities and improve ‘country trade’ to have suitable goods and Chinese products.651 
When London ordered Madras to investigate the Tonkin factory in 1693, Madras agents 
also operated their private trade with a large number of individuals’ commodities 
carried to Tonkin. Moreover, Madras and London had different opinions on using 
Tonkin: while London mostly focused on the Eurasian trade to supply silks for Europe, 
Madras viewed Tonkin as an inherent part of the regional trade. Indeed, some of the 
members of the Madras Council had previous trading experience in East Asia in Tonkin 
itself as well as Siam and Taiwan. For example, in the 1680s, Gyfford, the Governor of 
Madras had experience on both Mallaca and Tonkin while Baron worked as an adviser 
for Gyfford about the English trade in East Asia.652 Moreover, other Tonkin factors such 
as George Tash and William Hodges who were dismissed from Tonkin to Madras in 
1686 became other channels to help Madras undestood about the trade with Vietnam. 
Because such men insured that Madras was very conscious of Southeast Asian trade, 
Madras continued to think of the possibilities for a continued Southeast Asian presence 
even after the departure of Gyfford and his cronies and after Tonkin factory was closed 
in 1595.  
Cochin-China seemed to be a potential choice for both the EIC’s general 
strategy and Madras’s own desire of country trade because of its geographical location 
and the regular presence of Chinese merchants. Hoi An, the famous trading city of 
Cochin-China, had an essential location in the regional trading network linked to Macao 
and Batavia, and it could act as a place to exchange and connect to East and Southeast 
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Asia.653 Voyages from China to Cochin-China were relatively straightforward, as the 
sea route (around six days and nights) was familiar to Chinese merchants. 654  The 
advantage of distance was also recognised by the English in Batavia in 1627 as they 
reported to London that Cochin-China ‘connected with the main of China, …seven days 
journey from Chin-Chew: and there is free intercourse by sea and land…’.655 Cochin-
China thus offered the Madras Council a means of accessing Chinese merchants in the 
1690s, which allowed the English to maintain a connection with China, develop the 
intra-Asian trade, and control the China Sea in competition with other Europeans. The 
wealth of China was a potential market for both the EIC’s formal and private trade in 
India to export textile and import silk, porcelain, lacquer, tea and sugar. While land 
routes through Burma (now Myanmar) remained unclear, the sea route from the Indian 
Ocean through the Indonesian area and the corner of Siam Gulf (now the Gulf of 
Thailand), Cochin-China and Tonkin, was still the main way for the English in India to 
access China.  
For the above reasons, the Madras Council granted Thomas Bowyear leadership 
of the English mission to Cochin-China in 1695 and instructed him to discover the 
commercial possibilities of Cochin-China, such as the prices of commodities and 
trading networks between Cochin-China and Japan, Cambodia and Siam. 656  These 
instructions demonstrated both Madras’ desire to find a suitable place in the South 
China Sea to replace Tonkin as the EIC’s intermediary point in East Asia and the EIC’s 
                                                             
653 Wheeler, ‘Cross-Cultural Trade and Trans-Regional Networks in the Port of Hoian: Maritime Vietnam 
in Early Modern Era’ (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Yale University, 2001), p. 6. 
654 Le Quy Don, Phu bien tap luc [Desultory Record of the Subjugated Border], c1776, Vietnamese 
translation (Hanoi, 1962), p. 233. 
655 Noel, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, p. 373. 
656 IOR/G/40/18, Factory Records Miscellaneous, Instructions to Bowyear from Madras Council, 2 May 




hope to connect with Japan again via Southern Vietnam. Broadly, its ambition was to 
connect the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea with a station at Cochin-China. As 
such, the mission to Cochin-China in 1695-1696 served both official and private aims of 
the Company’s officials in Madras. While the EIC needed this kingdom to link with 
China and to control the sea-routes in the area, English agents in Madras needed a part 
of the ‘country trade’ system in the South China Sea to serve their developing private 
trade. Consequently, the English approached Cochin-China in different ways and for 
other reasons than those that had earlier guided its activities in Tonkin. In the 1690s, the 
East India Company was learning to trade in East Asia in new ways with the mission to 
establish a relationship with native governments and discover the potential of trade. 
 
The Bowyear’s mission to Cochin-China and the English experience657 
 
By analysing the English mission to Southern Vietnam from the perspective of Madras, 
this part examines how the Company operated in its diplomacy and trade with the local 
Court. It also analyses the roles played by English staff, by considering how much they 
knew about and learnt from Cochin-China in comparison to the earlier lessons gleaned 
from interactions with Tonkin.  
Significantly, the Madras Council used Thomas Bowyear, an experienced 
member of staff who had worked in the Taiwan factory and visited Tonkin in 1682 and 
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1688, and Siam in 1682, as a leader of the mission in 1695.658 Bowyear’s appointment 
demonstrates how, as with the Court of Directors in London, the Madras Council 
increasingly used long-serving staff to perform pioneering tasks, such as gathering 
information and settling formal relations. Bowyear, with his skills and background 
knowledge of Taiwan, Siam and Tonkin, was the most suitable factor for discovering 
information about and negotiating with Cochin-China. 659  The 1695 mission also 
included Mr Gyfford, but we do not know whether this man was William Gyfford, the 
chief of Tonkin factory (1672-1676) and President of Madras Council (1683-1686) or 
not, since Elihu Yale replaced him in 1686, and we have no information about him after 
that.660  
The primary aim of this mission was to set up diplomatic relations with the 
Cochin-Chinese Court by sending a letter and gifts from the Governor of Fort St George 
to the Nguyen Lord. With experience in dealing with Indian kingdoms and the lessons 
from Tonkin factory, the Madras Council understood the importance of carefully 
engaging with the Cochin-Chinese Court. Their cautious approach is demonstrated by 
Nathaniel Higginson’s (the President of Fort St. George) instructions to Bowyear. The 
English began by finding out information about the Cochin-Chinese political system, 
such as ‘the names & titles of ye King & his family; the names titles & offices of his 
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chief servat & favour; the names of the government, especially relating to ye trade of 
foreigners’ and the political relations between Cochin-China with Tonkin, Siam and 
Cambodia.661 The Madras Council was also keen to understand the trajectory of the 
Nguyen Lords’ war with Tonkin between 1627 and 1672, to comprehend the current 
relationship between the two kingdoms in 1695. The Council also felt that Cambodia 
and Siam were significant due to their conflicts with Cochin-China as the Nguyen Lords 
had expanded southward.662 The Madras Council’s instructions to Bowyear concerning 
Cochin-China’s political issues show that they had collected basic information about the 
political relationship between this country and its neighbours. That information was 
indirect from various sources in different periods such as from Gyfford and Baron in the 
1680s, and from other of Madras’s merchants during their trading activities with Tonkin 
and in the ‘country trade’ system with Manila, China, Siam, and the Malayan states in 
the 1690s.663 With experience of trade in East Asia, the Madras Council understood the 
necessary political information and considered the political effects of both official and 
private trade. Accordingly, both the Madras Council and President Higginson sent 
letters and detailed instructions to the English mission on 2 May 1695.  
On 18 August 1695, Thomas Bowyear and his assistants arrived in Champellos 
(Callao Island, or now known as Cu Lao Cham), Cochin-China under those 
requirements. The English brought with them a letter from Higginson to the King of 
Cochin-China. In this letter, Higginson stressed his position in the English East India 
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Company as the President on the Coast of Coromandel, Bay of Bengal, Sumatra and 
South Seas who had the power to address all the English issues in East Asia on behalf 
of the English government.664 With such power, Higginson’s letter was valued by the 
Cochin-Chinese Court and helped the English ambassador to meet the King and Grand 
Mandarins and negotiate meaningfully. Higginson’s desired role is illuminated by the 
issues he chose to mention in his letter to the King of Cochin-China. Besides the desire 
of a peaceful commerce, he thanked the King for helping Mr. Blackmore in 1693 as the 
English junk was wrecked in the Cochin-China channel (see chapter three), and noted 
that the English were ‘not seeking to conquer kingdoms but carry on their trade only to 
the great benefit of the country where they trade.’665 It is no doubt that Higginson 
understood the political situation of Cochin-China and its worry about the external 
influence towards the national security, as Cochin-China was still on the conflict with 
its neighbours, and tried to avoid any misunderstanding of the Company’s aims in 
Cochin China. Consequently, Higginson noted that he held the ambition to trade and 
tried to reassure the King that the English did not focus on political issues or wish to 
conquer the country. The letter acted to reassure influential individuals about the 
English presence in Southern Vietnam, and as a passport to help Bowyear to enter and 
contact the Cochin-Chinese Court effectively. 
During their first month in Cochin-China, the English were welcomed by two 
Dispatchdores and the local Mandarins. On 9 October, Bowyear went to Sinoa, the 
capital of Cochin-China (now Hue province). Bowyear, however, did not meet the King 
since he was in the time of recreation and, it took time to transfer the English gifts to the 
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King because the two Dispatchdores needed to check them carefully.666  All further 
formal meetings between Bowyear and the Cochin-Chinese Court occurred under the 
management of the King’s Dispatchdores. In November 1695, the English sent their 
letter to the King after translating it into Portuguese and Cochin-Chinese as they did in 
Tonkin in 1672, because Portuguese was the international language in Cochin-China 
(see chapter two).667 In general, by using a formal letter and gifts, Bowyear’s attempts at 
forming a diplomatic relationship with the Cochin-China court proved successful, and 
these activities helped the English to negotiate with the King and native Mandarins 
about trade and residence. 
After their initial diplomatic gestures, the King and his Court welcomed the 
English. Firstly, they received 3,000 local cash from the King in return for their gifts to 
the Court. All their goods were then brought to the ‘custom house’ and were protected 
carefully by Cochin-Chinese soldiers. On 2 November 1695, the English again received 
gifts from the King of 10,000 cash, a hog, two bags of rice, two jars of salt fish, and two 
jars of wine.668 Secondly, the Cochin-Chinese Court supported the English in gaining a 
trading licence, although this negotiation proved difficult due to resistance from the two 
Dispatchdores, the most important Mandarins for foreigners. 669  The first, Ung Coy 
Backe Looke Dean, assisted the English but he had no authority to allow them to trade 
immediately. The second, Ung Cookey Thoo, the King’s uncle shared the same power 
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as the first Mandarin but tried to make a profit from the English. He requested 500 taels 
of silver for his lobbying while Bowyear was willing to pay only 100 taels.670 Luckily 
for Bowyear, Ung Coy Backe Looke Dean helped the English to send a trading proposal 
to the King without any fee. In this case, we can see the difference between Cochin-
China and Tonkin in their treatment towards foreigners. While all Tonkin’s Mandarins 
required gifts and a fee for the permission of trade and residence, Cochin-China more 
willingly welcomed overseas merchants, and the native Mandarins tried to help 
foreigners to trade. They did so because commerce advantaged the Cochin-Chinese in 
their fight against Tonkin.671 While Tonkin continued to focus on their agricultural 
economy and tried to limit newcomers, Cochin-China acknowledged the importance of 
overseas commerce. Consequently, in contrast to Tonkin, Cochin-Chinese 
Dispatchdores and other Mandarins were not allowed to restrict or obstruct overseas 
trade.672 The support of local government was always crucial to the development of 
trading relations in East Asia. With the experience of both Taiwan and Tonkin, 
Bowyear quickly recognised the differences of Cochin-China, and such recognition led 
to Bowyear’s positive evaluation of their ability to settle an English factory in this 
kingdom.  
Thirdly, the English received a welcome letter from the King of Cochin-China to 
the Governor of Madras, which was extremely different from Tonkin’s treatment of the 
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English in 1696.673 In the letter, the King praised the English friendship and good 
knowledge of his kingdom and its relations with neighbours. He felt satisfied with the 
Englishmen in the mission and described Bowyear’s behaviour in glowing terms: ‘the 
piety, the behaviour, the fidelity, and the truly solid justice’.674 The King also sent 
presents from Cochin-China to the Governor of Madras to represent the friendly 
relationship.675 Furthermore, he sent some samples of Calambac, gold, silk and wood 
and promised that the trade between the EIC and Cochin-China would be fruitful when 
the English ships came back. 676  This welcome contrasted with that from Northern 
Vietnam, as the Tonkin Court never sent a letter to the EIC or made a trading trial with 
the English. Consequently, Bowyear and the English had many chances to travel around 
the kingdom to discover its trading potential, thus meeting Madras’ requirement. They 
were even able to trial a small trade with the native Court. The success of this 
diplomatic activity led Bowyear to expect that the trading relationship between Madras 
and Cochin-China would develop in the future, which was important, given the fragility 
of the Tonkin factory. 
As in Tonkin, the English considered diplomacy as a useful and vital tool to 
settle a trading relationship. To help Bowyear, and explain the aim of the voyage, 
Higginson wrote to the King of Cochin-China in 1695 and revealed that: ‘…I have sent 
my merchant, Mr Thomas Bowyear, to wait on Your Majesty, whom I pray Your 
Majesty to receive courteously, who if it pleases to permit him will make a small 
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present to Your Majesty’s acceptance, and proposals on behalf of the noble English 
Company for a future commerce.’677 This letter presented both the English respect for 
the King of Cochin-China, their desire to trade with this kingdom if possible, and the 
role of Bowyear as a leading trader to contact with Cochin-China. However, in the 
instructions to Bowyear, Madras stated that he could ‘make and receive proposals’ but 
could not make any contract with the King of Cochin-China.678 It meant that Madras 
continued to consider what Cochin-China’s possible functions might be in the regional 
commercial chain and ensured that Bowyear had little power or autonomy. They, 
therefore, stated that Bowyear’s job was only involved in fact-finding rather than 
enacting negotiations with the local Court. 
The Governor of Madras required Bowyear to ‘make a list of the sorts, 
quantities, and prices of commodities bought and sold’ in Cochin-China.679 He noted 
seven specific privileges which the Company was allowed in other markets and hoped 
to gain in Cochin-China:  
1. A piece of ground to build a factory in ye most convenient place; 2. The 
English cheif to have power of judging all matters wherein English men are 
concerned either wth English or natives; 3. Collies & other to serve ye English 
paying them at ye same rate as ye natives pay & to be purnished by ye English 
cheif where guilty of a fault; 4. Freedom of custom for all goods exported or 
imported; 5. A convenient place for building a dock wherein our ships may be 
laid ashore & repaired or new ships built either in ye river ot on some idland; 6. 
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Ships cast away by stome or other accident on any part of ye coast of Cochin-
China not to be forfeired or seizedbut ye Kings subjects to assist in saving & 
securing ship men & goods & all to be delivered to ye English ffactory; 7. All 
goods belonging to ye English ffactory to pass from the ffactory into ye land & 
from ye land to their ffactory free of custom having ye Chop of ye English chief 
& they & their servnt to travell to free & safe without molestation. 680 
 
The privileges included places for a factory and dock, advantageous conditions 
for free trade, labour, and even issues related to law and native’s power, transportation, 
the support from the native government. With such specific orders, Madras showed its 
serious consideration of trade with Cochin-China and its desire to settle a factory in the 
area. Madras’s requirements were part of Bowyear’s proposal to the King on 27 
December 1695. In that proposal, Bowyear tried to obtain trading privileges for the 
English in the issues of tax, a place to build a factory, right to trade in the whole 
kingdom or take part in the regional trading system. Firstly, he suggested less tax for the 
English ships that arrived in Cochin-China, a place to build a factory and the ability to 
trade with Cochin-China’s neighbours.681 The tax was 500 taels silver for all English 
ships which arrived in Cochin-China to trade while including 200 taels for others which 
touched in at Cochin-China for more cargo or refreshment on the way to China. 
Secondly, he desired two places to build a factory, Foy Foe (Faifo or Hoi An), the most 
famous trading port of Cochin-China and Sinoa, the capital (now Hue province). As in 
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Tonkin, the English focused on a location near to foreign merchants and the capital. 
Thirdly, he not only focused on trade with Southern Vietnam but also considered this 
kingdom as one part of the regional system. Therefore, one of the exciting points of the 
Madras’ trading proposal in Cochin-China was the desire to create a trading network or 
‘country trade’ as they asked for a Royal Chop of free trade with Champa, Cambodia 
and Siam. 682 Although political relations between Cochin-China and those countries 
were bad, the trade, especially private business, still worked, and it was an excellent 
opportunity for the English to be involved in the regional trade in the Gulf of Siam to 
make a counterweight to the Dutch in Batavia.  
 Alongside proposing the English desire for trade in Cochin-China, Bowyear 
demonstrated his influence and role in the mission by discovering fundamental data 
about the trading potential of Cochin-China, including information about commodities 
and trading networks. He exploited his time to travel and find all prospective ports and 
markets in the kingdom, such as Faifo (Hoi An), the capital Hue and the river system 
before confirming its potential with Madras. As a result, Bowyear had useful knowledge 
about the types of Cochin-Chinese products. Like in Tonkin, Cochin-China had many 
luxury commodities which were suitable for the regional trade such as wood 
(callamback, agula), jagary, bird’s nests, pepper, cotton, and gold and other products for 
Europe as raw and wrought silks and sugar.683  
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Furthermore, during his time in Cochin-China, Bowyear contacted the Prince of 
Champa and the Cambodian ambassador, who warmly welcomed the English to create a 
trading relationship with their kingdoms.684 Those meetings, although short, provided 
the English with more information and the opportunity to trade in the regional system. 
Bowyear also discovered the trading relationship between Cochin-China and Canton 
(Chinese port), which provided silk, porcelain, and medicinal materials. At the same 
time, other countries provided opportunities for trade in other commodities: Cambodia 
for local woods and skins; Siam for local woods, tin, lead and rice; together with 
Batavia for pepper and Manila for silver.685 At least ten or twelve junks were arriving in 
Southern Vietnam from China, Japan, Siam, Cambodia, Manila and Batavia annually.686 
Importantly, Bowyear recognised the influence of a considerable community of Chinese 
people in Hoi An, the famous port of Cochin-China, where there were more than one 
hundred families to conduct the trade among China, Cochin-China and Japan.687 Since 
the Chinese political situation was still erratic and negatively affected the EIC’s direct 
trade with mainland China, the appearance of Chinese traders in Southern Vietnam was 
important as an optional solution to contact China. Especially from the Madras 
Council’s perspective, the Chinese expansion in the South China Sea was a bridge to 
link Southeast Asian countries, and it was helpful for the English country trade. With 
that information, Cochin-China was considered as a suitable port in the South China Sea 
to collect Chinese and Asian commodities. The wealth of Cochin-Chinese products and 
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its link with other countries in the area was a potential for Madras’ private traders in the 
system of ‘country trade’, which they ran in both India and the Malay islands.688 
 By performing a trading experiment with both the Court and merchants in 
Cochin-China, Bowyear again confirmed his role in providing knowledge about the 
trading possibility of this kingdom. However, although Bowyear praised the trading 
potential of Cochin-China, the commercial results of the trial were not as valuable as 
those of the diplomacy. The King was the first customer of the English, and he had 
some special orders. Just as in Tonkin, the King of Cochin-China wanted 1400 taels 
silver in the English bullion, and he paid gold for goods at a high rate.689 Except for 
standard products, English people were asked to supply guns and cannons as samples in 
the capital, as a requirement for approval of their commercial proposal. The Cochin-
Chinese demand for armed-trade was larger and more serious than Tonkin, as this 
kingdom conflicted with both Siam and Cambodia, and was in a tense relationship with 
Northern Vietnam. It was a big chance for Madras’s private traders to maintain relations 
with Cochin-China in the ‘country trade’ system, but unfortunately, there was no 
trading activities between Madras and Cochin-China in line with Bowyear’s suggestion. 
Significantly, Cochin-China’s climate meant that it issued no orders for English cloth or 
even Indian textile products. Only Indian redwood and brimstone met local demand.690 
The trading experiment of Bowyear showed that just as in Tonkin, trade with Cochin-
China would not benefit from exporting English or Indian goods there, but from 
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collecting local products and transferring in the intra-Asian trade. Cochin-China’s role 
thus was an intermediary or trading market to help the English to collect all kinds of 
East Asian commodities as Tonkin had played in the 1670s and 1680s. 
The knowledge that the English obtained from the mission had unexpected 
results in issues related to national security. Bowyear asked Cochin-China to judge ‘all 
matters wherein Englishmen are concerned, either with English or natives’, and he also 
asked that no native Mandarins or other people could enter the English factory in a 
violent manner for any reason.691 These requirements reflect the wishes and ambitions 
of the Madras Council as they wanted (as in other places) to build a ‘separate area’ or a 
fortification for the English to live and work.692 The English also desired to have special 
privileges at the Cochin-China border and required that the local government would not 
interfere in English issues. In other words,it was the English ambition to own their 
territory in Southern Vietnam. On the one side, Madras Council worried about the 
difficulties from local Mandarins, and they tried to limit their influence towards the 
English job and secure the commerce smoothly. They wished that English merchants in 
Cochin-China be treated in the same way as in Madras, where the Company built a 
fortification and the English could enact free trade after paying regular tax and 
promising local government necessary support. On the other side, there was a 
requirement for a ‘diplomatic area’ or a small colony, where the English applied their 
law, trade, relations in their own way. That order not only reflected Madras’ demands 
and opinions about the free trade in Cochin-China, but it also showed the English 
change in their treatment of Asian countries.  
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The EIC began asking for more privileges, which amounted to territorial control 
or at least autonomy. Generally, this change was from the 1680s under the power of Sir 
Josiah Child, the EIC’s Director, as he believed that the English would work well with 
territories independent from local rulers.693 Such demands had previously been made in 
Cochin-China and Tonkin but had largely been denied as the Confucianist states 
claimed that everyone and everything in the kingdom belonged to the King. As in 
Tonkin, Cochin-China welcomed foreigners but still managed them with the key aim of 
securing their own national territory, especially when this kingdom was at war with its 
neighbours. The demands of national security did not allow the King and his Mandarins 
to offer the English or any foreigners such powerful privileges in the kingdom. 
Accordingly, it was hard for the English to gain any special permissions related to the 
territorial issue. All provisions related to those requirements were not mentioned in any 
future conversations between the King, his Mandarins and the English, while all clauses 
related to free trade were allowed quickly and satisfactorily. Cochin-China’s refusal to 
give territorial privileges was an essential lesson for the English in their attempts to 
connect with Confucian countries. As a result, they looked elsewhere to establish 
fortifications in subsequent years, such as Pulo-Condore island. 
 
The English factory in Pulo-Condore island 
 
 With relative successful results in diplomacy and trading experimentation, at the 
end of this voyage, Bowyear strongly recommended creating a factory in Southern 
Vietnam to link India and East Asia. Unfortunately, since the EIC’s main policy in this 
                                                             




period was to focus on China and Chinese commodities, the potential of Cochin-China 
could not persuade the Madras Council as it provided little or even no strategic trade 
products as silks, and there was no Cochin-Chinese formal confirmation about the 
establishment of English factory in Hoian. 694  Madras, thus, did not mention the 
establishment of a factory in this kingdom. However, it still tried to exploit this 
kingdom until the early eighteenth century by sending ships to Pulo-Condore island 
which was under the control of the New EIC in the period 1702-1705 before calling at 
China.695 Nevertheless, knowledge from Bowyear’s mission to Cochin-China became 
essential for the New EIC as it considered another place to establish a factory to replace 
the unsuccessful branch in Chusan (China). That the New EIC attempted to build a 
factory in Pulo-Condore in Cochin-China between 1702 and 1705 to control the South 
China Sea by force shows that the New EIC was not only resorting to the suggestion 
that agents in Bantam had made in the 1620s but simultaneously demonstrated that the 
Company was moving on to another period in its history. The time of colony also 
changed its behaviour towards Vietnam.696  Creating a fortification and a factory in 
Vietnam together with other fortifications and colonies in Surat, Jaiour, Madurai, St 
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Helena, Tevenapatam, Cuddalore (south of Madras), Anjengo (Kerala), Bengkulu 
(Sumatra), Calcutta (Bengal) therefore, was a turning point in the EIC’s strategy in 
Asia.697 From then until 1858, the EIC only considered Vietnam, especially Cochin-
China as a military and political target, not a trading market.698 Due to the failure of 
Pulo-Condore, the English connected with Vietnam solely through formal embassies, 
and their key goals were to settle a formal relationship with groups who took power in 
Vietnam for more than one and a half-centuries. 
The English attempt to acquire Pulo-Condore island was under the role of the 
New EIC, and it was evidence of the EIC’s changing stance towards Vietnam. The 
island was an unsuitable place to settle a trading factory but was significant in 
navigating the South China Sea.699 Dampier in 1688 wrote that ‘this island lie very 
commodiously in the way to and from Japan, China, Manila, Tunquin, Cochin-China, 
and in general all this most easterly coast of the Indian continent; whether you go 
through the Straights of Malacca, or the Straights of Sunda, between Sumatra and Java, 
or other parts of the East-Indies…’.700 He also said that ‘forts might be built to secure a 
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factory, particularly at the harbour, which is capable of being well fortified.’701 His clear 
judgment about the strategic position of Condore to control all sea routes in the South 
China Sea, and from this sea to the Indian Ocean, affected Allen Catchpoole, the 
English president of the New Company in Chusan (China). As the Chusan factory faced 
difficulties from the local government, Pulo Condore was chosen as its successor to 
maintain the New EIC’s expectation of controlling the regional sea routes. 702 
Catchpoole reported to London that ‘its [Pulo Condore] situation is far better than this 
[Chusan] or any other port of China to settle upon in respect of all the coast in India, 
because it will be an intercepting port, to and from China and Japan, will much lessen 
the growth and power of the Dutch in all parts of India within a very few years’.703 As 
such, a factory with a fortification in Pulo Condore was the best means to help the 
English control the sea routes via the South China Sea and undermine the position of 
the Dutch there.  
The EIC, thus, sent twenty seamen, including officers, artisans and carpenters to 
Pulo Condore in 1702. Regarding the role of the island as a new Batavia, more officers, 
soldiers and workers were quickly ordered to be sent out from England to build a 
factory.704 A Council was created in mid-1702 with Captain Peter Sherstone, Daniel 
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Doughty, Joshua Helder, John Newbold and Nathaniel Heyfield. The Chusan factory 
closed and all the Company’s factors there move to Cochin-China on 25 July 1703. 
Besides those men, Catchpoole hired sixteen Macassar to work as soldiers and builders 
on the island, since he believed that at least one hundred soldiers were compulsory to 
secure the safety of the factory there. Commander Thomas Rashell was also advised to 
invite all natives and merchants to live in the English garrison and protect them.705 The 
Old Company supported this fortification by calling ships at Pulo-Condore on the way 
from India to China in 1703.706  
As such, the English used workers and soldiers to build a factory and a 
fortification in Pulo-Condore without the allowance of local government. However, to 
create an alliance with foreigners during the progress of conflicts with Cambodia and 
Champa, and to find military and financial supplies, Nguyen Lords tried to make a 
peaceful relationship with the English. Knowing about the appearance of English people 
in Pulo-Condore, the Lord Nguyen Phuc Chu sent a letter to show his desire for 
cooperation and friendship.707 He also sent the English some gifts and asked the English 
for a delegation in the Cochin-Chinese Court and for help with defending against pirates 
and in return for the allowing the English to trade, and have a regular relationship with 
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local government.708 The English, however, underestimated the power of Cochin-China; 
and they were too confident in their army and weapons. They ignored Nguyen Lord’ 
requirements about the peaceful diplomacy and the respect towards the Cochin-Chinese 
national security. No member of the English Council in Pulo-Condore appeared to meet 
the Cochin-Chinese requirement. This response showed the difference in behaviour 
towards local government between the previous English in Vietnam in the seventeenth 
century and the New Company. While all English merchants had recognised that it was 
compulsory to present and send Royal Letters and gifts to Trinh Lords in Tonkin and 
Nguyen Lords in Cochin-China, the New Company did not follow this system. They 
were confident in their military power and ignored the desire of Cochin-China for free 
trade and diplomacy. It meant that the English ignored their previous experience with 
diplomacy and understanding of the power in Vietnam. Consequently, as the Nguyen 
Lord considered the connection between the English and Cambodians in 1705, he 
decided to attack the English and massacred English men ostensibly to protect the 
national security of Southern Vietnam.709 
The Pulo-Condore fortification ended all the English attempts to contact 
Vietnam by free trade and diplomacy and pointed to a new period of the EIC’s strategy 
towards this country and East Asia in general. The Company only re-considered the role 
of Vietnam in the late eighteenth century, when the French fiercely intervened into 
Southeast Asia and threatened the English position there. Pulo-Condore thus was a 
turning point in the history of the relationship between the EIC and Vietnam, from early 
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peaceful trade to political consideration. The failure of military action also directly 
affected the EIC’s decision to only send embassies to Vietnam in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Broadly, what the EIC performed in Vietnam was representative of 




The English mission to Cochin-China in the 1690s was a remarkable example of the 
English attempts to find a new means to expand the trade and position in East Asia from 
the perspective of overseas factors and factories. While the previous English activities 
in East Asia focused on trading experimentation, Madras started to look to Cochin-
China and East Asian countries more broadly, recognising the importance of 
establishing a formal relationship. Instead of creating a factory immediately, the English 
considered Cochin-China among other options and operated an official mission to have 
detailed information about this kingdom before making a final decision to trade or settle 
a relationship. During this process, overseas factors such as Higginson and Bowyear 
still played the critical role as they recognised what needed to be discovered in Cochin-
China, how to treat with the native government. Beyond the role of factors in the trading 
company, their job illustrated the way the EIC changed from a trading factory to a semi-
government in the eighteenth century with both tradings, political and diplomatic 
missions. 
 Through the mission, the EIC gained more knowledge about the potential of 
Cochin-China indicating that this kingdom was important in the South China Sea, but 




Bowyear’s reports showed that this kingdom was rich in both natural and manufactured 
commodities, but they were not ones that drew the EIC’s attention. From the late 1680s, 
the EIC mostly focused on the direct trade with China and the product in which it was 
most interested was silk. This policy was encouraged after China opened the country to 
foreign trade in late 1684. Therefore, the role of intermediary sites such as Siam, 
Taiwan, Tonkin was less important as English ships began to call directly at Canton, 
Amoy and other Chinese ports. Although Madras kept the ‘country trade’ system for 
private trade and considered Cochin-China as a part of this network, it still paid more 
attention to mainland China as the most significant market. Madras’ decision to stop 
considering to settle a factory in Cochin-China, therefore, showed the strong change of 
the EIC’s policy towards East Asia. Instead of establishing factories in intermediary 
sites in the South China Sea, the EIC built a factory in Chusan (China) in 1700 to direct 
dealing with the Chinese government. The presence of English people in Pulo-Condore 
island (Southern Vietnam) in the next century of the New Company, thus, was not the 
EIC’s trading attempt, but the English extremely new idea to declaim and confirm their 
power in East Asia, which started a new period of the EIC’s history, the time of colony. 
However, the failure of the New EIC in Pulo-Condore demonstrated how the EIC faced 
problems in East Asia as it ignored the previous lessons about peaceful diplomacy and 
believed too much on their military power. This failure thus caused the entire change of 
the EIC’s relationship with Vietnam in the late eighteenth century, sending diplomatic 









Through the case of Vietnam, the thesis examines the roles of small factories and the 
seventeenth century in the EIC history and its learning process to improve and become 
the most powerful organisation in the eighteenth century. In terms of the learning 
process, the connections between English servants and Vietnamese people examines 
two main arguments about the roles of individuals (English servants and Vietnamese 
informants) and of Vietnam in the EIC expansion and influence in East Asia. In detail, 
the thesis shows that individuals provided the EIC with lessons about diplomacy, trade 
and the place of Vietnam in the regional trading network.  
 How to treat the native King and Mandarins was one of the first lessons learned 
by the EIC in dealing with both Tonkin and Cochin-China in the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries. Importantly, the EIC also achieved broader lessons about engaging 
with existing power structures in the countries they wanted to gain access to. Generally, 
establishing a relationship with the local government was the primary job of the EIC in 
all overseas countries. The difference was that Vietnam, particularly Tonkin followed a 
defensive policy towards foreigners, and it required a patient approach to gain access. 
The English learned throughout the century with both successful and failed 
experimentations, and with different subjects in Tonkin and Cochin-China. If English 
factors were important to learn and understand the nature of diplomacy in Vietnam, 
local officials were key suppliers through their connecting with the English. During that 
process, the English learned more about a type and quantity of gifts and the value of 
diplomacy. However, they also learned a vital lesson with the failure of the military 




relatively successful results from diplomacy with both Tonkin and Cochin-China and 
the failure of their military action in 1702-1705 the EIC came to prefer the ‘embassy’ to 
trading voyages in connecting with Vietnam and broadly East Asia in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The EIC learnt to recognise the role of diplomacy and gifts 
towards the Confucian countries through the case of Vietnam.  
 Vietnamese officials not only supplied diplomatic lessons, they and local 
merchants provided the EIC with knowledge about trading in both Tonkin and Cochin-
China in the seventeenth century with issues of commodities, trading chain, 
competitions, and customers. From the early days of the relationship with Vietnam, the 
English held the necessary basic information about this market and its availability in the 
East Asian trade, and about the intense competition from local and regional merchants 
to develop a trading relationship in the region. However, for much of the seventeenth 
century, that knowledge was insufficient for the EIC seriously to consider settling a 
factory or creating a formal relationship with Vietnam, as the Company wanted to focus 
on India and the Spice Islands. The EIC’s experience of trade in Vietnam is only 
remarkable in the late seventeenth century as they began to pay more attention to East 
Asia and the need for intermediaries for gaining access to the key markets of Japan and 
China. Daily trading lessons were about how to deal with local merchants, how to 
improve native products to satisfy the demand of Europe and how to compete with the 
Dutch and Chinese to gather more goods.  
On the macro level, the experience the EIC gained was about commodities (what 
to buy, customers’ demands, and issues of quantity, quality and type of goods) in which 
the EIC identified silks (including native and Chinese products) as the main subject of 




In trying to develop this trade of collecting silk from Tonkin, the EIC also learnt a series 
of lessons about investment, shipping and exchanged goods. More importantly, 
throughout the seventeenth century, the EIC gradually increased its understanding about 
the regional trade network and the role Vietnam or other factories played in that system 
in the EIC’s commercial strategy in East Asia.  
In the 1610s, the English overseas factors’ attempts to expand the EIC’s trade 
highlighted the importance of the existing trade system for the EIC’s position and future 
in the area and as a link between peripheral and key markets. Through experimentation 
of both the Court of Directors and the Tonkin factory in the 1670s, the EIC recognised 
more about the interrelationship between a small market of Tonkin and key markets of 
China and Japan in particular periods, and how the system provided capital for the 
EIC’s trade in East Asia with the flow of goods and silver. English overseas individuals 
recognised the value of both Tonkin and Cochin-China in the connections with Japan, 
China, and other countries in the South China Sea in which their role as intermediaries 
and partly markets to collect Asian commodities. Although the EIC had no direct 
connection with mainland China, its trade in East Asia still survived and developed due 
to the role of supplementary markets or broadly the existing regional trade network. 
However, the role of this trading network was only valuable in the seventeenth century 
as the EIC had limited connection with mainland China and insufficient knowledge 
about trade in East Asia. The English acknowledged the limitation of this system in 
creating global trade, and they gradually removed their dependence on small factories to 
focus much more on large markets in the massive trading system, or the transoceanic 
trade in the late seventeenth century. Meanwhile, those small markets had limited 




crisis. These factors caused the EIC’s changes in policy towards those countries from 
the last decade of the seventeenth century. When China, the main target of the EIC in 
Asia outside India, opened the country for foreigners in 1684, supplementary countries 
in the China Sea came to be considered important only as military and political stations, 
and the EIC therefore only saw a need for a few of them with strategic locations as a 
part of the EIC’s system in East Asia. Interestingly, the EIC’s presence in Vietnam 
demonstrates exactly this change in EIC strategy. Initially, the EIC viewed it as a small 
region with a significant role as an intermediary in the seventeenth century and came to 
consider its purpose in its political strategy in East Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. It meant that Vietnam and other small markets in the South China Sea 
contributed economic value in the seventeenth century and held military and political 
function in the next centuries, in the EIC’s view. 
 Alongside giving contribution about the role of individuals and Vietnam in the 
EIC position in Asia, the thesis also illustrates the importance of the seventeenth 
century in the EIC history. That was a background period with experimentations which 
helped the Company to improve in management and structure. In personnel 
management, the thesis demonstrates that the EIC’s policy of using skilled men in 
transoceanic areas afforded both positive and negative results for the company. English 
factors worked day-by-day in distant regions collecting and transferring knowledge, and 
directly driving the EIC’s trade. Throughout the seventeenth century, their contribution 
to the EIC-Vietnamese connection gradually improved and the EIC became increasingly 
dependent on far-flung servants to expand and secure their position in Asia. If in the 
early seventeenth century, with the limitations of capital and military, the EIC’s use of 




policy in the later period since those factors showed their ingenuity and satisfied the 
EIC’s requirements of gathering information of overseas trade, creating relationships, 
and running the trade. English overseas individuals became pioneers, finding new 
chances for the EIC to improve its trade in East Asia. The story of Richard Cock, 
William Adams and John Saris in Japan and Vietnam in the 1610s; Quarles Browne, 
Samuel Baron, William Gyfford, William Keeling in the 1660s and 1670s in Tonkin; 
and Thomas Bowyear in 1690s in Cochin-China provides strong evidence of the critical 
roles played by distant English staff. Through connecting to and consulting with 
Vietnamese individuals, such staff were increasingly able to provide more detailed 
information on trading choices, drove the trade directly, and then actively considered 
those areas from different perspectives. Such individuals offered crucial contributions, 
ensuring the success or failure of the English trading in the long-distant regions. Tonkin 
and Cochin-China, therefore, provide an essential example of the EIC’s policy of using 
experienced staff and their position in the Company’s enlargement in East Asia in the 
seventeenth century. 
 However, the thesis also mentions that the EIC management in the seventeenth 
century was imperfect as the Company was still unstable with involvement of different 
groups of merchants in London. The EIC’s policy of using and depending on 
individuals was not perfect, and the problems brought about by failure to control 
overseas individuals was among one of the important lessons the EIC obtained via the 
case of Vietnam. Although distant factors informed London of useful information, not 
all of the knowledge was valuable due to the varying levels of ability of the factors to 
evaluate, or personal investment in failing to reveal the full situation. In the 1610s, 




overseas staff and preferred the Company’s staff to decide all issues related to trade in 
Japan and East Asia which indirectly affected the results of the EIC’s trade with 
Vietnam. This lesson changed in the 1660s as London required various suggestions 
from different sources and finally decided to settle a factory in Tonkin with the advice 
of a free trader, S. Baron. Nevertheless, the problem of self-factor in overseas areas was 
still serious during the progress to drive distant branches as ‘select individuals’ tried to 
exploit their power for illegal cooperation. If W. Gyfford presented the shape of a 
Company’s man (but with unlucky plans), W. Keeling showed the problems of overseas 
factors who created their own power and might put their own vested interests beyond 
those of the Company thereby taking risks for the Company. London’s dependence on 
overseas factors and their illegal trade or cooperation with local people in the long-
distance areas meant that the EIC faced significant problems in managing both 
personnel and factories in overseas areas. This study about the English presence in 
Vietnam in the seventeenth century, therefore, provides supportive research about the 
EIC’s administration or principal managerial issues. The study argues that it was hard 
and even impossible for London to control both transoceanic servants and branches, 
directly and satisfactorily, due to the characters of timing, transportation, and distance 
of overseas trade and the behind-the-scenes relations of their servants. The EIC failed in 
Japan and Tonkin for many reasons, but one of them was from the negative effect of the 
actions of overseas factors who misunderstood the nature of trade, manipulated their 
power for illegal cooperation and private trade, and damaged the Company’s profits.  
  Based on the connections between the EIC and Vietnam in the environment of 
the East Asian trading system, the thesis challenges the model centre-periphery and 




role of Vietnam or small factories in the EIC history in the seventeenth century. Within 
the EIC structure, the Tonkin factory was only ever on the periphery while London and 
Bantam and later Madras formed at times conflicting cores. In term of the EIC’s trading 
strategy, Vietnam was a peripherial market and trading point in a region where Japan 
and China were the cores.  
 In the first group, London was central, in theory, in the network of all the EIC’s 
overseas factories; and its decision was primary in determining the actions of all 
Company’s branches. However, through the case of Tonkin, the research discloses that 
there were always at least two centres in the Company’s structure, London and distant 
agencies such as in Bantam and Madras and even Bantam was often beyond the control 
of London. It has shown that the core London greatly depended on outlying factors and 
the EIC’s agencies were beyond the control of London, and they had own power to 
decide issues of employees and trade which from then affected smaller branches. 
London in fact, had little control over small branches like Tonkin as it was under the 
power of regional headquarters, Bantam, especially before 1682. The struggle between 
London and the Bantam Council thus not only illustrated the EIC’s attempts to control 
oceanic factories in Tonkin, East Asia or Asia broadly, but also demonstrated the inside 
infighting of the EIC’s stockholders in London, and between London and distant areas. 
Moreover, the role of English staff in Bantam or even the Tonkin factory was crucial 
towards the EIC during its expansion in the seventeenth century, and the EIC depended 
on overseas factors due to its policy of using experienced men, as they provided useful 
information and knowledge about distant areas, helped the EIC to make a trading 
decision, and drove the trade directly. The complexity in the relationship between 




challenges the role of centre and argues the importance of supplemental factories in the 
EIC overseas network.  
 This view is also considered in the second connection between Tonkin/Cochin-
China and Japan/China, as surrounding and middle points in the EIC’s commercial 
strategy in East Asia, or about the role of Vietnam and other small factories in the 
Company’s factory system in East Asia broadly. There is no doubt that besides the 
Spice Islands, China and Japan were the main EIC markets in East Asia in the 
seventeenth century, and the English target was to discover an effective route to 
mainland China and Japan. From the perspective of the core factor, the appearance of 
Tonkin and Cochin-China together with other small branches in Siam, Cambodia and 
Taiwan was to serve the key objective. Accordingly, this conception ignored the role of 
small factories. By contrast, the thesis challenges accepted ideas about the role of 
intermediaries in both regional and transoceanic trade. It is interesting that, in the EIC’s 
commercial strategy, those factories were always mentioned together with leading 
markets. Remarkably, the EIC sought to maintain the Tonkin factory a few times, 
although its trade was bad, and it had little potential. The main reason which is 
discussed is Vietnam’s strategic geography, its possibility of connecting with mainland 
China and Japan and generally, its role in the regional trade and broadly, and its 
function as an intermediary to connect with a leading market. The Company never 
succeeded in trading directly with Japan and China in the seventeenth century, except 
for the short-lived Hirado factory in the 1610s. They were denied residence and trading 
rights in Japan in the late century, while their direct trade with China only started from 
around 1685 with difficulty and dynamically changed and developed in the mid-




in the regional trading network to help English merchants to connect to the key markets 
indirectly. The case of Vietnam thus indicates that in the seventeenth century, the 
English needed small factories to connect indirectly with potential markets and those 
supportive places created the EIC trading system in East Asia and provided the EIC 

























Appendix 1.1. Letter of the EIC to the Great and Mighty King of Tonqueen with 
wishes of a long life upon this earth and victory over his enemies 
 
IOR/E/3/33, East India Company Original Correspondence 1672-73, No. 3643 
 
Ye: yo Maho shouath to ye Dutch Portuguese things & all other stranger dealing with 
Mater Dommions is att all the world and the Kingdom of Tonqueen is also therefore 
happy yt ye Heaven have given them such as our Great King of England hath given 
order to ye Honble Compas: to request ye the English nation may be accepted us and 
confident as people of ye Mater Honor and that they may thou live and freely trade & 
therefore our dealing in the Ally of the King of Bantam with this letter in the name of 
the English Compas: to Cap Wmr Gifford wee comended him to ye Mater favour and good 
with and that your Mater may be phased wee have charged our Capt to acquainted ye 
Mater with our request our intention is good and upright, secure ye Mater wt we may and 






Appendix 1.2. Letter of the EIC to the Great & Mighty Prince of Toncquin wth 
wishes of a long life upon earth & victories over his enemies 
 
IOR/E/3/33, East India Company Original Correspondence 1672-73, No. 3644 
 
The whole world esteems ye Kingdom of Toncquin happy because ye King of Heaven 
hath given yo Highness yt Comand & Government wth now enjoy. We know yt strangers 
trading wthin yt territories of yo Highness freely trade & safely rest under ye shadon of 
your Highness at Toncquin, ye freedom subject who have their happy being under ye 




enemies of yo Highness though never soe stubborn were never soe potent as to resist ye 
Power. The greatness of yo Highness actings are fully known to ye Great King of 
England, & therefore have od Honor Compas given order to ye English governor willing 
in ye cities of ye King of Bantam for to send their Cap Wm Gyfford wth this letter, & wth 
their presents to attend yo Highness. What we request & desire of yo Highness is ye od 
people may have ye freedom to trade wthin ye bound of yo Highness dominions wthout 
disturbance or molestation ye soe there may be ye truth of friendship between ye King of 
Toncquin & od English nation, our Cap will mae yo Highness acquaints wth od true 
intentions, but seeing he is a stranger to yo Highness, we beg yo Highness favour both 
for him & for all od other people. We pray Heaven for yo Highness long life ye yo 






Appendix 1.3. Letter from Nathaniel Higginson to the King of Cochin-China, 
dated Fort St. George, 2nd May 1695 
 
IOR/G/40/18, Factory records: Miscellaneous 1695- 1697, pp. 1-2. 
 
To ye most illustrious & Mighty Prince, the King of Cochin-China, Nat. Higginson, Esq, 
ye President for ye English nation on ye coast of Cormandell, Bay of Bengall, Summatra 
& South Seas, wishesh health & happiness, & a long & prosperous reign. 
May it please your Majesty. 
Whilst your ancestor frbid other nations to visit their Kingdoms, their lustre was 
confined with their own bounds but since your Majesty has permitted & invited them to 
trade in your ports ye fame of your Majesty greatness, power of justice shines like the 
sun throughout ye world. God made ye Heaven for ye throne of his glory, and ye earth 
for ye habitation & use of mankind & hath divided it among a  few whose greater 
wisdom & valour renders them fit to govern men your Majesty is one of those to whom 




fruitful nature with variety of good things convenient for ye little of man in grater store 
than is necessary for ye maintenance of your own people soe hath God given other good 
things  to other countries & hath not given all to any part of ye earth but hath by his 
Providence ordered ye one Country shall communicate to another & that by a friendly 
exchange each part of ye world enjoys ye benefit & choice of all. 
In confidence of your Royall goodness & justice I have sent my mercht mr Thomas 
Bowyear to wait on your Majesty whom I pray your Majesty to receive courteously who 
if please to permitt him will make a small present to your Majesty’s acceptance & 
proposals in behalf of ye Noble English Company for a future commerce at present not 
understanding ye trade of ye country have sent but a small ship & a small stocke for a 
tryall & I pray your Majesty permitt him to sell his goods & buy such commodities as ye 
place affords & give him leave to return in due time the next year I shall send more as 
your Majesty shall give encouragement. 
I have heard a report that Mr Lemuell Blackmore belonging ye English factory at 
Tonqueen was cast away on ye coast of Cochin-China & that your Majesty used him 
civilly & gave him free passage to Tonqueen for which favour I return your Majesty my 
humble thanks & beg this further favour that your Majesty will assist Mr Bowyear in 
sending my letters to my factories at Tonqueen whom I sent two years ago wish a ship 
& heard nothing them since but there is a report that ye King of Tonqueen detain my 
ship. 
It is well known to all parts of India where ye English have traded what they deal justly 
Y live peaceably with all men not seeking to conquer Kingdoms but carry on his trade 
only to ye great benefit of ye country where they trade. 












Appendix 2.1. Translate of ye King of Cochin-China letter sent to English govern 
of ye city of Madras in India ended into Latin from ye Chinese character 
 
IOR/G/40/18, Factory records: Miscellaneous 1695- 1697, pp. 21-22 
 
The King of ye Kingdom of Aynam returned this answer to ye English govern in India 
with of ye present of ye King 
Our holy Book tays ye tear of Heaven presents Kingdom & ye heart of a ….wiseman 
carry in itself ye right …of gaining ye friendship & procuring league with ye heigh 
turning to we now there any business so difficult for a man of a tough judgment and 
who earnestly endeavour at piety will attractive ye goodness & ye lightness of its & a 
may be said to ye King.  
Supreme Government & Princely Councillor who represent ye Chief Person of ye …. 
which receive its name from ye northern having over it. The English who preferring 
understand whatsoever is contained in ye book of ye Heart of ye three nation to called 
among us & containing whole on countries who have ye strength & courage of ye Bear 
& ye Pigre & ye Panther who ….. the military art and the mathematics & perfectly 
understand not only ye Heaven but also land ye winds ye clouds & any region whose 
understanding hatches ye Sun & whose hand are able to sustain ye firmament who are 
to very careful in choosing government & ruling their subject in ye …of their people in 
jurying amour to great & worthy wee in kindness to Homeness who manage themselves 
regularly in those after nine rules of Government and although ye distance from a kinds 
our …… ye our mind are never separated from you in attention & ..not many month are 
came whom. 
The supreme government & Councillor sent on monose out & who was Capt of a ship & 
called Bowyear who brought into this our kingdom a Pacquett of letter with gifts & 
presents which was appear favour the behaviour ye fidelity & truly solid justice of ye 
Deputy not mark of fan interiors lesson. 
Now wee returne you an answer to those letter with them and some present to The 
supreme government & Mightly Councilour as big as mall memorial of out attention as 
to what reply to ye merchandised brought in ye ship rereferred them ministers to be 




not true to drany thing clandestinely as to ye try all rely ye ship & hat we were to 
receive other things of ye …ye seaport & opportunity if this now path lutif ye ship 
return this next year wee will grant them all thing & introduce an method of the making 
use of ye riches ye are under heaven we may give of all nation both of ye northern & 
southern Chine this we send some offering: Clamback: one Europe pound, Gold: 10 of 
ye ame pound, Silk: 30 pound, Wood of a fine quantity 200 peiculs 
Dated ye 12th day of ye 12th month of ye 16 year Chinese Wch happens only 16 day of 







Appendix 2.2. The King of Cochin-China gives this answer to the Great General in 
Pulo Condore his letter, and to those of his Council 
 
IOR/H/628: Miscellaneous collection of firmans and treaties 1602-1753, pp. 469-479. 
 
It is written in one of the classic books - whereas the Heaven has created all people, 
without doubt it is careful and concerned about them – Upon which account, it is 
agreeable to reason, that King who in this respect act the part of Heaven, in the first 
place worship Heaven itself, and next love and embrace the people committed to their 
charge as their children. They ought also to measure other peoples’ bowels by their own 
heart within rule and establish their Kingdom without and embrace and cherish 
strangers – They are obliged likewise to look on the Kingdoms, Ho & Viet – altho’ at a 
great distance from one another as one House and Family. Moreover serve – themselves 
of people and things as of their Brothers and – companions. As for our part truly we are 
obedient on the one hand to the Commands of Heaven, and on the other we perpetuate 
the Government of Our ancestors. We largely make use of Royal rules to govern out 
subject; we penetrate into the methods of governing practised by former Kings, and we 
shew lenity and meekness towards strangers. When statutes are decreed with mature 




When Piety is not destitute and solitary, it has a great many neighbours. When Royal 
Bounties are not bestowed partially, the meaner sort daily increase and grow rich. 
 Some time ago we heard you gentlemen did sail to arrive at and settle upon the 
island Condore, which land indeed belongs to our Kingdom and jurisdiction; for thither 
– prows go and return, and there our affairs increase with our people that dwell these. 
You came all of sudden truly beyond our expectation; you have allotted large stations 
coming from your native Country without bringing any evidence of your honesty; you 
have entered another’ territories and shewed no civility by making of Presents. But we 
out of regard to piety and love, embracing the whole world countries so soon as he 
heard of your arrival was confirmed in the truth thereof; wherefore in obedience to his 
commands you sent Ambassadors hither to testify your fidelity. 
 Our complaint is against your uncivil and illegal behaviour, but don’t complain 
because you hant made presents, it Presents are not attended with civility why do we 
receive them? But seeing you have now settled yourselves there it only remain that the 
end answer the beginning, and that you don’t betray your honesty and fidelity; for 
although the customs in the southern and northern countries are different, yet there is 
one reason common to all the world. Consider ye and examine seriously and fear 
Heaven with all your heart and all your strength, and you will presently become as if we 
were surrounded by one wall.  
 Your letter also make mention, that there are a great many Pirates in these 
places, it is convenient therefore ye guard that country, by which means it will come to 
pass, that merchants may be without fear and both strangers and our people may get 
gains together and rejoice together. 
 Now if you have a desire to trade with us, to be outwardly furnished with arms 
to appose Robbers and inwardly to be apparelled with your cloaths and civility, there’s 
no reason why we should hinder you; but the examining of ships is the unalterable 
custom of our Kingdom; so that at this time the ships of all Kingdoms are as many in 
number as the stars, and all sorts of merchandise abounds as a running water. Follow 
therefore the old custom and conform your business thereto; for how can it be that we 
should permit any base thing to be done to you? Whereas if we shewed ourselves 
singular to you, we shall make the trust of other Kingdoms reposed in us of no effect, 
and without doubt suspected; for our commands are as regulated as the four reasons of 




 You are pleased to say in your letter, that upon another occasion when a ship 
comes you send richer presents. How can such sorts of things be precious to us? Would 
you know what it is we highly esteem? Upon goodness and piety we put a great value, 
friendship and love we reckon of great moment what regard can we have to pearls and 
rich silks, if honesty and respect be wanting? But seeing you are very expert in sea and 
military affairs, we are confident yell exert your teeth and hoofs against our enemies; 
and on this account you will do a considerable piece of service and worthy of you: and 
so long as you stay and trade in that island we freely forgive you the customs of the 
goods and tribute of the land, although the old inhabitants pay both; for providing you 
observe our laws, we do not value the usual ways of measuring out the ground, as well 
that we may assist your shipping at that we may increase your merchandise and riches. 
 Get everything in good order that you may come to Court yearly, whereby it will 
come to pass that we shall mutually as in the winter season cherish one another, and 
also increase our fidelity and friendship, which two blessings are so great that they can 
never be exhausted. 
 Now the wind is favourable, the sea calm, and the vessel desired to leave the 
port, and we have written this letter. Altho’ the Rivers be as a belt and altho’ the Hill be 
as a stone to rub ink upon; altho’ also the Sea be spacious and the Heaven high; 
nevertheless piety, concord, gratitude, and the remembrance of favors done shall never 
have an end. We send 5 pieces silk, 2 tans, 30 painted canes, 30 clouded ditto. 
 Dated the 24th of King Chinhoa the 20th day of 6th Moon anno Domini 1703 the 












Appendix 3.1. List of Tonkin’s chief factors 
 
William Gyfford 6/1672 - 6/1676 
Thomas James 7/1676 - 12/1681 
William Keeling 12/1681 - 8/1682 
William Hodges 8/1682 - 2/1683 
William Keeling 2/1683 - 9/1693 
Richard Watts 9/1693 - 11/1697 




Appendix 3.2. List of English factors in Tonkin (1672-1697) 
 
IOR/G/12/17/1-10, Tonkin factory (1672-1697); IOR/E/3/33, EIC Original 
Correspondence 1672-1673; IOR/L/AG/1/1/8, India Office records and Private papers 
(1678-1682), Personal account of William Keeling, f. 141; IOR/L/AG/1/1/9, (1682-
1694), Personal account of William Hodges, Lemuel Blackmore, ff. 140 (1), 520 (2). 
 
Period Name Job Time 
1672-
1676 
William Gyfford Chief 6/1672-6/1676 
Thomas James Second factor, accounting presents, 
servants wages, household stuff,  




reportation, and general stuff 
William Keeling  Writer, assistance of Mr Waite of 
the warehouse, and writing affairs 
Walter Tapping Writer, keeping account of diet 




Thomas James Chief 7/1676-12/1681 
William Keeling 2nd (temporary): Writing a diary 
2nd factor: Keeping storehouse 
7/1676-12/1678 
7/1679-12/1681 
Henry Ireton Writer, Keeping account  
Keeping charge of disbursement 
7/1676-7/1679 
7/1679-1682 
Robert Smith Assitant of writing 7/1676-? 
John Blunden 2nd factor 12/1678-7/1679 
George Tash  
John Styleman  
Keeping books, journal and 








Lemuel Blackmore Writer 
Writing and keeping warehouse 
10/1677-7/1679 
7/1679-1681 
1681-82 William Keeling Temporary chief 12/1681-8/1682 
 Henry Ireton 2nd factor 
George Tash Keeling’s assistant: keep books and 
journal registers 
Lemuel Blackmore 4th factor: help Tash and keep 






William Hodges Chief 8/1682 - 2/1683 
William Keeling 2nd factor: keep charge, 
disbursement 
8/1682 - 2/1683 
George Tash Keeping books 1682 - 1683 
Henry Ireton Keeping storehouse 1682- 10/1683 
Lemuel Blackmore Keeping account 1682 - 1685 
1683-93 William Keeling Chief 2/1683-9/1693 
Lemuel Blackmore Keeping account 
Second factor 
1683-1685 
1686 – 1693 
 George Tash Keeping books 1683-1684 
 William Hodges Second factor 1683-1686 
1693-97 Richard Watts Chief 9/1693-11/1697 
Richard Farmer 2nd factor: accounting and writing  
William Keeling ? 9/1693- 1/1695 
William Warren Kept account and expense  
Lemuel Blackmore ?  
Richard Hunt ?  














Appendix 4. The ‘River of Tonkin’ as depicted by the English 
 
British Library, London. This map is adapted from Hoang, Silk for silver, p. xxxiii and 











Appendix 5. The English ships to Tonkin (1672-1697) 
 
IOR/G/12/17/1-10, Tonkin factory records (1672-1697);  IOR/G/21/7, Java factory 
(1677-1707);  IOR/E/3/87-92, Letter Book IV-IX (1666-1697), IOR/L/MAR/A: Ships’ 
Journals 1605-1705; Farrington, A., Catalogue of East India Company ships’ journals 
and logs, 1600-1834 (London, 1999), pp. 169-70, 549, 611, 655, 724; Hoang, A.T., Silk 
for Silver: Dutch-Vietnamese relations, 1637-1700 (Leiden, 2007), pp. 228-229. 
 
Year Number  Name From Description Duration 
1672 1  Zante Frigate London-
Bantam 
180 tons 27/5 – 
27/6/1672 
1676 1  Flying Eagle London-
Bantam 
120 tons 26/6/1676- 
25/1/1677 
1677 1 Flying Eagle Bantam 120 tons 7-12/1677 
1678 1  Formosa Bantam 200 tons, 
20 crew, 8 guns 
12/7- 
24/12/1678 
1679 1  Formosa London-
Surat- 
Bantam 
200 tons, 20 crew, 
8 guns 
? – 15/12/1679 
1680 1  Advice Bantam 100/150 tons ? 26/7-
10/12/1680 ? 
1681 1  Taiwan Frigate Bantam 140 tons 
24 crew, 8 guns 
5/7 – 
20/12/1681 




180 tons, 36 crew, 
18/24 guns 














1685 1  Dragon London-
Acheh 
180 tons, 36 crew, 
18 guns 
10 or 12/1685 
– 2/1686 ??? 
1686 3 Rainbow London 250 tons, 37/50 
crew, 18/24 guns 
11/6/1686-
6/1/1687 
Prospect Madras  26/8 - ??? 
Tywan Siam ?? Private N/A 
1687 2  Tywan Siam private ships N/A 
Bona Vista Porto Nova N/A 
1688 3 Rainbow London 250 tons, 37/50 
crew, 18/24 guns 
7/1688-
13/1/1689 
Saphire Frigate Madras N/A N/A 
Curtana ??? private ship N/A 
1692 1 ??? Madras N/A N/A 
1693 1  Pearl Frigaet Madras 80 tons, 25 crew, 
16 guns ??? 
6/9/1693-
19/1/1695 
1697 1  Mary Bowyer 
Frigate 





Appendix 6. The EIC’s investment in Tonkin (1672-1697) (Spanish dollars) 
 
Source: IOR/G/12/17/1-10, Tonkin factory records (1672-1697); IOR/G/21/7, Java 
factory (1677-1707);  IOR/E/3/87-92, Letter Book IV-IX (1666-1697), Buch, ‘La 
Compagnie’ (1937), and Ma, English trade in the South China Sea. 
 
Year Investment Result Year Investment Result 
1672 4,516 0 1685 2,750 N/A 
1673 0 0 1686 10,000 17,297 
1674 0 0 1687 0 0 
1675 0 0 1688 N/A N/A 
1676 3,955 6,791 1689 0 0 
1677 8,750 9,490 1690 N/A N/A 
1678 11,209 12,194 1691 0 0 
1679 13,750 15,598 1692 0 0 
1680 N/A N/A 1693 N/A N/A 
1681 N/A 11,869 1694 0 0 
1682 3,000 9,449 1695 0 0 
1683 2,744.6 6,957 1696 0 0 








Appendix 7.1. The EIC’s goods in the Zante Frigate to Tonkin in 1672 
 
IOR/G/12/17/1, Tonkin general, 5 July 1672, pp. 7b-8a. 
 
29 bales English cloth 6 pes each 
8 bales of English Stuffs (22 or 23 pieces/bale, each) 
8 pieces about 40 couetts 
1 chest Looking glasses  
1 chest Scales of weights  
16 chests Brimstones 
107 pigs of Lead of about 257 peculs 
10 Great guns  
4 Casks of Arrack 
3 bales of Dungarees (100 pieces/each) 
1 bale of long cloth (30 pieces) 
2 bales of Cambay cloth (100 pieces) 
2 bales of slaue cloth  
1 bale of red salloes 
2 bales of Chintz Coddy 
2 bales of Chintz dungum broads, 120 pieces/each 
1 bale of salampares (80 pieces) 
1 chest of Corral (about 100 cattees) 
1 bale Salloes junah (400 pieces) 
1 bale of fine English cloth for the King present 
1 box of Knives  
1 bale of Musters  
618 peculs of pepper  
159 peculs of sandalwood (1000 pieces) 








Appendix 7.2. Goods from Madras to Tonkin in the Pear Frigate in 1693 
 
IOR/G/12/17/9, Tonkin general, 21 September 1693, p. 325b. 
 
10 cask coppria 4,5 carge long cloth 
2 half pieces fine broad cloth  4 ditto sallampores 
1 piece aurora 1 flowered mulmuls 
1 piece yellow broad cloth  6 peculs spapefine 
3 fine perpetuation  1 carge ditto orandw 
2 pieces morees 19 string amber  
4 ditto sannees 1 chest rose water 
1 carge jamwars 25 bales of several goods 
2 chest small Persia carpets 255 baggs of saltpetre 
1.5 carge Dutch long cloth 3 Private carpets rose water 

















Appendix 8. The EIC’s gifts for the King and Crown Prince of Tonkin in the first 
time they arrived in this kingdom, July 1672 
 
IOR/G/12/17/1, Tonkin factory, July 1672, pp. 6a-b. 
 
For King For Crown Prince 
3 pieces fine cloth (scarlet, black, vermillion) 2 pieces fine cloth (scarlet, black) 
10 sword blades  6 sword blades 
12 agate hafted knives 6 amber hafted knives 
2 half cases of amber hafted knives 6 agate hafted knives 
1 silver wired tweezers 1 silver wired tweezers 
1 three barrelled birding  
10 bottles of rose water 5 bottles rose water 
2 taker guns 1 great taker gun 
1 three barrelled pistol 1 two barreled pistol 
1 Staff gun  1 two barreled gun 
1 large looking glass 3 looking glass 















Appendix 9. The EIC’s orders from London towards Tonkin factory in the trading 
season 1678/79 
 
IOR/G/12/17/5, Tonkin factory 1678-1679, pp. 230b- 231a; IOR/E/3/88, Letter book V 
1672-1678, p. 243. 
 
 Velvets: 300 pieces (100 crimson and cornation, 100 perfect grafs green, 100 
sky colour);  
 Pelangs 16500 pieces (10,000 white, 1,000- yellow, sky colour, cornation, 
perfect grafs green, 500-haze colour, 2000 perfect white plaine),  
 Choses plain 5000 pieces (broasest sort sky colourm yellow, cornation, white, 
grafs green);  
 Hockins 2500 pieces (white, yellow, sky colour, cornation, grafs green);  
 Peniascoes 2000 pieces;  
 Loes of plain corte 1500 pieces (perfact black 1000, yellow 500);  
 Ditto flower 1000 pieces (white, perfect black);  
 Ditto yellow 1500 pieces (yellow, sky colour, cornation);  
 Thea Ming Whing 1000 pieces (white, perfect black, yellow, sky colour, 
cornation);  
 Damask 4000 pieces with 15 or 30 long per piece (1000 perfect white, 1500 
crimson cornation, vallonves 1000, sky colour 500);  
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